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This book reviews the process of  corporate lending in support of  bankers and financial managers in their decisions on lending or borrowing debt capital. The authors observed the near chaotic conditions in the 
credit markets beginning in 2008, and concluded that is was time for a book on the concepts and processes of  
bank lending to companies. Whether the reader is a practicing bank lender or involved in corporate finance, 
this book demonstrates how various factors influence credit, funding, pricing decisions and proper structur-
ing of  loan agreements. We focus on the most important issues confronting financial and banking managers 
today, with the discussion of  the financial processes used to formulate decisions and analyze the strengths 
and weaknesses of  credit metrics.
Managers, regulators and senior government officials have lived through the failure of  Lehman Brothers 
and other organizations; the forced acquisitions of  Merrill Lynch, Wachovia Bank and many other firms; 
the decline in the Federal Reserve’s  benchmark lending rate to nearly zero; and official U.S. unemployment 
hovering just below 10%. To survive, companies have been forced to make drastic changes in hiring, product 
development, expenses, and of  particular interest to our reader, in their management of  working capital. 
There are survival issues for companies and their banks if  there were excessive use of  debt that cannot be 
serviced in a business downturn.
The Impact of Debt
 Companies have only a few choices in financing: new bank debt, bonds or equity; after-tax profits placed 
in retained earnings; the sale of  assets or portions of  the business; and the restructuring of  existing financings. 
The choice of  the financing method drives strategic business choices and affects the long-term structure of  a 
company’s balance sheet. Here are some examples.




° Borrowing to improve an equity position. Interest rates are currently so low that compa-
nies are borrowing to pay dividends to stockholders and repurchase stock in an attempt 
to drive up the price of  their shares. Microsoft issued three-year bonds at rates below 
one percent in 2010 partially for this purpose.4
Credit decisions critically affect companies and banks, and can cause a national economy to stumble. The 
intervention in the markets by the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve and Congress in 2008 was based on 
fears of  systemic collapse, and the rescue of  commercial and investment banks was unprecedented since the 
Great Depression.
Concept of the Book
In developing a handbook approach for this book, several factors have been considered to assist the reader.
• Chapters have been kept to a manageable length, typically 5,500 to slightly more than 6,000 
words.
• Some accounting and financial knowledge is assumed and therefore not repeated. For ex-
ample, we do not discuss the basic financial statements (the balance sheet and income state-
ment) nor do we explain concerns of  working capital or capital budgeting.
• Comprehensive teaching cases are provided in the text material as illustrations of  good and 
bad banking practice. The purpose of  these cases is to demonstrate real-life situations that 
involve various management issues concerning problems in lending. See the “Introduction to 
Corporate Lending Cases” that begins that section.
In planning the content, the authors and publisher had in mind the needs of  several types of  readers:
• Current managers and bankers who need a succinct, well-written reference, particularly in the 
context of  greater emphasis by bank examiners on appropriate lending practices.
• New financial managers and bankers, given the greatly reduced focus on internal bank credit 
training.
4  Sapna Maheshwari and Tim Catts, “Microsoft Plans $4.75 Billion, 4-Part Bond Sale,” Bloomberg BusinessWeek, Oct. 16, 2010, at 
www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-22/microsoft-plans-4-75-billion-4-part-bond-sale.html.
• Merger and acquisition activity. When interest rates fall as they did in the 1980s, in the years 
after the recession that began in 2001 and again beginning in mid-2008, the idea of  over-
paying for an acquisition did not seem to matter because the financing cost was less at the 
time of  the transaction than when deals were planned. Remember that even a small change 
in financing costs can translate into a major savings for a business. 
 A $50 million1 deal becomes cheaper by $250,000 a year if  this cost decreases by just one-
half  of  one percent. Furthermore, equity values often rise as interest rates fall, so when the 
pieces of  a company are later sold they fetch more than the entity’s price. These deals may 
become untenable when interest rates rise and/or when equity prices fall.
• Foreign investment. Interest costs are deductible to companies. When foreign investments are 
being considered, an important concern is the tax treatment that will be experienced in the 
host country. Global markets are particularly attractive to U.S. companies for three reasons:
° Many markets are developing capitalistic economies and have vast potential. Just go to any 
recent issue of Bloomberg BusinessWeek or the Wall Street Journal to read stories about the global 
economy. Or go to the CIA’s website to find comparative statistics.2  You will find that the hot 
growth is not in the mature economies but in such developing countries as China (9%), India 
(7½%) and Lebanon (7%). Contrast these results with the U.S. (-2½%) or the U.K. (-5%).3
° The U.S. has the second highest tax structure among developed countries (after Japan) 
and going overseas may result in substantially lower taxes. (This concern was noted by 
presidential candidates during the 2008 election campaign, although it is unlikely that 
Congress will take any action.)
° Labor costs are lower in many countries and educational standards are sometimes higher 
than in the U.S. It is no accident that global outsourcing has become such an attractive 
alternative to domestic operations.
1  All references to dollars ($) in this handbook are to U.S. dollars.
2  At www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.
3  All growth statistics are estimated for 2009 for the real growth rate of  gross domestic product (GDP).




• Lear Corporation to analyze the issues in analyzing an industry of  derived demand manufac-
turing (automobile parts)
• Florida Turnpike, to demonstrate some of  the issues in governmental project finance
These cases were chosen from the fifty or so that the authors use in their university teaching and profes-
sional seminars on bank credit decision-making.
The Authors
The authors are James Sagner, PhD and Herbert Jacobs, both of  whom reside and work in the New York 
City area. Former bankers, they are the principals of  Bank Credit Training Partners, a firm that specializes in 
providing credit training seminars to bankers and corporate financial managers.
Sagner teaches MBA and executive education at the Universities of  Bridgeport and North Carolina. He 
led the Consulting Services Division of  the First National Bank of  Chicago (now J.P. Morgan Chase), and 
has managed over 250 large-scale studies for companies and non-profit organizations worldwide.
He is recognized as an expert in financial management and his clients have included leading insurance 
companies, securities firms, finance companies, banks, hospitals, manufacturing companies and service or-
ganizations. Most recently, he was the author of  Essentials of Working Capital Management (Wiley, 2010). He has 
written six other books in finance and economics. He speaks regularly at professional conferences and has 
published some fifty papers and articles.
Jacobs is a consultant to the banking industry and an Adjunct Professor at New York University, teach-
ing graduate courses in financial statement analysis, term lending and negotiating loan agreements. He was 
the General Manager of  DEPFA Bank, and previously was Senior Analyst and Manager in Security Valuation 
Office of  N.A.I.C. and a Senior Vice President of  HSBC. During his tenure with these institutions, he served 
on various credit committees and ran credit training programs in the U.S. and Europe. He is a Member of  
the Board of  Directors of  College Loan Corporation.
• Members of  allied professions, including accountants, information technology specialists, 
marketing and production managers and others who need to expand their knowledge base.
• Readers outside of  the U.S. who either plan to do business here or are observing their 
economy as evolving into a U.S.-type of  capitalism.
outline of the Book
 This handbook is presented in nine chapters supplemented by eight cases, one each in Chapters 1, 4 and 9, 
and five at the end of  the text material with suggested solutions. Except for the cases in Chapters 4 and 9, the 
cases are derived from actual situations using real company or organizational names. The first chapter provides an 
introduction to the subject of  the book, and provides an overview of the process of  corporate lending. The next 
chapters (2 through 4) review recent trends in commercial loan activity, the credit process and credit analysis.
Chapters 5 and 6 outline the credit agreements that banks require to protect their position in the loan 
with particular emphasis on loan covenants. Risk management techniques in administering the bank loan 
portfolio are presented in Chapter 7, and Chapter 8 provides a discussion of  credit in the context of  21st cen-
tury relationship banking. Chapter 9 examines the role of  the senior financial manager in analyzing alternative 
financial and non-financial considerations in a business situation.
The cases were chosen to provide a broad range of  corporate lending experience, because compa-
nies and industries vary widely as to stress points and critical factors. The Chapter 1 case is O’Reilly 
Automotive, which sells replacement and repair parts to the retail market and requires a renewal of  its 
credit facility. The Chapter 4 case is Barely Edible (fictional), an upscale sandwich-type chain in need of  
new capital. The Chapter 9 case is Appliance Station (fictional), a manufacturer of  consumer durables 
whose board of  directors is considering a major capital expansion. In the cases section of  this handbook, 
we have included the following:
• Three chemical manufacturing companies to demonstrate variations in financial results with-
in the same industry
• Krispy Kreme, illustrating too aggressive sales and receivables policies
• Coldwater Creek, showing the cyclicality of  retail women’s fashions




This chapter discusses the following topics:
1. Corporate lending: is it selling or the management of  risk?
2. The banker’s role in commercial banking
3. The impact of  financial deregulation
4. Introductory case: O’Reilly Automotive
5. The response of  banks to competitive pressures
6. Actions by financial managers to changes in capital markets
7. The credit crisis of  2008-2010
During the recent credit crisis, government officials at such agencies as the U.S. Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve Board appeared to flip-flop in applying tourniquets aimed at stopping the financial bleeding, i.e., first 
saving Bear Stearns and then abandoning Lehman Brothers. The gyrations were such that some observers were 
heard to remark that it was policy set by “deal”.  It is our collective experience that corporate banking displays 
comparable behavior, in that it is more lending by deal than lending using a cohesive, synchronized strategy 
that joins the loan agreement to credit approval.
leNDING: SellING VS. MANAGING rISk
For most financial institutions today, lending is a two-step process that often is separate from the credit 
review process. For example, credit approvals for large loans at commercial banks either pass through a com-
mittee or up a chain of  loan officers. In an ideal situation, the credit proposal delineates the inherent risks to 
the transaction; however, the thrust of  the credit approval is more often to sell the deal internally. As such, 
Research support was provided by Lyubena Trendafilova. She is Sagner’s graduate assistant and an MBA 
student at the University of  Bridgeport, who assisted in developing the financial analysis for the suggested 
solutions in the cases.
Disclaimers and Acknowledgements
Some of  the cases in this text are based on Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings of  pub-
licly-traded corporations in its EDGAR database, although certain facts were modified. See the chapter 
“Introduction to Corporate Lending Cases” for the citation. Earlier versions of  material in this book were 
presented in various forums by Sagner who wishes to acknowledge the following:
• “How to Measure and Manage Liquidity Today,” Journal of Corporate Accounting. and Finance, 
Nov.-Dec.  2009
• “Bank Loan Covenants: Measures and Mis-measures,” North American Journal of Finance and 
Banking Research, Volume 3, No. 3, 2009
• “Bank Transparency: Cost of  Capital & Return on Credit Issues,” paper presented at the 
Midwest Finance Association annual meeting, Las Vegas, Feb. 2010
• “A Quick Guide to Bank Lines of  Credit,” Journal of Corporate Accounting. and Finance, Nov.–Dec. 
2010
• “ ‘Shotgun’ Bank M&As,” Journal of Corporate Accounting. and Finance, Jan.-Feb. 2011.
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Commercial banks make a significant portion of  their income on the spread between the interest rates 
paid to depositors and the rates charged to borrowers; other revenues come from fee income derived from 
noncredit products.6  Interest rates are critical factors in bank and business decision-making.
• Banks and financial institutions attempt to make a profit on the spread between the cost 
of  funds and the interest rate charged to borrowers. As interest rates rise, borrowers may 
become more stressed in servicing their debt, that is, in making required payments of  the 
principal amount borrowed and the interest due each period.
• Business is concerned about the level of  interest rates because changes in financing costs 
requires the reevaluation of  capital programs to determine if  target returns will be met.  In 
addition, rising interest costs drain liquidity and could cause problems with certain ratios 
specified in loan covenants.
Until the credit crisis that began in 2008, this rate volatility caused banks to write a large number of  
their commercial loans at variable rates rather than as a fixed interest quote. Since that time, banks have more 
carefully scrutinized corporate borrowers and companies have reported some difficulty in obtaining loans. 
However, the use of  derivatives does allow financial institutions to offer fixed rate pricing as well as variable 
rate pricing.
Philosophy of the Book
This book offers a comprehensive framework for managing the corporate lending process. Our ap-
proach suggests coordination in business credit decision-making, not the suboptimal mismatching of  
calling – largely a sales and financial analysis effort – and risk management – primarily a credit review and 
legal effort. Using case studies developed for banking courses at a leading U.S. graduate university, we ask the 
reader to identify the problem areas in individual loan requests. After identification of  these risks, consider-
ation is focused on protections for the lender as developed in the loan agreement. Our solutions are detailed 
in the book appendix.
6  Noncredit services are discussed in Chapter 8.
the credit proposal, if  it does err, errs in overselling the strengths of  the credit and in underestimating the 
risks in the transaction.
Conversely, the loan agreement needs to focus on the risks and not the strengths of  the credit arrange-
ment. However, much of  the documentation effort is handled by the law department that drafts the agree-
ment. Often the reference document used in drafting these agreements is the memo approving and selling the 
credit, which is not the ideal starting point.
What Do Bankers Do?
Banks provide credit and various noncredit services to businesses.5 Credit activities may be in the form 
of  short- or long-term loans; leases; letters of  credit; the issuance of  commercial paper, notes or bonds and 
various other arrangements; and are extended to finance both operational and capital budgeting requirements. 
Exhibit 1-1 shows sources of  business capital for new, start-up companies, primarily equity, and for estab-
lished firms, a mix of  debt and equity.
5  A variety of  financial institutions are now permitted to provide credit activities, including commercial banks, securities 
firms, commercial finance companies and insurers. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of  1999 ended all restrictions on financial 
service activities. 




 Bankers began to develop sophisticated costing systems beginning about 1980, and close analysis showed 
that lending to large corporations did not meet bank target return-on-equity (ROE), especially compared to 
the fees investment bankers were earning on corporate finance activities. Some banks are turning away bor-
rowers, while others are demanding higher interest rates, more revenue and greater returns. The credit situa-
tion has changed to a lenders’ (sellers’) market from a borrowers’ (buyers’) market7 driven by various factors 
including:
• The reduction in the number of  banks by more than half  since 1980 (due largely to changes 
in the law allowing interstate banking mergers).
• The significant losses experienced by banks and other financial institutions in the 2008–
2009 period due to inadequate loan review, insufficient collateral and the sale (“syndica-
tion”) of  loans to investors hoping for above-average returns but without real knowledge of  
the borrower.
 As a result, corporate executives have become the traveling salespeople of  the business world, taking 
their road shows to rating agencies, lenders, investment bankers and journalists to sell their “stories.” Because 
of  the reluctance of  banks to accept credit business, the number of  potential credit contacts has had to be 
significantly increased, sweetened by promises to reassign noncredit business from banks that had long-time 
relationships with borrowers.
 In one case, a New York Stock Exchange-listed company that enjoyed a 100-year affiliation with a money 
center bank was told that the previous levels of  credit would no longer be available, despite an investment-
grade rating and a stable balance sheet. Regional banks in the relationship provided some relief, but the total 
desired credit was not attained.
THe o’reIllY AuToMoTIVe CASe
In this book we present several cases that are illustrative of  the corporate lending process, with solutions 
in the appendix. This first case is relatively straight forward and is intended to expose the reader to the typical 
situation faced by experienced loan officers. Assume that you work for a major money center bank that has been 
7  A sellers’ market exists when the seller determines the conditions in the marketplace; a buyers’ market is when the buyer 
controls. As an example, the residential real estate market in early 2008 is clearly a buyers’ market in most communities.
We spend much of  the book on the mechanics of  lending, particularly the loan agreement. This docu-
ment is the contract between the borrowing company and the lender. Its significance cannot be overstated; 
any failure to comply with loan agreement provisions constitutes a source of  actionable relief  for the banker. 
The borrower must constantly monitor compliance to avoid default, and if  business conditions deteriorate, 
should immediately inform the lending institution of  the situation.
THe reGulATorS AND DereGulATIoN
Because banks accept deposits from individuals and companies, there has been a long history of  super-
vision by government agencies. The three important regulators of  the American banking system are noted 
below:
• The Office of  the Comptroller of  the Currency (OCC), the first important bank regulator, 
was created in 1863. The OCC grants charters to national banks and is directly responsible 
for their regulation and supervision.
• The Federal Reserve System (the Fed) was created in 1913 as the central bank for the U.S. 
The Fed oversees financial institution activity and takes various actions to ensure the integ-
rity of  the banking system.
• The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was created in the Glass-Steagall Act 
of  1933 as the result of  widespread bank failures and the resulting losses to depositors. 
The agency provides insurance on deposits on amounts of  up to $250,000 per personal or 
corporate account at insured financial institutions. 
The Business Impact of financial Deregulation
 Through most of  the twentieth century, commercial banks were prohibited from operating outside their 
traditional activities – accepting deposits and making loans – and from locating facilities outside their state 
of  domicile; see the discussion in Chapter 2. Business line restrictions were eliminated by legislation just 
before the turn of  the century, allowing banks, securities firms, insurers and finance companies to pursue any 
potentially profitable financial service activity.




O’Reilly is one of  the largest specialty retailers of  automotive aftermarket parts, tools, supplies, equip-
ment and accessories in the U.S., selling its products to both do-it-yourself  customers and professional 
installers.  On December 31, 2009, the company operated 3,421 stores in 38 states. The stores carry an 
extensive product line, including, but not limited to, the following products:
• New and remanufactured automotive hard parts, such as alternators, starters, fuel pumps, 
water pumps, brake system components, batteries, belts, hoses, chassis parts and engine parts
• Maintenance items, such as oil, antifreeze, fluids, filters, wiper blades, lighting, engine addi-
tives and appearance products
• Accessories, such as floor mats, seat covers and truck accessories
• A complete line of  auto body paint and related materials, automotive tools
The stores average approximately 7,000 total square feet in size. They are served primarily by the near-
est distribution center, but they also have access to the broader selection of  inventory available at one of  
O’Reilly’s nearly 200 master inventory stores. In addition to serving do-it-yourself  and professional installer 
customers in their markets, master inventory stores also supply other stores within the contiguous area, pro-
viding access to a large selection of  inventory on a same-day basis.
O’Reilly leases certain office space, retail stores, property and equipment under long-term, non- cancellable 
operating leases. Most of  these leases include renewal options. On December 31, 2009, future minimum 
rental payments under all of  the operating leases for the next five years average about $175.000 million, de-
clining to $126,223 million by 2014. Rental expense amounted to $226.049 million, $142.363 million and 
$55.358 million for the years ended December 31, 2009, 2008, and 2007, respectively.
A Meeting with the Cfo
In your meeting with O’Reilly, the desire to replace BAC was stated as due primarily to what the 
chief  financial officer (CFO) asserts are onerous terms. She literally ranted about the requirement for 
bank debt to be secured, noting that annual profits for the past three years were roughly $193 million in 
2007, $186 million in 2008 and $307 million in 2009. She went on to say that in the last two years, 
interest expense was a paltry $26 million in 2008 and $45 million in the last fiscal year. Pre-tax income 
approached by O’Reilly Automotive (stock symbol: ORLY) regarding your possible interest in replacing Bank 
of  America (stock symbol: BAC) as its lender. The basic details of  the existing loan structure are noted below.
o’reilly’s Credit requirements and Business
On July 11, 2008, in connection with the acquisition of  a complementary company, O’Reilly entered 
into a credit agreement for a five-year $1.2 billion asset-based revolving credit facility arranged by Bank of  
America (BAC). This credit is comprised of  a five-year $1.2 billion revolving credit facility which matures on 
July 10, 2013. As of  March 31, 2010, O’Reilly had outstanding borrowings of  $593.2 million. As part of  
the credit, O’Reilly has pledged substantially all of  its assets as collateral and is subject to an ongoing con-
solidated leverage ratio covenant, with which O’Reilly has complied. For balance sheet data, see Exhibit 1-2.




o’reIllY AuToMoTIVe: THe CrITICAl ISSueS
Here are 15 important factors in the O’Reilly case. Throughout this book we provide explanations of  im-
portant terms and concepts used, examine issues relevant to a lending decision, and provide in-depth analysis 
of  banker and corporate financial manager concerns.
The financial Statements
1. What about the balance sheet? Is it clean, that is, free of  debt?  If  we measure debt by long 
term debt-to-invested capital, the result is $596.710 million ÷ $3.397 million or 17.6%, 
which is very low. Total debt to net worth is calculated as $2.037 million ÷ $2.800 million, 
or a paltry 72.8%.
2. Does the company have adequate liquidity (cash) and cash flow? The standard ratios measur-
ing liquidity are the current ratio (CR) and the quick ratio (QR). O’Reilly’s CR is 1.78 times 
as compared to the industry’s 1.4. The QR is 0.26 times as contrasted to the industry’s 0.4. 
This indicates ample liquidity but a need to better control inventory levels; see question 12.8
 Cash flow examines sources and uses of  cash, with a particular focus on primary sources – 
net income and depreciation – and primary uses – capital expenditures, dividends and debt 
principal repayments. If  primary sources consistently exceed primary uses, the company 
can service debt through internal sources. Otherwise, O’Reilly can only repay through a 
refinancing.
3. Is there any one item on the balance sheet that concerns you? As of  March 31, 2010, book 
net worth is about $2.8 billion. If  we deducted goodwill ($743.824 million) from book 
net worth, the result would be tangible net worth of  $2.056 million. As a result, when we 
calculate total debt-to-tangible net worth we get $2.037 million/$2.056 million or about 
100%. This compares to the industry average (median) of  270%.
8  We discuss ratios in Chapter 5. The source of  industry data for the ratios in the O’Reilly case is Annual Statement Studies, Risk 
Management Association (RMA), Automotive Parts and Accessories Stores, NAICS code 441310, for the largest compa-
nies (sales of  $25 million or more).
for those two years was $496 million and $303 million producing EBIT coverage, per the CFO, that was 
“off  the charts”. O’Reilly is looking for an unsecured loan facility to replace BAC. For income statement 
data, see Exhibit 1-3.
As a senior loan officer for your bank, you are expected to produce a counteroffer but not necessarily 
what O’Reilly has requested. Critical to your proposal are the terms and conditions you will require of  the 
borrower. In your analysis, consider the following issues:
1. Would you be willing to lend unsecured to O’Reilly?
2. What do you think would be the most important terms and conditions and explain your 
reasoning. For instance, should a minimum debt service ratio be part of  the agreement?
3. In your analysis, detail what you think are the key risks to lending to O’Reilly and explain 
how your terms and conditions will mitigate those risks.




7. What about the level of  fixed charge coverage? We don’t have annual earnings for the com-
pany but we have annual lease expense of  $214 million. If  we can assume that pre-tax, pre-
rent and pre-interest expense is roughly four times $170 million (the quarterly results) or 
$680 million plus about $220 million in rent, the total is $900 million. Divide that by $214 
million plus $40 million in interest expense and EBIRT (earnings before interest, rent and 
taxes) coverage calculates to 3.6 times, certainly acceptable but not overly high. In contrast, 
the industry’s coverage is 6.0 times.
 What if  we capitalize the leases, how does that affect things? At what rate do we capitalize? 
Consider leasing as an alternative to debt. Leases generally run ten years or even longer, and 
as a rule of  thumb, are often capitalized at ten times. If  we do that, we add $2.14 billion 
to debt and now we have debt to worth at say $4.2 billion against tangible net worth of  $2 
billion or leverage of  2 times!
8. Would we want to see budgets and plans? New store plans would be useful; we would also 
want to see same store sales, information on worst stores and planned remedial actions, and 
monthly results. Would you not want to ask the company for their expansion plans, how 
they measure a store’s success and/or failure? Would you not want to know what stores are 
exceeding expectations and which are not exceeding expectations and how they decide when 
to close a store that is not meeting expectations?
The Competition and the retail Market
9. Are there positive opportunities? What are they? Two of  the most important opportunities 
are noted below.
• Aging of  vehicles on the road. As the average age of  a vehicle increases, the vehicle goes 
through more routine maintenance cycles requiring replacement parts such as brakes, 
belts, hoses, batteries and filters. As reported by the Automotive Aftermarket Industry 
Association (“AAIA”), the average age of  the U.S. vehicle population has increased about 
one year over the past decade. Due to difficult economic conditions and better engi-
neered vehicles, it is expected that this trend will continue.
4. How profitable is the company? Are primary internal sources greater than primary internal 
uses? What do we mean by primary sources and uses? Pre-tax profits-to-tangible net worth in 
the latest quarter calculates as 7.7%; the industry’s was 20.6%. Pre-tax profits to total assets 
were 3.3%; the industry’s was 3.8%. Primary sources of  funds are usually net income and 
depreciation. Some analysts also include any increase in deferred income taxes if  the amount 
is significant. Primary uses are capital expenditures, dividends, acquisition costs and debt 
repayment. The low profitability may be due to insufficient leverage; see question 1.
5. How about interest expense coverage? It looks sensational, does it not? Pre-tax and pre-inter-
est expense income is $169.355 million and interest expense is a paltry $10.879 million, so 
fixed charge coverage is an outstanding 15.567 times compared to the industry’s 2.4 times.
6. Is O’Reilly capital intensive? A capital intensive industry requires a large portion of  financ-
ing to buy plant and equipment compared to labor costs. For O’Reilly, there is a low capi-
tal requirement, as it is a retailer whose largest costs are leases of  stores, and warehouses 
(discussed in question 7) and inventory. A low capital commitment is desirable for lenders, 
because a future default will not require the forced sale of  significant amounts of  fixed assets 
at a fraction of  their book value. A summary of  cash sources and uses is provided in Exhibit 
1-4. With the exception of  a major debt refinancing in fiscal 2008, primary sources roughly 
match primary uses.




to accept returns of  excess inventory, could affect profitability. O’Reilly believes that the 
extended nature of  the life cycle of  its products is such that the risk of  obsolescence is 
minimal. The industry has developed sophisticated systems for monitoring the life cycle of  
products and has historically been very successful in adjusting the volume of  inventory in 
conjunction with a decrease in demand.
The loan Agreement
13. Do you envision O’Reilly generating surplus cash flow that will repay the loan? In Chapter 
4 we review the construction of  the cash flow statement. For our current purposes, suffice it 
to say that the company has positive operating cash flow in the amount of  some $750 mil-
lion offset by about $300 million in payments for financing activities. Investments in plant 
and equipment (now about $350 million) could be deferred should there be any difficulty 
in repaying the loan.9
14. What about covenants in the credit agreement? Would you want to analyze O’Reilly’s com-
petitors using various measures to determine if  the company is stronger or weaker than its 
competitors? Specific covenants could include minimum ratio performance for liquidity, 
activity turnover (such as inventory turns), leverage and profitability.
15. Should an unsecured loan be offered if  certain objectives were reached? If  unsecured, would 
you charge more in interest spreads above the standard benchmark? The loan should be 
offered as O’Reilly is a desirable client with an adequate business strategy and sufficient 
profitability to repay the loan. Earnings can actually be improved with additional financial 
leverage, which has a lower after-tax cost than equity. An unsecured loan could be justified at 
a 50 basis point higher spread over a benchmark rate (see Chapter 5) than a secured loan.
9 Extrapolated from data in “Condensed Consolidated Statements of  Cash Flows,” O’Reilly 10-Q, for March 31 2010, page 
5, at www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/898173/000119312510113014/d10q.htm.
• Unperformed maintenance. According to estimates compiled by the AAIA, the annual 
amount of  unperformed or underperformed maintenance in the U.S. totaled $50 bil-
lion for 2008. This metric represents the degree to which routine vehicle maintenance 
recommended by the manufacturer is not being performed.
10. What about the competition? Are price or market share significant issues? Competitors in-
clude auto parts chains, repair shops, and auto dealers, in addition to discount stores, hard-
ware stores, supermarkets, drugstores, and convenience stores.  Two prominent competitors 
are Autozone and Pep Boys.
• Autozone believes that expansion opportunities in underserved markets. The company 
attempts to obtain high visibility sites in high traffic locations and to this end, under-
takes substantial research prior to entering new markets. The most important criteria for 
opening a new store are its projected future profitability and its ability to achieve their 
required investment hurdle rate.
• Pep Boys is more concerned with vendor relationships than is Autozone due to its 
smaller size and lesser capital position. A disruption of  vendor relationships could have 
a material adverse effect on its business results. Disruptions could occur due to financial 
difficulties that vendors may face, increasing the cost of  the products purchased from 
them.
11. Could the geographic concentration of  O’Reilly’s stores impact its business success? 
Approximately 30% of  O’Reilly’s stores are located in Texas and California. The business 
is sensitive to the economic and weather conditions of  those regions. Unusually inclement 
weather has historically discouraged customers from visiting the stores during the affected 
period causing reduced sales. A number of  competitors have more financial resources, are 
more geographically diverse or have better name recognition, which might place O’Reilly at 
a competitive disadvantage.
12. Is inventory a particular risk? This industry historically has been able to return excess items 
to vendors for credit. Future changes in vendors, in their policies or in their willingness 




• Opportunities for cross-selling. Complementary marketing prospects will be significant, be-
cause the largest banks can offer a nearly complete array of  financial services to corporate 
customers. However, various studies have shown that the average bank customer currently 
buys only about two products, and some banks offer customization for their priority corpo-
rate customers, resulting in the creation of  unique and costly services.12
• Portfolio risk diversification. Financial institutions will be able to better diversify their asset 
holdings to reduce portfolio risk and more accurately predict the expected enterprise return. 
A large, globally diversified financial services company may be able to generate a higher 
return than a smaller competitor if  governed by prudent controls. As a result, the larger in-
stitution can fulfill its commitments to meet highly liquid claims – such as those associated 
with demand deposit (checking) accounts – with little risk – enhancing its attractiveness to 
potential investors and business partners. However, the recent losses at Citibank and Merrill 
Lynch clearly show that much more work needs to be done in developing acceptable levels 
of  risk management; see Chapter 6.
financial Managers respond
It is unlikely that Congress or the regulators will ever force banks to increase lending to existing and/or 
prospective borrowers. After all, banks are independent companies, answerable to stockholders and deposi-
tors. Financial managers must consider and promote nontraditional alternatives to traditional loan sources.
• Capital rationing. In an atmosphere of  strict capital rationing, an acceptable level of  total 
investment is determined and projects are then funded based on returns, critical to the mis-
sion of  the company, and any other extenuating circumstances (for example, regulatory or 
safety requirements or the impending obsolescence of  an existing asset). Not every worthy 
project can be funded.
12 From studies by Booz, Allen & Hamilton and First Union Bank (now Wachovia Bank); cited in “Empty Aisles at the Finan-
cial Supermarket,” BusinessWeek, Nov. 8, 1999, page 40. Studies conducted by the authors for banking clients confirm these 
results.
WHAT SHoulD BANkS AND fINANCIAl MANAGerS Do?
 The opportunities for efficiencies and broadened product offerings will drive global financial service 
consolidation for decades. For example, in one recent situation, the merger between Commerce Bank (U.S.) 
and Toronto Dominion (TD) Bank (Canada) was concluded for $8.5 billion.
Banks respond
 In the near-term, banks will be building up their capital to compensate for recent loan losses. Beyond that 
period, profitable merger and acquisition (M&A) deals are likely to be sought. Once the recent credit prob-
lems are past, deals are likely to resume between banks, diversified financial service companies and securities 
firms, given the ROEs of  banks (15%), diversified financials (15%) and securities firms (19%). They will be 
harder to make for insurance companies, which have an average ROE of  13%.10
 The motivations for these transactions include the elimination of  costs, the enhanced opportunities for 
the cross-selling of  products, and the opportunity to diversify portfolio risk.
• Elimination of  costs. Increased returns are expected when scrapping such duplicate costs 
as systems, offices, staff  and marketing and by the control of  prices charged as the 
industry emerges into oligopoly11 from its current posture of  significant competition. 
However, there have been numerous situations where financial businesses were acquired 
in which the acquirer had no real expertise and/or where a clash of  cultures and sheer 
incompetence were serious impediments. Examples include the recent investment by 
nonbanking institutions in subprime mortgages and credit card portfolios and large 
insurers that are offering banking services.
10 The weighted average ROE for the insurance companies reported in Fortune categories 36 through 39, including life and 
health mutual and stock companies, and property and casualty mutual and stock companies. ROEs reported directly in-
clude: banks, industry no. 9; diversified financials, no. 13; and securities firms, no. 58. “Fortune 500 Issue,” Fortune Magazine, 
April 30, 2007, pages F-50 to F-73. Given the credit crisis beginning in 2008, it is no surprise that the results reported 
recently (special issues of  May 5, 2008, May 4, 2009 and May 3, 2010) show generally weaker profitability.
11  An oligopoly is an industry where there are several sellers, any one of  which can affect prices and quantity sold. In a mature 
economy, the oligopolistic form of  competition is most prevalent.




Banks are deemphasizing the role of  the noncredit sales force. Existing noncredit salespeople market 
standard sets of  mature, stand-alone products, with little hope of  extending these products into additional 
marketing opportunities. The trend in banking and in the corporation-banker relationship is for the consoli-
dation to a few, very important relationships. This cannot be accomplished unless the calling officer is highly 
consultative, able to reach senior managers and capable of  offering a full range of  banking services.
THe CreDIT CrISIS AND fINANCIAl DeVeloPMeNTS
The period since 2008 has been tumultuous, with economic changes that would have taken decades in 
normal times. It required years of  lobbying for the two major financial deregulation laws to be enacted. It 
took less than a month to:
• nationalize The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
• rescue and seize control of  AIG, the world’s largest insurer
• extend FDIC coverage to money-market funds and to increase bank deposit guarantees
• temporarily ban short selling in nearly one thousand stocks in the financial industry
• commit to the continuing liquidity of  the commercial paper market; and
• provide $700 billion to make capital injections into financial institutions.14
Who Was to Blame?
Congressional investigations, civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions could take decades to resolve the 
extent of  blame for all of  the mistakes of  judgment. However, it is clear that the major U.S. agencies charged 
with protecting the economy failed to do their jobs:
• The Federal Reserve: for keeping interest rates too low for too long, and for failing to 
consider the systemic risk to the financial system from the combination of  lending, capital 
adequacy, securitization and other practices. We discuss the mechanics of  securitization in 
Chapter 7.
14  These are among the provisions of  the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of  2008.
• Joint ventures. Partnering with direct competitors or companies in allied industries is be-
coming an accepted approach to developing a new product, conducting research, entering 
a new market or pursuing any activity involving a capital investment. Various factors sup-
port partnering, including globalization, the shedding of  noncore competencies, the need 
for rapid response to e-commerce opportunities13 and a generally accommodative antitrust 
policy. As a result, joint ventures and partnerships are becoming viable alternatives to acquir-
ing or building.
• Commercial finance lending. Commercial finance has evolved into a $1+ trillion industry, 
with business loans primarily based on equipment, receivables or other collateral. Such loans 
traditionally have been to subpar borrowers at higher than bank rates, including venture 
finance loans to early-stage high technology and other subpar companies at interest rates 
above that of  banks. Given the tightening bank credit market, some borrowers may be forced 
to accept loans and the higher rates offered by commercial finance companies.
• Innovative financing. Companies must work with banks to redesign traditional lending prod-
ucts. LBOs (leveraged buyouts), the commercial paper dealer and direct issuance, derivatives, 
and other financial products have been developed in the last three decades in response to 
market demand. Similarly, borrower demand for credit will force lenders to offer adequate 
lending facilities to enable business to continue to operate while generating acceptable levels 
of  profits.
Banks react to the Priorities of financial Managers
Bankers are becoming more focused on the needs of  and the incentives driving businesses. Financial 
staffs have been downsized since about the time of  the 2001 recession, and senior managers do not much 
care about, and are not paid to think about, noncredit services. If  a $100 million company can reduce annual 
funding costs by ¼ of  1% (25 basis points [bp]), the annual savings are $250,000. It is hard to conceive of  
noncredit service efficiencies that can possibly have such an impact. Furthermore, bank noncredit salespeople 
are seldom knowledgeable about credit or capital market issues and so will not be of  much help to the com-
pany in providing advice on economic trends or financing alternatives.
13 See James Sagner, Financial and Process Metrics for the New Economy (AMACOM Books, 2001), chapters 2 and 3.




Possible outcomes from the 2008 financial Situation
Inevitably, several changes will be considered by government policymakers and the private sector. Political 
considerations will drive these reforms regardless of  issues relating to free markets and capitalism.
1. Existing regulation. The operational regulator for banks is the Comptroller of  the Currency, 
an agency that has been in existence since the American Civil War. New levels of  examination 
will be required, including loan documentation, verification of  the value of  collateral, proof  
of  earnings and assets, periodic review of  loan performance, and other steps to improve the 
balance sheets of  banks. This should prevent future distressed bank sales like Wachovia Bank 
in 2008, but will inevitably deny credit to marginal borrowers who may be struggling to buy 
their first homes or keep a small business afloat.
2. Government political actions. Government helped create the current financial problems 
largely for political reasons. Some examples:
• to satisfy homeowners: deductions for homeowners on mortgage interest and property taxes 
on residential real estate
• to appeal to those at lower incomes: encouragement to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for 
loans to borrowers with questionable credit histories
• to make borrowers happy: unrealistically low interest rates as set by the Federal Reserve
• to placate business managers: the business deduction for interest on debt
 Political decisions will again be made to satisfy angry constituents and place blame. It is 
difficult to know who will bear the brunt of  this anger, but a reasonable forecast is that the 
financial services industry will be the target. The restoration of  the pre-deregulation regime is 
unlikely – the period before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of  1999 (GLB) – but some changes 
are inevitable. However, we must remember “the law of  unintended consequences” which basi-
cally states that passing new regulations inevitably causes other (and possibly worse) problems.
3. The organization of  regulation. Although functional regulation continues in the financial 
industries, the passage of  deregulation through GLB permits financial companies to enter 
• The Comptroller of  the Currency: for failing to determine that adequate loan documenta-
tion and review was being conducted on mortgage loans, as well as on commercial properties 
that may see tenants vacate as consumer spending declines.
• The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): for failing to provide guidelines for the 
financial stability of  securities firms and for failing to police imprudent practices.
• Congress: for pressuring Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into purchasing securitized, highly 
rated tranches (or units of  a pool based on the maturity dates or riskiness of  the loans) of  
marginal borrowers, for failing to provide adequate oversight of  the financial industries and 
for not reorganizing how regulation is administered following the changes in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of  1999.
Does Government know Best?
The major investment banks have formally disappeared, with Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch now owned 
by commercial banks (JPMorgan and Bank of  America respectively), and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
essentially becoming commercial banks. Of course, smaller investment banks exist for regional transactions, but 
the securities industry has been transformed in ways considered unthinkable even a year ago. How could this 
happen and what will be the new look of  the financial system, both with regard to the financial companies pro-
viding the services and the corporations that depend on credit and equity to conduct their business operations?
Financial markets are probably inherently unstable, as banks and other institutions seek new methods 
to enhance the fairly small return from lending or fee-based activities. It is a struggle for a bank to earn one 
percent on its asset base even in prosperous times, and the innovations developed by through quantitative fi-
nance15 were largely intended to enhance these fairly puny returns while limiting the amount of  equity capital 
required to support normal activities.
15  Developments in quantitative finance include the creation of  exotic products made out of  simple lending arrangements like 
mortgages. Securitization became an essential element in the current financial crisis; that is, where a package of  similar types 
of  loans is bundled and sold to any institution or individual seeking higher returns from principal and loan payments than 
is available through other credit products. The buyer then owns the loans and can hold them or resell them to other inves-
tors. A variation is to restructure the package as component parts of  principal repayment and interest, by term and type of  
the loan and by risk. 




in a reelection bid, the relatives of  former cabinet secretaries or other political hacks are poor 
methods to choose Executive Branch senior managers. Just as some states write qualifications 
for cabinet-level positions, the Congress may chose to insist on banking, accounting, legal or 
other agency-specific experience for these critical positions.
any financial area. This situation of  inadequate oversight may have been a major element in 
the 2008 credit crisis and strongly suggests the need for consideration of  a consolidated 
regulatory scheme similar to that used by the Financial Services Authority in the U.K.16 The 
matching of  the integrated strategy permitted by GLB to an appropriate regulatory structure 
has been suggested by former Secretary of  the Treasury Henry Paulson and others, and is 
likely to be considered in a future Congress as the omissions and errors made both by the 
regulators and the companies are investigated.
4. Government market actions. The theory of  the market clearing supply and demand at an 
equilibrium price may not be working in certain situations, and governments cannot stand 
back and watch chaos and instability destroy long-established consumer expectations and 
behaviors. The most obvious recent problem has been with commodities, from metals to en-
ergy to food, although the precise role of  speculators and hoarders has yet to be definitively 
established. In any event, governments will stockpile, subsidize, set price floors and ceilings, 
prosecute and change the procedures by which these products trade.
5. Restrictions on business. Congress is loath to interfere with the free market system and real-
izes that it knows less than business managers how companies should operate.17 The disas-
trous post-World War II experience in Great Britain with nationalization ended with Prime 
Minister Thatcher’s decision to privatize most of  British industry, and we are not about to 
go back to the days of  a Labour Party under Prime Minister Clement Atlee. However, there 
is considerable pressure on executive pay, particularly regarding disclosure and limitations.
6. Government leadership. One of  the most unfortunate outcomes from this entire credit mar-
ket disaster has been the growing recognition of  the weak stewardship at certain of  the 
regulatory agencies that should have been monitoring the situation. The country has two 
strong leaders in Chairman Bernanke at the Federal Reserve and Secretary Geithner at the 
Treasury. Congress may begin to realize that awarding former colleagues who were defeated 
16  For a more complete discussion, see James Sagner, Is U.S. Business Overregulated? How Government Destroys Our Ability to Compete 
Globally, York House Press, 2008, particularly Chapter 7.
17  Most Congressmen have never worked in the corporate world; for statistics on the professions of  the current Congress, see 
“Membership of  the 109th Congress: A Profile,” CRS Report for Congress, pages CRS 3-4, at www.senate.gov/reference/resourc-
es/pdf/RS22007.pdf.
CHAPTER 2:  
RECENT TRENDS IN 
COMMERCIAL LOAN 
ACTIVITY
This chapter discusses the following topics:
1. Changes in U.S. bank regulation
2. Categories of  banks
3. Loan composition of  banks
4. Loan losses
5. Rules on capital adequacy
6. Restrictions on lending
The essential purpose of  any financial institution is to provide intermediation services, that is, to collect 
deposits from corporations and individuals and to lend them to borrowers. Banks offer this activity as their 
field of  expertise, using history, experience and analysis to evaluate the stability of  borrowers and their likeli-
hood of  repayment of  the principal and interest of  the loan. If  banks did not exist, savers would be forced 
to find borrowers to earn a return on their funds, and those borrowers might be of  significantly lower credit 
quality than would be acceptable to bankers.
CHANGeS IN THe reGulATIoN of u.S. BANkING
There have been numerous changes to the environment for lending over the past two decades, and some 
observers believe that those developments have led to the recent credit crisis in global financial markets. In 
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global markets. See Exhibit 2-2 for data on banking in selected countries; the U.S. has only three institutions 
among the largest thirty banks in the world due to past restrictions on growth. In contrast, the emerging 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have seven banks.
regulatory Problems
By about 1990, it became apparent that the legislated restrictions faced by U.S. banks were interfering 
with prudent techniques of  risk management. For example, banks could not establish branches outside of  the 
order to understand these changes, it is necessary to briefly review the steps taken by Congress toward deregu-
lating financial services and then to analyze the impact on the credit provided to corporate borrowers.
u.S. restrictions on National Banking
The laws of  the U.S. that controlled banking activities until the 1990s are summarized in Exhibit 2-1. 
The general intent was to restrict lending and the collection of  deposits to specific geographic and line-of-
business markets, and to prevent any subset of  banks from becoming dominant.
This situation is unique to the U.S., as other countries have historically permitted the formation of  very 
large financial institutions in order to finance the growth of  industrial companies and the expansion into 
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• International competition. American banks faced restrictions on their activities that were 
not encountered by their international competitors. Foreign banks could enter nearly any 
area of  finance, and could buy market share by underpricing their American competitors. 
This became a serious concern by the 1980s, particularly as the cost of  energy began to 
cause serious balance of  trade deficits in the U.S. Although the government (through the 
Department of  Commerce) has strongly supported efforts at exporting, the necessary in-
ternational financing mechanisms (such as letters of  credit) have been more effectively and 
efficiently offered through global banks.
The result was that laws changed in the U.S., permitting a more rational structure of  the financial ser-
vices industries. The Riegle-Neal Act of  1994 allowed full interstate commercial banking by 1997, and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of  1999 permitted commercial and investment banks, and insurance companies to 
enter any financial services line of  business. These actions by the U.S. now parallel the structures of  financial 
services in most developed countries.
THe STruCTure of BANk loANS
Despite these efforts to rationalize the banking system, U.S. financial institutions include participants of  
various sizes, orientations and focuses. Many observers classify these institutions by market focus, using terms 
such as money center or international, regional and community banks.
u.S. Commercial Banking is often organized by Geographic reach
U.S. commercial banking is often organized by geographic reach.
• Money center (international). The term “money center” is used to describe the largest finan-
cial services firms although there is no precise definition. Characteristics include a very large 
balance sheet (perhaps $100 billion or more), and involvement in all types of  commercial 
lending and related services in domestic and international markets.
 Typically the money center bank will have a physical presence in some if  not all of  the major 
financial centers of  the world outside its country of  origin. Money center bank cities include 
state in which they were domiciled (as mandated in the McFadden Act), and in some states (e.g., Illinois) they 
could not do business outside of  their home county (known as unit banking). The effects of  these limitations 
included the following problems:
• Insufficient diversification. A critical element in financial intermediation is the spreading 
of  risk across many borrowers so that the deterioration of  any one sector will not destroy 
a financial institution. For example, it is prudent to construct a commercial loan portfolio 
consisting of  industrial, real estate, agricultural and asset-backed borrowers. However, a bank 
located in a rural downstate Illinois county would primarily encounter farmers as potential 
borrowers and depositors.
 If  there were a failure at harvest time, or an overabundance of  a crop, the economic result 
might be insufficient revenue to repay the loan. If  this condition holds throughout the bank’s 
market, the bank could fail. These conditions actually developed in the late 1920s leading 
to widespread bank failures in the Midwest, ensuing pressure on the New York financial 
markets, and the October 1929 stock market crash.
• Inadequate profitability. Later in the book (Chapter 7) we will examine the profitability of  
banks by selected lines of  business. It is perhaps sufficient to note that any business manager 
will invest in ventures that offer returns higher than the accompanying financing costs (the 
cost of  capital which is discussed in Chapter 4); we refer to this process as capital budgeting.
 As the result, a bank will choose lines-of-business and markets that are profitable and avoid 
those that are marginal. However, the lines-of-business restrictions resulting from the Glass-
Steagall Act prevented banks from pursuing potentially profitable activities such as invest-
ment banking, insurance and venture capital.
 In order to make adequate returns, banks used borrowed funds to write loans, earning a 
small return on each transaction but leveraging the institution far beyond normal business 
practice. This high degree of  financial leverage will enhance profits but jeopardize the integ-
rity of  the institution if  too many loans are in default. 
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lending Activity and the Business Cycle
Bank lending activities vary with the business cycle. Exhibit 2-4 shows that loans as a percentage of  assets 
have increased significantly since the post-World War II prosperity began in the late 1940s, with only slight 
dips during periods of  recession. For example, banks tightened their lending policies in 2008 and 2009, 
partly as a response to the uncertain economic outlook. During this recent period, banks were responding to 
other factors, including the poor quality of  assets on their balance sheets, the implications of  that situation 
for their own capital, and disruptions in capital markets.19
19  Federal Reserve Board, Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. Commercial Banks in 2009, at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin/2010/pdf/bankprofits10.pdf, pages A3-A11.
London, New York, and Tokyo and such other financial locations as Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Toronto, Paris, Chicago and Zurich.
• Super-regional18/regional.  In the U.S., the term “regional bank” describes a mid-sized insti-
tution, of  less than $100 billion in assets but more than $15 billion. Characteristics include 
a significant presence in one or more geographic regions, a small international presence, and 
a fairly extensive retail branch network. Ongoing consolidation in the banking industry peri-
odically results in the merger or acquisition of  a well-known regional bank.
• Community.  Community banks are often locally owned and operated, and typically have less 
than $15 billion in assets. These banks offer the standard banking services, such as checking, sav-
ings, loans and mortgages, and safe deposit boxes, for both consumers and businesses. Lending 
decisions are made locally by people who understand the unique challenges and financial needs 
of the business people and residents who live and work in the community that the bank serves.
As there is no standard categorization by size, activities or other factors, we use the classification system 
of  the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the discussion that follows. Lending activity varies 
by bank size, so these differences are significant.
loans by Bank Size
The categorization of  banks may seem arbitrary, but close examination of  statistics shows that the bal-
ance sheets of  banks vary significantly by purpose and size. While all banks hold loans as the dominant asset, 
large banks tend to hold fewer loans as a percentage of  assets than smaller banks. Exhibit 2-3 provides data 
from the period before the current credit crisis and from current experience.
As can be noted, there is no significant difference in the proportion of  loans and leases from each pe-
riod. This positioning by large banks reflects a greater focus on non-credit products that have the potential 
to generate substantial non-interest income. The packaging of  credit and non-credit services for large and 
middle-market corporations has come to be referred to as “relationship banking” (discussed in Chapter 8).
18  The American Banker defines a super-regional bank as a non-money center bank in the top 100 banking companies in the U.S. 
that has merged across state lines to establish a full commercial banking presence in another state.
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loAN loSSeS
Banks are highly leveraged in terms of  financial capital, with the typical U.S. bank financed about 
ninety percent with debt and only about ten percent with equity; see Exhibit 2-7. (In contrast, an 
industrial company may have 30 to 40 percent debt and 60 to 70 percent equity.) The precise debt-
to-equity position of  an industry can be determined from such sources as RMA and Troy’s Almanac.20 
On average, U.S. banks have significantly higher levels of  equity capital than their European and 
Asian competitors; see Exhibit 2-8. This is notable as international rules require banks to maintain 
minimum amounts of  equity capital. We will discuss these developments in the section on capital 
adequacy.
20  See RMA, referenced in Chapter 1, footnote 5; and Leo Troy, Almanac of Business and Industrial Financial Ratios (published by 
Commerce Clearing House). These sources are available in the business reference sections of  many libraries.
The change in bank balance sheet composition is revealing, with efforts to reduce cash holdings due to 
mediocre returns. Banks became efficient managers of  their assets, with improved internal management of  
bank internal treasury operations and the elimination of  such non-core assets as bank premises and equip-
ment; see Exhibit 2-5. 
As loan demand contracted, bank holdings of  securities expanded about 20 percent over 2009, with 
growth particularly strong in holdings of  Treasury securities and government agency debt securities; see 
Exhibit 2-6. Commercial and industrial (C&I) lending follows the general economy, and the severe contrac-
tion experienced through this period caused loan activity to plummet by nearly 20 percent, the steepest 
decline since at least 1985.
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recent experience (2008-2010)
As loan losses increased as in the period beginning in 2008, the equity capital of  banks was destroyed 
to the extent of  the loss. However, adequate capital remains in the banking system to support operations. 
During the current economic slowdown, estimates are that loan losses (as a percent of  all loans) may be as 
high as 3% (they were actually 2.5% in the 4th quarter of  2009),22 which would be equivalent to the rate 
experienced during the Great Depression of  the 1930s. Internal capital generation from operations would 
likely be inadequate to overcome these losses, resulting in the further deterioration of  bank balance sheets.
22  “Charge-offs, which are the value of  loans removed from the books and charged against loss reserves, are measured net of  
recoveries as a percentage of  average loans and annualized.” “Charge-off  and Delinquency Rates on Loan and Leases at 
Commercial Banks,” at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/chgallsa.htm.
Past experience
In normal times banks expect to incur some loan losses as commercial borrowers become insolvent. The 
degree of  these losses usually is about one-half  of  one percent of  a bank’s loan portfolio; see Exhibit 2-9. 
C&I loans tend to experience a greater volatility in losses but are generally well less than one percent. Past 
experience showed loan losses at historically low levels in the late 1990s, but then began to increase after the 
events of  September 11, 2001, and the ensuing slowdown in economic activity.
The dilemma facing all financial institutions is that customers demand market rates on their investments 
or deposits, forcing bankers to search for alternative methods to generate adequate returns. Banks compete for 
funds with money-market mutual funds, commercial paper, credit unions, government agencies, repurchase 
agreements (repos)21 and various other instruments. The competitive environment has led to such techniques 
to enhance returns as the development of  origination fees from loans; and the securitization of  those loans, 
involving the packaging of  a loan portfolio and its sale to investors.
21  A repo (repurchase agreement) involves a holder of  securities (usually U.S. Treasuries) to sell them to an investor with an 
agreement to repurchase them at a fixed price on a fixed date, usually overnight. The security “buyer” effectively lends the 
“seller” money for the period of  the agreement. 
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Concept of Capital Adequacy
The underlying concept of  Basel 2 is that the greater the risk to which the bank is exposed, the more 
capital the bank needs to hold to maintain solvency.  The capital adequacy described in the accords are Tier 
I core capital, including equity capital and disclosed reserves, and Tier II secondary capital, including undis-
closed reserves, general loss reserves, and subordinated term debt. The Capital Adequacy Ratio is a percentage 
of  a bank’s risk weighted credit exposures, and is calculated as:
Capital Adequacy Ratio = Tier I + Tier II Capital
 Risk Weighted Assets
Loan losses have been very carefully managed by banks during the past three years, and some banks are 
reporting lower rates of  losses than expected by the markets. This development has come at the expense of  
normal lending activity to medium-sized and smaller businesses which have found it difficult to borrow for 
ongoing activities.
CAPITAl ADeQuACY
Recent global economic crises have resulted in efforts by various national governments, central banks and 
regulators to develop remedies to restore confidence and stability and to prevent future financial problems. 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) addressed this problem beginning in 1988 with the so-called 
Basel Accords. Basel 2 contains international standards for banking regulators on the amount of  capital banks 
must maintain to mitigate typical financial and operational risks.
Draft Basel 3 regulations have been proposed as the result of  the recent credit crisis. Provisions include 
a mandate for increased common equity with banks required to hold 4.5% by 2015, then a further 2.5%, 
totaling 7%; the introduction of  a maximum debt leverage ratio; a framework for counter-cyclical capital 
buffers; measures to limit counterparty credit risk; and short and medium-term quantitative liquidity ratios. 
Global acceptance of  these measures by national regulators is not certain because of  the expected dampening 
of  loan activity and business expansion.
Why these Capital requirements Were Developed
Proponents assume that such protocols can help prevent the global banking system from a sys-
temic collapse should a major bank or a series of  banks fail to meet counterparty obligations such 
as nearly occurred at Citigroup in 2008. The “international capital framework” (the phrasing in the 
official document) attempts to accomplish this through the establishment of  rigorous risk and capital 
management requirements that ensure that a bank holds capital reserves appropriate to its risk expo-
sures created in normal lending and investment activities. The three pillars of  Basel 2 are noted in 
Exhibit 2-10.
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Although stress tests vary by regulator, a common approach is to examine three types of  risk: credit, 
market, and most recently, liquidity.
• Credit risks examine potential losses from defaults on the loans a bank makes. Stress tests 
analyze the impact of  rising loan defaults (known as non-performing loans) on bank profit 
and capital.
• Market risks determine how changes in foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and the prices 
of  various financial assets affect the value of  the assets in a bank’s portfolio, as well as its 
profits and capital. Typically, the test would assume a decline in the value of  the assets in the 
bank’s portfolio.
• Liquidity risks analyze the access that a bank has to the necessary cash to meet its short-term 
funds requirements. Before the failure of  Lehman Brothers, bank supervisors assumed that 
predictable flows would be sufficient to meet sudden cash demands. These presumptions 
were flawed, and the near paralysis of  the banking system was only avoided when regula-
tors developed unorthodox ways to inject massive amounts of  cash into liquidity-strapped 
institutions.
recent legislation
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of  2010 (Dodd-Frank) will not 
likely have major implications for the credit activities of  banks; however, precise regulations are yet to be writ-
ten by regulators. The Act guarantees there will be no more bank bailouts of  banks previously considered as 
too big to fail, thereby eliminating the moral hazard problem of  risk-taking by senior bank executives who 
assumed that there would likely be the possibility of  a government rescue (as in the case of  Citigroup).
The three most important provisions in Dodd-Frank are the following:
• The creation of  a consumer protection agency (the Bureau of  Consumer Financial 
Protection) although it is not clear that there was systematic fraud against individuals that 
led to the credit crisis.
As required in Basel 2, the total Capital Adequacy Ratio must be no lower than 8%. Tier II capital is 
limited to 100% of  Tier I capital.
U.S. financial institutions have far higher levels of  capital than their international competitors; banks out-
side of  the U.S. operate with 3½ to nearly 5% of  equity capital as compared to about 11½% in U.S. banks. 
Equity constitutes the most significant portion of  Tier I capital.  The search for global solutions to these 
dilemmas led to the Basel Accords, although it remains to be determined if  increasing capital will change 
banker behaviors.
BANk reSTrICTIoNS oN leNDING
There are various other restrictions on lending that may force a bank to reject a loan request regardless 
of  the efficacy of  the borrower’s situation. These include position limits, stress tests, recent legislation and 
regulatory arbitrage.
Position limits
In banking, position limits are the maximum allowable credit exposure to any single borrower, industry, 
geographic location or other customer classification. Experience with past exposure to specific sets of  bor-
rowers clearly indicates the need for portfolio diversification throughout a range of  risks. Many banks limit 
exposure to a single customer to ten percent of  total loans and leases, with industry limits of  fifteen to twenty 
percent.
Stress Tests
The concept of  stress testing has become particularly important since the onset of  the 2008 credit 
crisis. Would a bank survive unfavorable economic conditions, such as a continuing spike in unemployment, 
the collapse of  an important company, or other catastrophic events? Stress tests subject banks to “unlikely 
but plausible” scenarios designed to determine whether a financial institution has sufficient capital to sur-
vive the impact of  such adverse developments. The scenarios are difficult to build and results are subject to 
modeling uncertainty since there is no standard way to link the economic assumptions to default rates or 
asset prices. 
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It is not difficult for a financial institution to switch regulators; it merely involves changing the type of  
charter it has.  As long as there are multiple bank regulators supervising essentially equivalent institutions, 
there will be adverse regulatory selection, and this erodes the quality of  banking regulation and affects lend-
ing decisions.
Banks remain as the least expensive and most knowledgeable source for lending, making them the pre-
ferred source of  funds in many situations. However, recent rationing of  credit may have alienated old custom-
ers, and it remains to be seen whether other lenders will be able to permanently capture market share from 
bankers. Alternatively, investment and working capital may be funded from a combination of  internally gen-
erated capital, reduced interest charges to significantly lower borrowing costs, and lowered dividend payouts.
• The establishment of  a Financial Stability Oversight Council, a nine-member panel 
drawn from the Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission and other gov-
ernment agencies, that is supposed to monitor the financial industry’s largest companies 
and other market participants to spot and respond to any emerging growth in risk to 
the economy. This organization could impose higher capital requirements on lenders and 
place hedge funds and dealers under the authority of  the Federal Reserve.
• Prohibitions on the use of  derivatives contracts used to hedge those risks to which banks 
are exposed, including credit risk, foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk.
regulatory Arbitrage
Regulatory arbitrage23 uses differences in regulatory requirements to evade regulation that is onerous and 
costly.24 In banking, the avoidance of  capital adequacy rules by the removal of  assets from the balance sheet 
reduces or eliminates the requirement for a minimum amount of  capital in support of  that asset; i.e., a loan. 
The bank may securitize a package of  its loans, resulting in the removal of  those assets from the balance sheet. 
The risk is not removed from the financial system; instead, it is absorbed by willing investors who may be 
subject to significantly lessened capital requirements.  The arbitrager exploits the gap between the economics 
of  a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment, by taking advantage of  the regulator’s limited capacity 
to monitor transactions with precision.
U.S. banking presents a particular problem in regulatory arbitrage, as there are regulators with over-
lapping jurisdictions or different governments that share jurisdiction over the transaction. Multiple federal 
banking regulators supervising essentially equivalent financial institutions encourage regulatory arbitrage. In 
addition to those noted in Chapter 1 are the Office of  Thrift Supervision (for federally-chartered savings 
banks) and state regulatory bodies.
23  The term “arbitrage” refers to the practice of  taking advantage of  a price difference between two or more markets: striking 
matching deals that capitalize upon the imbalance, the profit being the difference between the market prices. In the current 
real-time environment of  global market making, it is difficult for an arbitrager to find price differences. However, other 
economic conditions are often treated in this manner, including regulation, taxes and accounting methods.
24  For an interesting theoretical discussion, see Victor Fleischer, “Regulatory Arbitrage,” University of  Colorado School of  
Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-11 (2010). Available at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=1567212.
CHAPTER 3:  
THE CREDIT PROCESS
This chapter discusses the following topics:
1. Lending philosophies of  banks
2. Approaches to business development
3. C&I and other types of  corporate loans
4. The process of  calling and the role of  the calling officer
5. The credit decision
6. Bank examiners
Underlying factors in lending decisions were discussed in Chapter 2. In this chapter we review the credit 
process, including lending policies and philosophies, business development activities, the credit decision and 
types of  loans.
leNDING PHIloSoPHIeS
A bank must consider its philosophical approach to lending as an initial step in the development of  a 
credit function. The three approaches in general use today are driven by time horizon perspectives – that is, 
short- or long-term – and concern for profitability.
When Values are the focus
Some banks take a long-range outlook toward the business of  banking, and consider credit and non-
credit services as a package of  benefits with which to establish a corporate partnership. JPMorgan Chase 
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P/E [price-earnings ratio] … obviously if  you look at where our P/E is today, the market 
isn’t giving us a superior P/E.26
Some observers (including the authors) believe that TD Bank has attained superior performance com-
pared to its peers. However, the clear focus has been profitability, risk and stockholder returns, and many of  
the comments in the full presentation address these issues.
When Market Share is the focus
Banks with an intermediate time horizon often refer to a focus on increasing market share compared to 
competitors, with frequent calling, somewhat aggressive credit risk and conscious decisions to buy corporate 
borrowers with below-cost pricing. The mission statement of  BancorpSouth contains the following statement:
 To be the leading financial services company in our markets ... To maximize shareholder 
value through … strong market share … To continuously transform BancorpSouth into a 
more diverse and comprehensive financial services company. To be our customer’s provider 
of  choice for financial services …27
Financial institutions that focus on market share tend to experience above average credit losses, and, in 
fact the bank’s comment on partial 2010 results (showing a loss in the second quarter) noted credit problems 
due to loan delinquencies and a more than tripling of  provisions for credit losses from the previous year.
BuSINeSS DeVeloPMeNT ACTIVITIeS
Loans to individuals are usually initiated when a customer requests credit for such purposes as buying a 
residence or an automobile. In contrast, business lending results from a calling program on the senior finan-
cial officer of  a company to initiate contact, establish the interest of  the bank, develop rapport, and obtain 
information about the prospect. Business development comprises various techniques that aim at attracting 
new customers and at broadening existing markets.
26  Statement by Ed Clark, President and CEO, RBC Capital Markets Banking Conference, January 19, 2005, at www.td.com/
communicate/speeches/19jan2005.jsp.
27  “Investor Relations: Mission Statement,” at www.snl.com/irweblinkx/corporateprofile.aspx?iid=100163 (2010).
exemplifies this approach, and attempts to offer superior products and relationship contacts at a fair but not 
at the lowest price point. The following excerpt from the bank’s 2010 corporate responsibility statement 
speaks to this philosophy:
 At JPMorgan Chase, we believe that being profitable and doing good works for the 
people and the world around us aren’t exclusive of  each other; they’re integrated goals. 
When our business is strong and well governed, we’re in a better position to translate 
positive financial results into … efforts that benefit everyone … Every day, we strive 
to make our firm a good corporate citizen -- and the most respected financial-services 
institution in the world.25
Note that there is no reference to profits or returns in this statement, nor is the stockholder even 
mentioned.
Banks that are value-focused pursue borrowers with strong or improving credit quality with strong plan-
ning and control systems in the effort to develop a consistent market presence. The credit decision on loans 
is conservative with an emphasis on diversification and stability. A financial institution like Chase frequently 
refers to its commitment to specific goals that require a long-term time horizon, including the community, 
the environment, accountability, social responsibility and sustainability.
When Profits are the Focus
Because of  pressure from investors for stock price performance, a large number of  banks emphasize prof-
its and shorter-term goals. The following statement was made concerning the TD (Toronto Dominion) Bank 
Financial Group at a banking conference:
… our mission statement is to try to be the better bank … … [with] a high regard for risk … 
We measure ourselves against economic profit and we want to make sure that when we rede-
ploy capital, we redeploy it in the interests of  the shareholders … we’ve been trying to run 
this strategy and improve every year and hope that over time we will command a premium 
25  At www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/Corporate-Responsibility/corporate-responsibility.htm.
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Certain lending facilities produce lower returns than are required by the bank. For this reason, banks are 
emphasizing more profitable activities such as small business and middle market loans to companies, and 
credit card and installment loans to individuals.
Marketing research that Supports the Bank’s focus
Regardless of  the industry expertise, marketing research should begin the search for new corporate cus-
tomers with the analysis of  economic conditions, competitive trends, capital projects that are typically re-
quired in the industry, working capital requirements, and current levels of  satisfaction with financial institu-
tion relationships. Sources of  data frequently used in this effort are provided in Exhibit 3-2. The outcome is 
to try to forecast the potential demand for the bank’s services and to develop knowledge about the industry.
Bank Industry focuses
Several of  the larger U.S. banks have developed expertise in specific industries due to geographic location, 
the specific interests of  past or current senior management, or a non-credit product capability.
• Geographic influence. Banks naturally develop technical knowledge based on their place of  
domicile, even predating the passage of  the Riegle-Neal Act that permitted full interstate 
banking. The large Chicago banks have long been agricultural and commodities exchange 
lenders due to the importance of  those activities in Illinois (as well as throughout northern 
Midwestern states).
• Senior management and director influence. Some banks made it a policy not to lend to 
casino operators because of  the negative connotations from gambling, while other financial 
institutions developed a skill set for the gaming and hotel industry, e.g., Wells Fargo and 
Zions Bank. Another example of  banker focus was the old Chemical Bank (now part of  JP 
Morgan Chase) which originally emphasized lending to the chemical industry.
• Non-credit product influence. Some banks have developed non-credit products that are 
widely used by certain industries. For example, Bank of  America has a long history of  
providing treasury management and custody services for the healthcare industry. The bank 
provides lockbox and ACH collections, various disbursement services, asset-based financing 
for equipment purchases, credit services and other industry-specific solutions.
Mix of loans
Restrictions on interstate banking no longer exist, and lending can now be made to any company 
in any market area. However, larger banks tend to emphasize large commercial and industrial loans, 
while smaller banks provide a higher proportion of  residential mortgages. For a comparison of  lending 
activities by bank size, see Exhibit 3-1. The smallest banks devote a significantly greater proportion of  
their portfolios to real estate loans (including residential mortgages), while the largest banks emphasize 
commercial and industrial loans to a greater extent. Other loans constitute a small percentage of  lending 
activity.
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• Uncommitted lines. No fee is paid and banks generally make best efforts to provide funds 
for uncommitted lines although they may be unable to do so during times of  significant 
economic distress.
Commercial Paper
Commercial paper (CP) is unsecured notes (without collateral or other security) issued by companies with 
high credit ratings, with durations ranging from a few days to 270 days.30 Most issuers use CP as a continu-
ing financing source and reissue the CP at the time of  maturity. Sales are either direct to investors or through 
dealers (securities firms) rather than through a commercial bank.  Although banks do not offer CP, they do 
provide support for this type of  financing through the backing of  credit lines, minimizing any risk to investors.
CP typically carries ratings by leading credit rating agencies and is graded by Moody’s or Standard and 
Poor’s as A-1, P-1, or A-2, P-2. The yield on commercial paper normally exceeds the yield on U.S. Treasury 
Bills by 30-50 basis points given the additional risk of  default but is significantly less expensive than bank 
borrowing. At the beginning of  the credit crisis (early 2008), CP carried a yield of  2.3% for directly-placed 
CP and 2.6% for paper placed through securities dealers. Rates in 2010 were about 1/4th of  1% (0.25%) 
for both types of  paper. CP is used primarily for working capital needs.
Asset-Based financing
Asset-based financing (ABF) supplements bank credit sources by providing credit to companies that may 
have difficulty in securing loans from financial institutions due to weak financial positions.  Some $750 billion 
of  such credit may be outstanding in the U.S., lent by large banks, regional and smaller banks, and commercial 
finance companies.31  Accounts receivables and inventory are the two primary assets used in these programs.
• Receivables. Loans on receivables are largely based on the credit ratings of  the borrower’s 
customers, and are used to provide working capital until those customers make payments 
on their invoices. In addition, lenders need to understand the collateral (the shipped mer-
30  The 270-day limitation is due to the SEC requirement for registration for securities with maturities that exceed that time 
period. CP avoids the cost and paperwork of  this approval process.
31  Such commercial finance companies as GE Capital, GMAC and CIT provide credit in specialized situations, although the 
most important source of  ABF continues to be the banking industry, 
As an example, the First National Bank of  Boston (now Bank of  America) recognized decades ago that 
the apparel trades required banking services in support of  working capital, primarily due to the very long 
receivables cycle from retailers in those industries (often as much as six months!). The bank developed a fac-
toring business that enabled its customers to borrow against their receivables in order to pay wages, supplier 
invoices and other bills.
The bank carefully researched the industries and each clothing retailer before making these loans to deter-
mine their credit histories and likelihood of  recovering the principal and interest.  In time, the expertise that 
was developed gave First National Bank of  Boston a near monopoly in apparel factoring, which became a very 
lucrative business. Furthermore, it forced the retailers to pay their bills on time or be refused credit approval.
CoMMerCIAl AND INDuSTrIAl loANS
Bank lending to businesses is referred to as C&I loans and is used for working capital requirements and lon-
ger-term capital investments. Working capital may be financed through lines of  credit and other types of  credit.
lines of Credit
A line of  credit is a prearranged amount of  credit a lender will extend to a company over a specified pe-
riod of  time, usually one year. Lines of  credit are used as short-term sources of  liquidity, often when seasonal 
cash disbursements exceed cash collections. In addition, lines of  credit support the issuance of  commercial 
paper, which are notes issued by creditworthy companies without any collateral backing. Lines of  credit may 
be arranged as committed or uncommitted, with the largest companies often preferring the latter to avoid the 
associated fees.28
• Committed lines. In this situation, a fee has been paid to guarantee the borrower’s access 
to the funds. The cost of  a committed line is about one-half  of  one percent, and typical 
pricing of  the used portion of  the line is about 1½ to 2 percentage points above standard 
benchmark rates; see Chapter 5.29
28  For a discussion of  decision factors with credit lines, see James Sagner, “A Quick Guide to Bank Lines of  Credit,” Journal of 
Accounting and Finance, Nov.-Dec. 2010, pages 39 – 42.
29  Statistics are from Sergei A. Davydenko, “When Do Firms Default? A Study of  the Default Boundary,” a paper presented 
at the 2009 American Finance Association meeting; available at ssrn.com/abstract=672343, page 5. 
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ment when the cash cycle may be low, and bullet loans with interest only paid until maturity. 
The security for term loans is usually fixed assets. Careful review of  the borrower’s situation 
is necessary because of  the greater risk due to the extended period until the loan is repaid.
• Revolving credit agreements. These loans, known colloquially as “revolvers”, allow compa-
nies to borrow up to a specified limit, repay some or the entire loan, and re-borrow until the 
maturity date. This type of  loan is used when future cash flows are uncertain. A loan com-
mitment fee may be charged on the unused portion.
TYPeS of loANS oTHer THAN C&I
There are various possible classifications systems for corporate loans. In this section we review the char-
acteristics of  real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, and other types of  loans in the order of  total 
bank loan portfolios.
Commercial real estate loans
Bank lending for commercial real estate is primarily short-term in duration, and used for construction 
and land development. Construction loans constitute interim financing with the expectation that a perma-
nent credit facility (often 20 years or more) will be arranged through institutional investors, such as insur-
ance companies or pension funds. The bank’s construction financing pays for materials, labor and site plan-
ning, with funds disbursed periodically based on pre-determined completion stages; e.g., the pouring of  the 
foundation or the completion of  interior walls. The bank is repaid when the construction is completed and 
permanent financing begins. Land development loans finance the necessary site infrastructure for residential 
construction, including roads and public utilities.
Construction financing can be quite lucrative but risky, particularly when urban areas are redeveloped and 
old buildings must be razed. The high degree of  uncertainty in finding tenants, securing permanent financing 
and dealing with unexpected site problems may force the bank to arrange joint financing to manage the risk. 
A current trend is for banks to regularly work with a trusted set of  developers who understand the need to 
prudently manage the risks in commercial real estate. This usually involves third-party appraisals, developer 
guarantees, signed tenant leases, zoning and other approvals from local governments, competitive market 
analysis, architectural and engineering studies, and other supportive documentation.
chandise) and the industry’s characteristics. ABF lenders communicate with their clients 
nearly every day and often spend time in the field checking on their borrowers. Information 
technology is essential to feed data on receivables (or inventory) so that credit sales can be 
updated based on items sold.
• Factoring involves the sale of  accounts receivable. By selling outstanding invoices for future 
payment, businesses generate cash sooner than waiting to collect cash from customers. The 
factor purchasing receivables takes ownership of  the invoices and instructs that payments be 
made to a post office box (usually a lockbox) when due. Factoring is an expensive source of  
credit, because the amount paid for receivables is discounted by about five percent.
• Inventory. ABF provides working capital using a company’s inventory as the collateral for the 
loan. Lenders typically make loans at somewhat less than the value of  the inventory and, with 
the key factor being its marketability in the event of  the borrower’s default. Interest rates 
charged on inventory financing are similar to those for receivables lending.
 Inventory financed through ABF programs often are consumer and industrial durables easily 
recognized by tag identification, serial number or other unique identifier. Lenders may spe-
cialize by line of  business; for example, ORIX lends on technology purchases and Textron 
Financial lends to aviation and golf  course customers.
longer-Term Commercial loans
Longer duration commercial loans are referred to as term loans or revolving credit agreements. Banks 
prefer to offer these loans at floating rates above Fed funds or LIBOR. For example, a recent $750 million 
term loan was quoted at LIBOR + 3%.32
• Term loans. This form of  financing offers maturities to five to ten years, and is used for capital 
investments or a permanent increase in working capital. There are variations in these loans 
structured for the convenience of  the borrower, including scheduled hiatus periods of  repay-
32  The borrower was Nalco, a leading water treatment and process improvement company; announced Oct. 6, 2010, in Globe-
Newswire.
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Some banks use a memo-type report, which requires a three to five page discussion of  the company and 
any opportunities for the bank. Other financial institutions use a formatted system requiring that the calling 
officer discuss relevant issues including:
• Bank and prospect staff  participating in the call
• History of  bank products used by the customer
• Basic financial information including sales, profits, number of  employees, locations of  of-
fices, and similar data
• Names of  financial institutions in the company’s banking system and specific credit and 
non-credit products used
• Any problems with current banking relationships such as errors in processing, obvious gaps 
or inability to provide services, or a bank’s refusal to grant credit
• Suggestions for the next call including support by bank product specialists and/or senior 
bank officers, opportunities for entertaining the prospect, and review of  the company’s inter-
nal procedures to enable the development of  recommendations for banking changes
A Disciplined Approach to Calling
Many banks persist in calling even when there are only slight business opportunities. For example, one of  
the authors observed prospect hostility toward his bank because of  perceived mistreatment during a previous 
bank management regime. In another situation, a decentralized company was required to use a certain money-
center bank for all services except local transactions. There was little point in investing time and effort on 
these companies, yet senior bankers demanded calling to try to restore/initiate a relationship.
Banks should establish protocols to quickly determine whether there may be a future bank-prospect part-
nership. Such factors include the following:
• Is senior company management willing to take a bank meeting?
• What is the extent of  dissatisfaction with current banking arrangements?
• Is the company willing to disclose non-public information?
• What is the level of  competence and expertise of  the banks currently in the relationship?
• Are sales of  bank products likely in the next six months?
other Commercial loans
Small amounts of  other commercial loans are made by U.S. banks.
• Farm loans. Banks in agricultural areas – primarily in the Midwest, South and California – make 
loans to farming operations for planting seasons, including seed, fertilizer, pesticide, farm equip-
ment and energy. The expectation is that the loans will be repaid when crops are harvested and sold.
 The risk associated with price uncertainty is hedged by many farmers using commodity futures 
contracts, so that the amount to be received is known months before the harvest. Because agriculture 
is an essential industry, the federal government has established a farm credit system to provide loans 
to farmers and to farm cooperatives. Agricultural loans are less than 1% of all bank loans and leases.
• Leases and financial institution loans. Other types of  bank financings include leases (less 
than 2% of  all loans and leases), involving the purchase of  fixed assets (often equipment or 
vehicles) by the lender which are then leased (rented) to customers; and loans to depository 
institutions and acceptances of  other banks (less than 1% of  all loans and leases), involving 
short-term credit facilities provided to other financial institutions.
THe ProCeSS of CAllING
The development of  a specific focus naturally leads to the evaluation of  the companies in that industry. 
A careful analysis of  company profitability, growth and product lines will usually lead to a calling decision, 
that is, the scheduling of  a meeting to present the bank’s story to the prospect’s financial managers.
Calling reports
Calling reports are used to maintain a history of  these contacts and to suggest areas of  discussion for 
future visits. These reports are filed in the credit history file created for the company.  Note: These internal 
statements are not the same as the call reports required by U.S. regulators.33
33  U.S. financial institutions are required to file periodic reports with their respective regulators. For banks, one of  these 
reports is the quarterly Report of Condition and Income, generally referred to as the Call Report, which is due as of  the close of  
business on the last day of  each calendar quarter. The specific reporting requirements depend upon the size of  the bank and 
whether or not it has any foreign office. For further information, see www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/inform.asp.
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five C’s of Credit - Positive
Calling officers use a long-established protocol – the five C’s of  credit – to evaluate the creditworthiness 
of  a borrower.
• Character. Is the borrower honest and trustworthy? Will the loan be used for the stated 
purpose or is there a possibility that it will be diverted to other needs of  the business or for 
personal use? Some banks conduct investigations of  the company’s principal managers, look-
ing for past criminal activity, legal judgments, surveillance by federal or local authorities, tax 
liens and similar negative background information.
• Capital. Does the borrowing company have the funds to repay the loan? If  the markets dete-
riorate, can its financial position withstand this situation? We discuss quantitative evaluation 
of  these questions in Chapter 4. The calling officer must attempt to measure the extent of  
desperation for additional credit displayed by the prospect.
• Capacity. Does management appear capable of  maintaining its business operations so that 
the loan can be repaid? Are there any issues regarding the company’s position in its industry, 
such as lawsuits, expiring patents or a trademark dispute, the possible loss of  important 
customers or suppliers, technology that is becoming obsolete, a labor dispute or other 
concerns?
• Conditions. How does the economic environment impact the company? Will continuing 
weak GDP growth, the declining U.S. dollar, inflation-deflation concerns or high unemploy-
ment put the company in difficulty regarding its obligations?
• Collateral. Is the security or asset supporting the loan adequate in the event of  that the com-
pany defaults on the loan? Can the collateral be seized and will it bring an adequate price at 
the time of  a forced sale?
These characteristics are essentially positive, in that the calling officer is looking for affirmation that the 
borrower can repay the loan.
When these and other questions produce positive responses, the banker must carefully examine the 
company as an essential element in deciding whether to proceed. The first step is an in-depth review of  the 
situation at the company. This process examines previous and current creditor experience, including adher-
ence to loan agreements; analyzes audited financial statements; obtains supporting documentation including 
authorizations by the board of  directors; reviews budgets and pro forma balance sheets, income statements 
and cash budgets; and develops information on the integrity and seriousness of  company management.
THe CAllING offICer
The initial credit decision – the assessment as to whether to make a loan – is handled by the calling of-
ficer as supported by the bank’s credit analysts.
The Importance of the Calling Officer
The calling officer is in a unique position that makes his or her judgment critical.
• Observation of  the company and its senior managers. Typically only the calling officer has 
been on visits and can judge the physical condition of  the potential borrower, the seriousness 
of  the managers responsible, the reasonableness of  future plans, and other matters that will 
affect the company’s long-term relationship with the bank.
• Industry/geographic experience. The calling officer has seen other companies in the industry 
and in the geographic area, and can contrast the prospect to peer businesses. These compari-
sons go beyond the financial results that companies report and probe into the viability of  
the company as a bank customer.
However, the association between the calling officer and the company can become too cozy, with friendly 
visits, entertainment and the development of  a personal relationship.34  When this occurs, objectivity suffers 
and loans can be made without adequate review. For this reason, banks frequently reassign calling officers to 
different clients.
34  For this reason, the Comptroller of  the Currency requires banks to specify restrictions on “… the acceptance of  gifts or 
other items of  value …” from customers or other persons doing or seeking to do business with the bank.  A usual limit is 
$50 of  value. Comptroller’s Handbook, page 5; see www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/insider.pdf.
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THe CreDIT DeCISIoN
Bankers are keenly aware of  the role of  the regulators in reviewing the quality of  a loan portfolio, and as a 
result they make credit decisions that satisfy standard examiner protocols. While there is no single assessment 
model used by commercial banks, the most significant contents in the credit file are the comprehensiveness of  
documentation, the adequacy of  collateral, and the likelihood and source of  repayment. The credit commit-
tee then reviews these data as it approves or refuses the loan.
Documentation
A complete file of  loan documentation is extensive, including loan and security agreements, financial 
statements and other information.36  A list of  typical requirements is provided in Exhibit 3-3.
Collateral
The bank may expect collateral (security) for the loan in the form of  assets that have some market value. 
Typically, the agreement specifies that a valid, perfected first security interest in the borrower’s assets will 
be provided, which obligates a borrower to repayment of  that obligation from those pledged assets (also 
known as a lien37).  The loan is perfected when the bank’s claim is deemed superior to that of  other creditors. 
36  The leading authority is Thomas S. Hemmendinger, Hillman on Commercial Loan Documentation, Practising Law Institute (PLI), 
2000 and updated annually.
37 A lien is the right to retain the possession of  the property of  another until the owner fulfills a legal duty to the person hold-
ing the property. The right of  lien generally arises by operation of  law; with a bank loan, it is created by express contract 
between the borrower and the lending institution. 
five C’s of Credit – Negative
Unfortunately, bad loans occur, and the fault may not be changes in conditions or the capital position 
of  the borrower. Calling officers do not always do their job – both authors have seen that situation at their 
respective banks – when the priority is personal business or making a loan to meet an objective in an MBO 
(management-by-objectives) statement. The following five C’s of  bad credit are a clever yet real-world list of  
behaviors to avoid.35
• Complacency. Has the banker carefully examined the borrower, particularly for changes in its 
business situation? Often adequate due diligence is not done because prior loans were repaid 
as scheduled. This is particularly critical during periods of  difficult business conditions.
• Carelessness. Is the loan documentation file complete? Does the bank have current audited 
financial statements, and are loan covenants included that are appropriate to the borrower’s 
situation?
• Communication. Has the calling officer explained the bank’s lending policies and require-
ments? Or, is the conversation mostly about last night’s football, baseball or basketball game? 
The financial managers of  the borrower must be made aware of  problems when they appear 
and corrective action must be agreed to by both parties.
• Contingencies. Is the calling officer willing to face a troubled situation at the borrower? 
Loans do default and that situation must be faced no matter how unpleasant.
• Competition. Has the bank merely followed a competitive bank’s offer or is it maintaining 
its own credit standards? In one situation in Chicago, one of  the authors knew that a com-
petitor was making loans that his bank was repeatedly rejecting. The eventual result was the 
competitor suffered massive losses on a major portfolio of  loans (in energy), and had to be 
rescued by the FDIC.
35 Based on Sam Golden and Harry Walker, “The Ten Commandments of  Commercial Credit: The Cs of  Good and Bad 
Loans,” Journal of Commercial Bank Lending, Vol. 75, Jan. 1993, pages 10–16.
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Depending on the size of  the bank, there may be several credit committees, each focusing on the lending 
process within its organizational responsibility. For example, a money-center bank may establish such com-
mittees for financial services, transportation, retail and wholesale, energy, agriculture and other groupings of  
industries. This assures the expertise required to act on loan requests.
BANk eXAMINerS
The credit committee does its work in the context of  the regulatory responsibilities of  bank examiners. 
Any lending decision must consider the obvious issue of  borrower creditworthiness while considering regu-
latory oversight. The role of  the examiners is to make certain that banks are operating legally and ethically.
Bank examinations include the following:
• Compliance with the requirements set by the Federal Reserve in regard to assets, to ensure 
that the bank is sufficiently strong to meet the demands for the types of  transactions offered 
to customers.
• Review of  lending policies, posting of  debits and credits and other bank activities. Any proce-
dure that is not squarely in keeping with federal policies will result in notification for correction.
examiner ratings
The Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System is an internal supervisory tool used for the evalua-
tion of  the soundness of  financial institutions on a uniform basis.38 The system identifies those institutions 
requiring special attention or concern through composite ratings that are assigned based on a “1” to “5” 
numerical scale.
• A “1” indicates the highest rating, strongest performance and risk management practices, 
and least degree of  supervisory concern
38  See “Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System,” December 3, 2009, at www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
rules/5000-900.html.
Collateral often mentioned in loan agreements includes leasehold improvements, accounts receivable, inven-
tory, equipment, furniture and fixtures, and cash.
repayment
The calling officer must determine how the loan will be repaid. The three primary sources of  cash 
flow for this purpose are normal operational cash flow, liquidation of  collateral or other assets, and the 
issuance of  debt and/or equity. However, neither of  the two latter sources is considered as desirable, 
largely because of  the uncertainty in disposing of  assets and in issuing new permanent financing. This 
is a particular problem if  economic conditions or the situation of  the borrower deteriorates during the 
period after the loan is made. As a result, loan approval may require a strong probability that cash flow 
from operations will suffice.
Although a less desirable cash source, a bank may decide to rely on a personal guarantee as a secondary 
repayment source. Should this not be sufficient, the bank may accept a co-signer who will agree to assume the 
debt should default occur. In these situations, documentation must be obtained of  the source of  the guaran-
tee, and the bank may require that negotiable instruments, valuables or other collateral be held in the bank’s 
vault or under its control until the loan is satisfied.
The Credit Committee
The credit application is presented to the bank’s credit (or loan) committee with a covering memoran-
dum. In addition to the data noted above, the credit committee will expect to see the analysis of  the per-
formance of  the company compared to its industry peers (see the discussion in Chapter 4) and the calling 
officer’s recommendation. The credit committee at a regular (usually weekly) meeting hears a summary of  
the loan recommendation and makes the final lending decision. The committee actually has two important 
functions:
1. To approve or reject new loan applications
2. To monitor the loan portfolio and to take action on troubled loans that may become 
non-performing
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banks in need of  supervisory attention. Individual ratings are disclosed to bank management, though not to 
the general public for fear of  causing a run on a low-rated bank. The frequency and extent of  bank examiner 
CAMELS reviews has been criticized as inadequate considering the recent credit crisis. The markets respond 
much more rapidly to changes in a bank’s situation and some regulators use these real-time signals to target 
troubled financial institutions.
As an example of  problems with the CAMELS system, the failure of  IndyMac39 was a total surprise to 
its regulator, the Office of  Thrift Supervision (OTS). The bank received composite ratings of  “2” from 2001 
through 2007, and it was not until 2008 that the rating dropped to “3” and then to “5” despite concerns 
with the bank’s capital, asset quality, management and liquidity. The report of  the Inspector General noted 
that it is difficult to understand how OTS continuously awarded a rating of  “2” throughout most of  the 
decade.40
Credit Policies
We began this chapter with a discussion of  the lending philosophies of  U.S. banks, using the mission 
statements of  three major financial institutions to illustrate alternative approaches to the credit decision. The 
FDIC encourages the development of  written credit policies to meet regulatory standards and to establish 
guidelines that are consistent with these goals. While there cannot be a standard set of  policies, elements that 
should be considered include the following:
1. What is the quality of  the loan portfolio with regard to types of  loans, maturities, loan size 
and quality?
2. How much lending authority is granted to calling officers? In these risk-averse times, many 
banks limit commitments to relatively small amounts with the decision responsibility resid-
ing in the credit committee.
39  IndyMac Bank was the largest savings and loan association in the Los Angeles CA area and the seventh largest mortgage 
originator in the U.S. The failure of  the bank on July 11, 2008, was the fourth largest bank failure in the country’s history, 
and the second largest failure of  a regulated thrift. The primary cause was its risky and ultimately largely nonperforming 
residential mortgage portfolio. 
40  Material Loss Review of IndyMac Bank, Office of  Inspector General, U.S. Treasury, Feb. 26, 2009, page 14, at www.scribd.com/
doc/16084026/Review-of-Literature-on-Camels-Rating. 
• A “5” indicates the lowest rating, weakest performance, inadequate risk management prac-
tices and the highest degree of  supervisory concern.
When assigning a composite rating, some components may be given more weight than others depending 
on the situation at the institution.
Because examiners spend more time with lower rated banks, the credit committee will carefully review loans 
with higher perceived risk even though the pricing of  the loan reflects this factor. Most bankers will accept lower 
risk - lower interest rate credit arrangements to avoid supervisory review. While this result appears to subvert the 
normal market function of  pricing, the fiduciary role of  banks requires prudence rather than entrepreneurship.
Loans found to be unlikely to repay principal and interest are adversely classified and assigned to one of  
three categories: substandard, due to inadequate collateral or borrower capacity; doubtful, with a strong likeli-
hood of  a loss to the bank; and loss, considered as uncollectible. Each category is then weighted and summed, 
compared to the loan loss provisions of  the bank, and, if  necessary, additional capital or other adjustments 
may be demanded.
CAMelS
Examiners use a rating system known by the acronym CAMELS that provides a comprehensive score for 
bank performance on the following characteristics:
C: Capital adequacy, maintenance of  capital reflective of  financial institutional risk
A: Asset quality, credit risk in the loan and investment portfolio
M: Management quality, competency of  senior management and the board of  directors
E: Earnings record, quality, trend and sustainability of  earnings
L: Liquidity position, adequacy of  sources of  liquidity and funds management practices
S:  Sensitivity to market risk, the degree to which changes in interest rates, foreign exchange and other 
market factors can adversely affect the position of  the bank
Like problem loans, ratings are calculated on a numerical scale, and are used by bank supervisory agen-
cies to evaluate bank condition. Banks assigned a CAMELS rating of  4 or 5 are placed on the watch list of  
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CHAPTER 4:  
CREDIT ANALYSIS
This chapter discusses the following topics:
1. Financial analysis case: Barely Edible
2. Calculation of  Barely Edible’s financial ratios
3. Ratio analysis and common-size financials
4. Cash flow
5. Financial forecasts
6. The amount of  the loan
7. The significance of  cost of  capital
8. Determining the borrower’s optimal leverage
In Chapter 3 we discussed aspects of  the credit process. In this chapter, we focus on the identification of  
the bank’s risk in making the loan; that is, how likely is it that the principal and interest will be repaid? This 
evaluation in many financial institutions involves a structured approach that examines:
• The business and its competitors, senior management and future expectations
• Financial statements and industry ratios
• Reconciliation of  cash flow
• Forecasts of  the borrower’s financial condition
• Determination of  the loan amount
• Impact of  the loan on cost of  capital
3. How will credit file information be developed and maintained? Who will review the files to 
determine that the appropriate material has been collected, organized and analyzed?
4. How will the credit decision work? What are the operating procedures that can assure ad-
equate review and thoughtful decision-making?
5. How will the pricing of  the loan reflect the perceived risk of  the borrower?
6. How will loan collateral be protected? Where in the bank will this responsibility reside?
7. How will the total amount of  lending be determined by loan type?
8. How will problem loans be detected and managed?
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The Business, Competitors and other Matters
The initial step in credit analysis is to develop information on management, the history of  the business, 
competitors and the company’s past and current relationship with the bank. What are the products and 
services offered by the company? Which distribution channels are used? Does the company plan to expand 
within the U.S. or globally? Is management responding appropriately to changes in the environment?
The character of  management is critical, and any issues regarding questionable practices must be noted. 
Furthermore, the competence of  the management team needs to be examined including the issue of  succes-
sion planning. Barely Edible appears to be a success, but we must ask if  management is still behaving as in the 
days when the company was a start-up rather than a nearly $300 million a year business.
We will examine each of  these topics in this chapter with a focus on sources of  information and ques-
tions to be raised with the borrower.  In presenting this material, a fictional business is analyzed – the Barely 
Edible Company – in the fast food industry. However, real industry data is used to develop comparisons and 
to note potential problems.
THe BArelY eDIBle CoMPANY
Barely Edible (stock symbol: BARE) has come to the Fourth National Bank for a $25 million loan for 
working capital and the acquisition of  real estate and equipment to expand its restaurants. BARE is consid-
ered a small “cap” (capitalized) company whose IPO (initial public offering) was in 2007, fortunately six 
months before the credit crisis began in 2008.
The company admits that it ran low on funds in the previous year and was just about able to cover a cash 
shortfall through very careful financial management. You are assigned the account and are expected to do a 
full credit analysis. On reviewing some basic company information, you find that there are 700 locations of  
BARE in the U.S., with about 10% of  these operated by franchisees.
The Product
The chain features ingredient-only sandwiches, that is, no tomatoes, lettuce or anything else included. 
The customer goes to a buffet and adds any desired toppings that are weighed and charged by the ounce along 
with the “naked” sandwich. The typical lunch costs $9.00, comprised of  $5.00 for the sandwich, $2.50 for 
the ingredients, and $1.50 for a drink. A side order of  potato chips or coleslaw is included with the sandwich. 
While this is more expensive than many hamburger chains, the attraction of  individualizing the meal and 
being a “chef ” has generated considerable interest. Promotion by the company emphasizes the idea of  naked 
and bare in a way that is both a tease and yet wholesome.
The concept has been working successfully although some patrons – particularly during the current eco-
nomic recession -- are not pleased to be charged separately for the basic sandwich and then for the extras. The 
company considers itself  as a premium fast food concept, much like Panera Bread, Atlanta Bread Company 
or Starbucks. BARE’s financial statements are presented in Exhibits 4-1 and 4-2. (Note: In the financial 
statements in Chapter 4, all decimals have been rounded to whole numbers. However, the percent and ratio 
calculations used in various statements are based on the full decimalized amount.)
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centile.42 The ratios for BARE, the industry and for comparison, Panera Bread, a leading premium sandwich 
company, are presented in Exhibit 4-3.
liquidity
Liquidity is critical because a business needs to be able to pay its bills as they come due. The two liquidity 
ratios are the current ratio and the quick (or acid test) ratio. The current ratio is calculated as follows: current 
assets ÷ current liabilities. The quick ratio is more useful because it eliminates inventory in the numerator, 
on the theory that this asset could be stale, worn or not saleable except at bargain prices. The quick ratio is 
42  Percentiles, quartile and other portions of  an array are methods of  defining a member of  that array. An array is a listing of  
the members of  a group in either ascending or descending order. For example, a student in the 95th percentile is in the top 
5% of  his or her grade.
Competitive Analysis
Competitive analysis can use standard sources of  industry data (see Exhibit 3-2) along with trade associa-
tion analyses. Information about competitors can similarly be developed or directly from company websites. 
In the case of  Barely Edible, it would be useful to visit both company outlets and those of  competitors. A 
list of  questions to address on these visits is required homework and of  course will vary by the industry. For 
the premium sandwich business:
• Is there adequate customer traffic both at meal times and off-times?
• Are the locations attractive?
• Is there adequate seating?
• How long does it take to be served?
• Are prices realistic given customer expectations and alternative choices?
• Are the restrooms cleaned regularly?
• What do customers think of  the food and of  the entire experience?
Too many banker visits to borrowers are made without sufficient (or any) preparation by the calling officer. 
As a result, impressions are gathered rather than hard evidence of  performance. The questions that are asked 
must be thoughtfully developed, requiring two or three trips and assistance from a knowledgeable colleague 
to develop firm conclusions. For the fast food business, the banker should anonymously visit both company-
owned and franchised operations to understand whether locations are uniform in their customer treatment.
CAlCulATIoN of THe fINANCIAl rATIoS
The various accounts on financial statements can be used to provide critical information about a com-
pany to bankers as well as to financial managers and other interested parties. The technique, called ratio 
analysis, places data in a numerator and in a denominator to allow the calculation of  a relationship considered 
meaningful. There are four sets of  ratios: liquidity, activity utilization, leverage and profitability.
We review each set using the financials of  the Barely Edible Company. In addition, the industry’s results 
(from RMA41) are provided for the 25th percentile, the median (50th percentile) in underline and the 75th per-
41  Industry statistics are from RMA (Risk Management Association), Annual Statement Studies, 2008-2009 (2009). We compare 
BARE’s 2009 financials to RMA results for equivalent time periods.
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Profitability
The two important profitability ratios are return-on-equity and return-on-assets (before taxes).44 The 
term “return” is another word for profits, and these ratios calculate the before-tax returns. Return-on-equity 
is calculated as follows: profits before taxes ÷ owners’ equity. 45 For Barely Edible, the result is 34.0% for 2009 
and 20.0% for 2010. For the industry, the result is 22.6% to 88.6%. While the result is within the industry 
averages, the deterioration during 2009 is cause for concern.
Return-on-assets is calculated as follows: profits before taxes ÷ assets. For Barely Edible, the result is 
17.0% for 2009 and 10.0% for 2010. For the industry the result is 15.0% to 1.9%. Again, the concern is 
the company’s deterioration and not the industry’s results.
rATIoS ANAlSIS AND CoMMoN-SIZe STATeMeNTS
The bank credit analyst typically will “spread” the financial information on a company and its industry 
using various methods of  evaluation. In this section we note two widely accepted techniques: analysis of  ra-
tios and common-size statements. In the next section we consider the use and projection of  cash flows.
Interpretation of ratios
The general rule when using industry comparisons is that any result within the interquartile range – that is, 
between the first and third quartiles – is considered as normal. However, Barely Edible is not really equivalent to 
the companies in the industry as reported by RMA, making comparisons problematic. The major differences are:
• BARE has a significant proportion of  company-owned stores while most large limited-service 
restaurant chains are entirely or mostly franchisee owned. This would result in  significantly 
larger fixed assets and more inventory than the industry, and a lower result in the activity 
utilization ratios.
44 We use “before tax” profitability measures following the reporting convention of  RMA, the most accepted source of  indus-
try ratios. 
45 These profitability calculations use the RMA definition. Other sources prefer after-tax returns as the numerator.
calculated as follows: (current assets less inventory) ÷ current liabilities. Both ratios are superior to the indus-
try’s performance; however, there is a significant deterioration from 2009 to 2010 that could lead to future 
problems if  not promptly managed.
Activity utilization
The activity utilization ratios indicate how efficiently the business is using its assets. Industry 
statistics are not meaningful as many competitors are largely franchisee operations, while BARE has 
a significant proportion of  company-owned stores. For example, many fast food chains collect sales 
by cash and credit card, while BARE has receivables from its franchisees and from company-owned 
stores that keep receipts until pre-established remittance dates. These collections are then sent to the 
home office. The most relevant ratio is sales-to-assets (asset turnover), which is about 1.2 times for 
BARE and 3.5 to 1.5 for the industry, which shows that revenues are not adequate for the assets being 
utilized.
leverage
Leverage measures the extent to which a company uses debt as a source of  its capital. The financial lever-
age ratio is calculated as total debt ÷ net worth.43 For Barely Edible, the result is 1.0 times for 2009 and 0.9 
times for 2010, while the industry’s results range begins at 2.5 times. The 1.0 times result means that there 
is a roughly equal amount of  debt and equity. The very wide range of  results for the industry makes any firm 
conclusion fairly inconclusive.
Times interest earned measures the number of  times that income (defined as earnings before interest and 
taxes) covers the obligation of  paying interest on debt. For Barely Edible, the result was 6.3 times in 2009 and 
4.8 times in 2010. For the industry, the result was 2.5 times. While BARE clearly exceeds industry norms, 
there was significant deterioration from 2009.
43  A second leverage concept is operating leverage, which supposedly measures the relationship between fixed and variable 
costs. However, this concept has generally declined in relevance in recent decades due to the reality of  managing a business 
with mostly fixed costs and few truly variable costs except in the long-run. 
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Competitive companies require less working capital than BARE, particularly on examination of  the 
current asset position of  the company. Certain accounts probably cannot be substantially reduced, such as 
inventories, but others need to be aggressively managed and where possible, improved. For example, accounts 
receivable appears to be excessive, and could be further analyzed by reference to aging schedules.46 BARE ap-
pears to be underleveraged, and could increase its debt position without approaching industry averages. We 
discuss the impact of  leverage in the cost of  capital section later in this chapter.
A very significant concern is the increase in the cost of  goods sold position from 2009 to 2010 and in 
comparison with the industry (although not for Panera Bread). The higher cost level drives down gross profits 
and reduces the amount of  funds available for promotion. This statistic shows that companies like Panera 
emphasize food quality rather than mass marketing. Despite deteriorating conditions in 2010, BARE is much 
more profitable (pre-tax) than its industry competitors.
ANAlYSIS of CASH floW
Bankers are primarily concerned with cash flow, because it is that asset that pays the debt service on 
a loan. Analysts will use the accrual accounting statements provided by potential borrowers to recalculate 
cash accounting statements to determine whether adequate liquidity is developed by the company to meet 
46  An aging schedule is an organization of  accounts receivables classified by time intervals based on days due or past due; it is 
used to identify delinquency patterns of  payments due from customers.
• Profitability is generally higher for BARE than in the industry due to the novelty of  the 
concept. However, returns markedly deteriorated from 2009 to 2010 reflecting both dif-
ficult economic conditions and price competition in the industry; i.e., $1 hamburgers at 
McDonald’s.
• As previously noted, BARE is a premium fast food operation and not really in the same 
business as McDonald’s or Burger King. Premium fast food involves higher quality, fresher 
ingredients, more concern for nutritional value and a generally more upscale atmosphere. 
However, RMA and other standard ratio sources include all of  these companies in present-
ing its data.
Ratio analysis must be used very carefully in credit analysis because of  these types of  differences between 
companies ostensibly in the same industry.
Common-Size financial Statements
Common-size financial statements present percentages rather than actual dollars, with the balance sheet 
using total assets and total liabilities as 100% and the income statement using sales as 100%. Standard sourc-
es such as RMA provide comparable common-size percentages.  These statements are presented as Exhibits 
4-4 and 4-5 for Barely Edible and Panera Bread.
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Cash from operations
The first section of  the cash-flow statement (Exhibit 4-6A) uses accrual income as adjusted for changes 
in the financial statements during the year. A source of  funds is an increase in cash, while a use of  funds is 
any decrease in cash. For example, the change (denoted as Chg.) in accounts receivable (the 2nd line of  Part A) 
represents an increase (use) in that account from $48.1 million in 2009 to $50.7 million in 2010.
BARE had a very healthy $33.6 million in cash flow from operations in 2010. This is an important 
consideration as bankers prefer that loans be paid from operational cash flow and, when necessary, from the 
refinancing of  existing debt. Furthermore, it does not appear that any sources or uses of  operational cash are 
inconsistent with industry practices.
Strategic Cash flow Activity
Strategic decisions in a company involve capital investments (Exhibit 4-6B), permanent financing (Exhibit 
4-6C) and the calculation of  the net cash position (Exhibit 4-6D).  For BARE, the source or use of  cash for 
capital investments shows that net assets increased by $19.1 million during 2010, a use of  cash, and that de-
preciation expense was $9.5 million, a source of  cash. (Depreciation is a cash source as no funds are utilized 
for this expense. It represents an accrual accounting assignment of  a portion of  previous capital investments 
to a period’s revenue stream.)
Financing in Part C shows that the company paid down $5 million each on its bonds and mortgage, cash 
uses almost certainly required by the provisions of  BARE’s borrowings. These payments are contractual, not 
discretionary. Part D summarizes Parts A, B and C, and shows that the net cash use was $5 million. We see 
that this in the net change in cash and short-term investments in the reconciliation from the 2009 and 2010 
balance sheets.
The bank would be comforted that a loan could be repaid based on this analysis. However, BARE just 
did make its cash requirements in 2010 suggesting that discretionary use of  cash for capital investments 
should be limited or prohibited except under specific circumstances as stated in loan covenant restrictions. A 
strong recommendation could be made that the company aggressively enter into franchising arrangements to 
its obligations. Exhibit 4-6 provides cash-based income statement data for BARE in four parts, showing 
the major elements of  cash-flows and a reconciliation of  cash developed from these statements and from 
balance sheet data. (The term “cash” refers to the cash and short-term investments accounts on the bal-
ance sheet.)
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• Other operating expenses.  Other expenses are projected using either a percentage-of-sales 
or a growth rate assumption. Should BARE more aggressively pursue franchising, there 
will be higher operating costs associated with that strategy, at least in the short-term, par-
ticularly in marketing, legal fees, investigation of  potential franchisees, the development 
of  training programs and similar expenses.  Interest expense will remain stable with old 
loans being repaid and the cost of  the loan under review relatively inexpensive at current 
interest rates.
• Balance sheet accounts. The balance sheet is forecast in a similar manner as adjusted for 
specific matters related to each account. For example, BARE’s accounts receivable may rise 
if  franchisees are added because the company will be awaiting its periodic royalty payments. 
Certainly fixed assets will not be growing at the same rate as in the past for reasons discussed 
previously. Notes payable will rise reflecting the loan (if  approved).
Scenario Analysis
The banker should develop alternative scenarios representing possible outcomes for the borrower in the 
coming periods. It is recommended that at least three “cases” be considered:
• A most likely case representing a defensible expectation for future results.
• A worst case that represents the greatest dangers and threats to the company’s attaining its 
goals.
• A best case showing optimistic results from an improving economy and customer acceptance.
The forecasts of  financial results are then assigned probabilities for each scenario, and will vary depending 
on the bank’s perception of  the borrower’s market position. For example, the most likely could be assigned a 
60% probability, while the worst case could receive a 25% probability and the best case a 15% probability. 
The result provides a range of  possible outcomes and defines the riskiness of  the loan.
Scenario analysis can be applied to BARE with the probabilities as noted. Exhibit 4-7 shows the three 
scenarios developed with the following assumptions for the most likely case.
expand its business as so many of  its competitors have done. In fact, this strategy would actually constitute 
a cash source, with franchisees paying BARE significant up-front fees and a percent of  revenue generated.
fINANCIAl foreCASTS
Forecasting future year results is difficult, particularly when a borrower’s sales are susceptible to economic 
conditions, concerns about unemployment and similar factors beyond management’s control. Bankers request 
projections of  financial results – called pro forma statements – but understand that company management is 
naturally optimistic about the future. This step in credit analysis is critical: what are likely outcomes for the 
company in the context of  these unknowns?
Assumptions in Pro forma Statements
The banker should make forecasts that include a range of  assumptions about sales, inventory, operating 
expenses and other factors that could change actual results.
• Sales. The initial step is to project various levels of  revenue based on recent sales growth 
experience. In fast food, the number of  store openings (and closings) is a critical factor, so 
data must be requested of  BARE’s management on this expectation. Another factor could be 
expansion of  the menu or extension of  hours of  operation.
 For example, the launch of  a breakfast sandwich could substantially increase per store revenue. 
It could perhaps be built on an omelet base with additional toppings available at the buffet, as 
previously described. Without such new initiatives, sales growth may slow in 2011 due both 
to a deliberate move to greater use of  franchising and fewer company-owned stores, to the 
continuing weak economy, and to the ending of  the “wow” factor from a new food idea.
• Cost of  goods sold.  This expense category is often based on a percentage-of-sales. For 
BARE, these costs increased markedly from 2009 to 2010. Inquiries should be made of  
possible causes, whether management intends to initiate inventory and purchasing programs, 
whether the significantly higher cost than the industry can be controlled or is the inevitable 
result of  higher quality ingredients, and similar matters.
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Assumed interest rate: Prime rate (3¼%) + 2% = 5¼%
Term of  the loan: 3 years
Amount of  the loan: $15 million
The calculation shows that the annual repayment of  principal and interest is $5.4 million, shown in 
Exhibit 4-8. The company can manage this amount if  capital investments are curtailed as suggested previously.
Admittedly, the $15 million is not what the company requested, but it may be as much of  a position as 
the bank is willing to finance given the competition in fast food and the novelty of  the BARE concept. These 
factors should be explained to company management with the suggestion that continued profitability may 
lead to reopening discussions on the size of  the loan. Other bank services should be suggested as part of  the 
loan package; for additional information, see Chapter 8.
THe SIGNIfICANCe of THe CoST of CAPITAl
We calculated the financial leverage ratio (debt ÷ equity) as one of  financial ratios. The effect of  debt 
and equity on the balance sheet, and the cost of  those forms of  capital, are critical decisions in financial 
management. We do not want a company to become overleveraged, that is, too debt heavy, because creditors 
will assume that there may be difficulties in servicing that debt. The calculation of  the weighted average cost 
of  capital (the abbreviations ACC or WACC are often used) helps in this determination. It is based on the 
cost of  debt capital for borrowings and the cost of  equity capital for stock sales that finance the company 
and for retained earnings.
• Sales assumes growth at a slightly higher rate as from 2009 to 2010
• Cost of  goods sold assumes better cost control through inventory and purchasing manage-
ment programs
• Operating expenses are assumed higher due to the marketing and legal costs of  franchising
The relative evenness of  BARE’s results are not surprising given the stability of  the fast food industry. 
The probable outcome shows net income after taxes of  $10 million, which is below the 2010 outcome but 
includes a worst case scenario 40% higher than a best case scenario. In any event, all interest costs appear to 
be manageable and the loan should be granted.
THe AMouNT of THe loAN
At the beginning of  this case, it was noted that BARE has requested a $25 million loan for working capi-
tal and the acquisition of  real estate and equipment to expand its restaurants. We now realize that this strategy 
may too aggressive and that more prudent growth may involve franchising. The final issue to be resolved is 
how much we can prudently lend to BARE.
The Annual repayment Amounts
Reducing the loan to $15 million and using a present value of  an annuity calculation at an assumed mar-
ket rate of  interest, we can calculate the monthly and annual debt service as follows:
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DeTerMINING A BorroWer’S oPTIMAl leVerAGe
Is a 48% debt/52% equity the right balance sheet structure for this company? The reception of  the 
marketplace to the mix of  financing will vary by industry, maturity of  company management, competitive 
position within the industry, general economic conditions and other factors. The credit markets dislike exces-
sive fixed obligations but expect that some debt is required as an inexpensive financing mechanism.
Alternate leverage Positions
We can build an estimated cost for each capital component at varying balance sheet percentage assump-
tions (at 25% increments in debt). These costs can be developed from discussions with the bank’s investment 
banking experts and from the analysis of  competing companies with recent financings. There are some inter-
esting developments that are demonstrated in Exhibit 4-10.
Cost of Debt and equity Capital
The cost of  debt capital is taken directly from BARE’s contractual interest payments for bank loans, 
bonds or other sources of  long-term borrowings.  We calculate the cost on an after-tax basis, using the 
applicable corporate tax rate of  35%. The cost of  debt capital is 9.85%, calculated as interest expense of  
$6.9 million and a total amount of  debt of  $70 million ($10 million in notes payable and $60 million 
in bonds and mortgages payable). The average cost of  debt capital is 6.40% ([1-35%] times 9.85%). The 
reason that we use the after-tax cost is that interest payments are deductible expenses in the calculation of  
net income.
The cost of  equity capital is the sum of  the cost of  dividend payments and the expected growth in the 
retained earnings of  the business or in the value of  the company’s stock (normally measured over one year).47 
The theory of  these two components is that stockholders acquire stock for two types of  returns: dividends, 
representing a share of  net income, and capital gains, representing the appreciation in the price of  the stock. 
BARE pays no dividends at this time as would be expected with a growth company. Shareholders expect to be 
rewarded with an annual increase in the price of  their stock. Given BARE’s high return-on-equity, a reason-
able expectation is an annual 12 to 14% price increase.
Calculation of the Cost of Capital
The cost of  capital is the interest, dividend and retained earnings or expected stock price appreciation 
cost of  financing the business, weighted by the amount of  debt and equity on the balance sheet. Using the 
costs noted above, the cost of  capital is 9.83%, as calculated in Exhibit 4-9.
47  An alternative method to calculate the cost of  equity capital is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The central idea 
of  the CAPM is that the relationship between the expected return and beta can be quantified. The equation that determines 
this result is as follows:
Expected Return of  a Stock (based on CAPM) = The Risk-Free Return + the b of  the Stock times the Market’s 
Expected Return less the Risk-Free Return (on a short-term U.S. Treasury security)  OR
Re = Rf + <be X (Rm – Rf)> 
CAPM shows that the expected return of  a stock (or other asset) depends on the risk-free return that is available to investors, the 
reward for bearing systematic risk, and the amount of  systematic risk. 
Handbook of Corporate Lending: A GuIDe for BANkerS AND fINANCIAl MANAGerS
84
CHAPTer 4: CreDIT ANAlYSIS 
85
What Are Considerations in Deciding on leverage?
Financial leverage depends on the expectation that the resulting returns will exceed the debt cost. The 
data reported in Exhibit 4-9 are illustrative of  what the company may experience. In fact, most companies 
have a saucer-shaped (or U-shaped) cost of  capital curve, with a fairly wide range of  financing combina-
tions yielding the optimal (lowest) cost. In adding $15 million of  debt to BARE’s balance sheet, financial 
leverage (measured as Total Debt ÷ Total Assets) rises from 48% in 2010 to 51% in 2011 (calculated as 
[116 + 15] ÷ [243 + 15] in millions). This appears to be well within the optimal range.
• The cost of  debt at 0% and 25% components (rows 1 and 2) is less than the 10.0% we 
used in our example for 50% debt (row 3). The reason is that lesser amounts of  debt 
result in a lower interest charge by lenders. The same outcome can be seen for equity 
capital.
• The cost of  capital is actually lowest at the mix of  50% debt/50% equity (row 3). The 
cost of  capital is considerably higher at 75% debt/25% equity (row 4). This higher cost 
is not trivial and can be calculated at about $2 million annually!  Few managers can afford 
to make mistakes of  this size. Intuitively, you may have expected the case in row 1 to be the 
least expensive because each component cost is the lowest; however, that is not so based on 
our calculations.
• There is no row 5 for 100% debt/0% equity because companies cannot be financed entirely 
by debt capital under normal conditions.48 The highest level of  leverage is in the financial 
services industries; banks in particular may have as much as 90% of  their balance sheets 
financed using debt. Owners/stockholders must have some stake to show lenders that they 
have an investment in the success of  the business.
• With this information, the financial manager can attempt to calibrate the debt/equity ratio 
to exactly the spot preferred by the marketplace, perhaps 40% debt/60% equity, or 45% 
debt/55% equity, or even 55% debt/45% equity. The decision will somewhat depend on 
the cost of  adding another “chunk” of  either method of  financing for his or her particular 
company. The goal of  a financial structure should be to optimize the debt/equity mix, re-
sulting in the maximizing of  stockholder value.
48  While no company can deliberately operate entirely with debt, there have been instances where companies have had nega-
tive net worth due to operating losses but continue to have positive cash flow. The website of  Bloomberg L.P. notes that of  
2,625 U.S. companies with a market value of  $500 million or more, 69 have negative net worth. Included are such compa-
nies as UAL Corp. and AMR Corp. (airlines), Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, Domino’s Pizza Inc. and Revlon Inc., Unisys 
Corp. (computers), Navistar International Corp. (trucks), Cablevision Systems Corp. (cable TV), and Dun & Bradstreet 
Corp. and Moody’s Corp. (financial information). John Dorfman, “Avoid Negative-Net-Worth Stocks Like the Plague,” 
Mar 14, 2010, Bloomberg Opinion, at www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-03-14/avoid-negative-net-worth-stocks-like-the-
plague-john-dorfman.html.
CHAPTER 5:  
THE CREDIT AGREEMENT
This chapter discusses the following topics:
1. Content of  the loan agreement
2. Interest rates and pricing
3. Lender protections
4. The concept of  bank loan covenants
5. Subsidiaries and lending agreements
6. Banks and parent-subsidiary issues
In Chapter 4 we discussed credit analysis. Once the commitment is made to offer a commercial loan, the 
process of  preparing the credit agreement begins. Credit administration is initiated with a formal loan agree-
ment or contract drafted by bank attorneys and signed by representatives of  the bank and the corporate bor-
rower. Provisions in such documents today are fairly standard, and include “boilerplate” clauses, affirmative 
and negative covenants required of  the borrower, required documentation, and other necessary clauses written 
primarily to protect the bank.
GeNerAl CoNTeNT of THe AGreeMeNT
Loan documents have specific provisions written to protect the lender against borrower misconduct. 
The typical lending agreement uses language that has been subject to decades of  judicial review and case 
law.  See Exhibit 5-1 for a typical loan letter agreement, often used for small businesses.  Many agreements 
now involve formal contractual language running to more than fifty pages; for content by major section, 
see Exhibit 5-2. In the discussion that follows we review the purposes of  the significant elements of  these 
agreements.
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The Basic Provisions
The first portion of  a loan agreement details the type of  loan being made, its amount of  the bank’s com-
mitment, fees and interest to be paid, the repayment schedule and any restrictions that may be applied on the 
use of  loan proceeds by the borrower. For example, the purpose of  the loan may be to finance the working 
capital requirements of  the borrower, and the amount could be $5 million with a maturity date one year from 
the execution date of  the agreement. Payments are due monthly by long-standing practice. For purposes of  
this book, the types of  loans that will be used are lines of  credit, term loans and revolving credits that can 
convert to term loans, with all these types of  loans having durations of  three years or more.
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(ERISA).51  Representations can also be stated regarding the borrower and its subsidiaries filing tax returns 
and having paid taxes owed.
Corporate Governance and the lenders’ role
When Berle and Means52 first wrote about the modern corporation and the separation of  ownership and 
control, they raised legitimate questions about who runs a modern day corporation: the shareholders, man-
agement, the board of  directors or some combination. What is sometimes ignored is the role of  the lenders 
in managing a corporation; certainly lenders have advantages not normally available to the investing public, 
including management projections, monthly unaudited financial statements and other sensitive information.
Arguably, the credit crisis at various financial institutions was brought to a bankruptcy threat by  lenders 
demanding additional collateral for outstanding loans. As one example, the principal clearing banks of  
Lehman Brothers in March 2008 demanded that the firm post additional collateral for loans made against 
marketable securities. Counterparties to the numerous repurchase transactions that Lehman conducted on a 
daily basis began to withdraw business. Liquidity was frozen by the clearing banks, and hedge fund customers 
began migrating to other firms. Lehman inevitably failed. The role lenders play in inadequate borrower risk 
management is critical and can be fatal to a firm dependent on regular sources of  debt capital.
INTereST rATeS AND PrICING
Many loans today are specified as variable rate interest and are adjusted periodically based on a bench-
mark (or globally referenced) rate. The benchmark rate has become an accepted basis for pricing loans.
Benchmark rates
The following benchmark rate quotes are from August 2010 and, for comparison, at the start of  the 
credit crisis (in March 2008).
51  ERISA establishes standards for pension plans in industry. The law was enacted to protect the interests of  employee benefit 
plan participants and their beneficiaries through the disclosure to them of  information concerning the plan; the establish-
ment of  standards of  conduct for plan fiduciaries; and provisions for access to the federal courts.
52 Adolph Berle  and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, 1932.
The second part of  a loan agreement, reflecting its essentially contractual nature, details “Conditions 
Precedent” where one party, namely the bank, is not required to perform its duties and obligations, that is, 
to lend the borrower the money, until the borrower has satisfied certain requirements, namely the conditions 
precedent to allow the loan to be executed. Obviously, depending on the structuring features of  the loan 
agreement, the conditions precedent will vary, i.e., is the loan to be guaranteed and if  so, then a satisfactory 
guarantee and a satisfactory legal opinion about its enforceability will be required as a condition precedent 
before loan proceeds can be disbursed.
representations and Warranties
Following the conditions precedent section, one finds a detailed listing of  representations and warranties 
normally to be made by the borrower. These “reps and warranties” involve commentary on the borrower’s 
legal status, i.e., its ability to enter into said obligations -- and this is no minor legal “formality”. In a classic 
case involving the construction of  a nuclear power plant in New Hampshire, various electric cooperatives49 
agreed to finance part of  the power plant in exchange for taking electricity from the plant when completed. 
Following construction cost overruns, the cooperatives argued that they were not legally permitted to enter 
into the financing contracts and succeeded in having their obligations cancelled.
This was not an isolated case. A British court ruled that interest-rate swaps arranged by a local govern-
mental entity in London were not legal and must be voided, resulting in large losses for the banks that ar-
ranged the contracts. In interest-rate swap contracts, companies, local governments or banks agree to exchange 
interest-rate payments on their borrowings for a specified period of  time. According to the High Court in 
London, the Hammersmith and Fulham Council, a mainstay of  the British swap market, did not have legal 
authority to enter into dozens of  swap contracts totaling about $9.5 billion.50
Other representations often involve statements on litigation and defaults; a listing of  subsidiaries of  the 
borrower, where they are incorporated and what percentage of  ownership the borrower has for those subsid-
iaries; outstanding liens; and the borrower’s compliance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
49  A utility cooperative delivers public utility services, such as electricity or water to its members. Profits are either reinvested 
for infrastructure or distributed to members in the form of  patronage dividends, which are paid based on a member’s invest-
ment in the cooperative.
50  Michael Quint, “British Court Invalidates Some Financial Swaps,” New York Times, November 6, 1989,  at www.nytimes.
com/1989/11/06/business/british-court-invalidates-some-financial-swaps.html.
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(OC), the risk of  the borrower (RB) and the required profit margin for the bank (PM). This formula 
can be expressed as:
Loan interest rate = CF + OC + RB + PM
A typical situation prior to the 2008 credit crisis may have involved a CF of  4%, OC of  1¾%, RB of  
1% and PM of  ¾ of  1%, for total pricing of  7½%. As we discuss in Chapter 7, this approach to loan pric-
ing has little to do with establishing a rate that will fully compensate the bank and enable profitability. Recent 
changes in Basel 3 (discussed in Chapter 2) may set higher capital requirements depending on the type of  
loan, which could impact loan pricing.
As we saw in Chapter 4, the typical schedule of  repayment for bank loans involves a present value of  an 
annuity calculation of  the monthly amount of  accrued interest and a portion of  the principal amount. Loans 
with durations of  more than one year may be scheduled as a bullet (or balloon) loan, in which only interest 
is paid for the duration of  loan with the principal paid at the end of  the loan as one lump sum payment or 
refinanced.
leNDer ProTeCTIoNS IN loAN AGreeMeNTS
Specific protections for lenders include collateral (as discussed in Chapter 3), required financial report-
ing, expiration of  the agreement, and certain other matters.
financial Information
• Financial statements. Borrowers are required to provide financial statements at the end of  
each quarter of  operations and independently audited financial once a year. Loan agreements 
may require additional data to support the financials; see Exhibit 5-3 for a list of  supple-
mental material that may be demanded by a lender. 
• Federal funds (Fed funds) is the rate that U.S. commercial banks charge each other for over-
night borrowing. In August 2010, Fed funds were offered at 1/5th of  a percentage point 
(0.20%). In 2008 the rate was 2.4%.
• LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate) represents bank overnight borrowing outside 
of  the U.S. and is established in twice daily fixings by London-based banks. Three-month 
LIBOR was 1/3rd of  1% (.33%) in mid-2010; in 2008 the rate was 2.7%.
• The prime rate (used is the Barely Edible case in Chapter 4) was once the interest rate 
charged by banks to their most creditworthy customers (those considered as prominent and 
stable businesses), and is usually adjusted when the Federal Reserve changes its target for Fed 
funds. Practice has migrated to the use of  Fed funds or LIBOR for these borrowers, with 
the prime rate now used mostly for middle marker and small companies. The prime rate was 
3.25% in mid-2010; in 2008 the rate was 5.3%.53
The variable rate quoted in a loan agreement is stated as one of  these rates – sometimes at the 
option of  the borrowing company – plus an incremental charge reflective of  the risk associated with 
the borrower; e.g., the prime rate plus 2% per annum. In some situations, the rate will be based on 
a fixed rate for the duration of  the loan. The Federal Reserve System publishes data on interest rate 
experience.54
Pricing the loan
Banking continues to be a highly competitive business despite the substantial reduction in the 
number of  financial institutions in recent years. As the result, loan pricing is based on a cost-plus 
calculation, with the benchmark rate used as the underlying cost of  funds (CF), to which are added 
increments for the bank’s operating costs including the necessary spread above the benchmark rate 
53  Benchmark and other rates are quoted weekly in the “Market Laboratory” section of  Barron’s and in the “Money & Invest-
ing” section of  the daily Wall Street Journal.
54  “Survey of  Terms of  Business Lending,” Statistical Release E.2 at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/current/default.htm, 
updated quarterly.
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require all reports filed with the appropriate regulators, i.e. public service commissions, be 
copied to the lender as well.
General Information
• Expiration. The agreement states the conditions that would lead to the termination of  the 
loan. For example, expiration could result from either the failure to close the loan by a 
specified date or a material adverse change. The latter situation refers to developments in 
the borrower’s financial condition or if  any warranty or representation made by borrower 
is determined to be false, incorrect or misleading in any material respect.  This enables the 
lender to refuse to complete the financing if  the borrower experiences such a change. The 
rationale is to protect the lender from major adverse events that make the borrower a less 
attractive client.
• Oral agreements. A typical provision is the unenforceability of  oral statements. This pro-
vision protects both the bank and the borrower against private, verbal side-agreements or 
statements by the loan officer or the borrower’s representative.
• Resolution of  board of  directors. It is standard practice for the bank to require a resolution 
by the board of  directors of  the borrower to authorize the loan.
• Other warranties. These warranties may involve the legitimacy of  the borrower as a cor-
poration or other form of  business, that it is not a party to substantive litigation, and 
that it is current with all tax payments. Additionally, the borrower is typically required 
to maintain its corporate existence and that of  its subsidiaries, to maintain its proper-
ties, to keep those properties properly insured, to maintain its records and financial 
statements, the latter consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), 
to comply with laws, to allow the lender at its discretion to inspect its facilities and re-
cords, to have the right to meet with the borrower’s accountants and to meet its payment 
obligations.
• Management’s projections. Banks will expect to receive financial projections from manage-
ment, along with an analysis by management of  the past period’s results, the reasons for any 
significant deviation from past projections, and a forecast and discussion of  expected future 
results.
• Status of  non-default. As a supplement to the request for notification of  a default, the lender 
often requires the borrower to provide it (usually either quarterly or annually) with a certifi-
cate stating, in effect, that no event of  default exists. Additionally, it is not unusual to find 
an affirmative covenant that requires the outside auditors to deliver with the annual audit a 
statement that no event of  default exists in the opinion of  the auditor, in effect, a cross check 
on events of  default having not occurred.
• Required filings. Lenders often require borrowers to copy the lender on all filings with share-
holders, the SEC and national security exchanges. If  the borrower is a utility, lenders often 
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Current Practice
Various researchers have analyzed databases of  specific credit agreements in the attempt to resolve such 
questions as whether covenants cause defaults,55 whether bank lines of  credit are a liquidity substitute for 
cash,56 and whether banks use unreasonable covenants to renegotiate loan terms and/or reduce their risk 
exposure.57 More theoretical research has examined other questions related to loan covenants.58
Research on bank loan covenants has uniformly assumed that the standard measures are useful and ap-
propriate, providing information to the lender as to the viability of  the borrower. However, these studies 
lack a critical examination of  the efficacy of  traditional covenants, and the American banking regulators have 
remained silent on the issue of  whether specific measures are relevant or necessary, or if  they should be man-
datory in credit agreements. In the economic prosperity of  the past, such a posture may have been acceptable; 
in the present economic situation, a fresh examination appears to be appropriate.
Access to Credit in the Present recession
The current liquidity crisis has severely restricted lending as the banking industry struggles to regain 
profitability and meet minimum capital requirements.59 The situation is gradually improving, with every ex-
pectation that lending will resume to normal levels and that the customary requirements will be reinstituted. 
In the interim, managers have adjusted to extremely difficult financial stresses.
55  Sergei A. Davydenko, “When Do Firms Default? A Study of  the Default Boundary,” a paper presented at the 2009 Ameri-
can Finance Association meeting; available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=672343, pages 5, 7, 46 (Table IX).
56  Amir Sufi, “Bank Lines of  Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22 (2009), 
pages 1057-1088; at ssrn.com/abstract=723361.
57  Clifford W. Smith, “A Perspective on Accounting-Based Debt Covenant Violations,” Accounting Review, Vol. 68 (1993), pages 289-303.
58  These include such issues as whether bondholders derive implicit protection by this form of  bank monitoring (Andrew H. 
Chen, Mao-Wei Hung and Simon C. Mazumdar, “Loan Covenants and Corporate Debt Policy Under Bank Regulations,” 
Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 19 (1995), pages 1419 – 1436.; whether tightly written loan covenants result from private 
information accessible only to banks and other lenders (Cem Demiroglu and Christopher James, “The Information Content 
of  Bank Loan Covenants,” a paper presented at the 2008 American Finance Association Meeting, available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=959393); whether loan covenants affect the rights of  creditors (Claire A. Hill, “Is Secured Debt Efficient?” 
Texas Law Review , Vol. 80 (2002), pages 1117- 1177); and whether they impact corporate governance (Charles K. White-
head, “The Evolution of  Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance,” Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 34 
(2009), pages 641-674.).  
59  As with other bank lending, banks are becoming more restrictive In their revolving lending agreements, shortening dura-
tions and charging higher fees. See, Serena Ng, “Banks Get Tougher on Credit Line Provisions,” The Wall Street Journal, May 4, 
2009, pages A1, A6.
THe CoNCePT of BANk loAN CoVeNANTS
The bank and the borrower effectively become partners at the time of  the loan, and each party wants 
a successful outcome: the customer in repaying the bank’s loan and purchasing other services, and the bank 
in continuing to assist the borrower and provide expertise. Loan covenants protect against the deterioration 
of  the borrower’s position, and specify actions should that occur. Illustrative loan covenants are provided in 
Exhibit 5-4. We provide a detailed discussion of  loan covenants in Chapter 6.
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The following are common reasons why companies have subsidiaries.
• Risk management. Many businesses use subsidiaries to manage and limit risk. By putting 
either high risk ventures into individual subsidiaries or putting entities that involve specific 
risks -- such as the litigation that tobacco companies have faced -- into individual subsid-
iaries, that individual subsidiary will be legally liable and not the parent unless the parent 
provided guarantees.
• Acquisition. When one company acquires another, the company acquired may become a 
subsidiary of  the acquiring company.
• Territoriality. Companies, particularly multinationals, may find it operationally and legally 
useful to incorporate subsidiaries in countries where they operate.
• Taxation. Taxes are assessed by country and may vary significantly. For instance, if  the cor-
porate tax rate is 12½% in Ireland and 35% in the U.S., there is a significant benefit for the 
U.S. parent to create a separate Irish subsidiary.  Conversely, if  certain expenses are transfer-
rable, it is best to move those expenses to a higher taxed entity.
The Impact of Transfers to/from Subsidiaries
Given the above rationales for having subsidiaries, how does this impact the structure of  loan cov-
enants? Let us first examine subsidiary structure. Attached are balance sheets of  a company (the parent) 
that borrowed money on day 1. There are no subsidiaries, just one company borrowing money from a 
bank. Then a subsidiary is created on day 2 with an injection of  $3,000 of  its cash into capital of  the new 
subsidiary. In addition, the parent sells all of  the fixed assets on day 2 and then uses all of  the proceeds 
to additionally capitalize the new subsidiary. In other words, it puts $5,500 of  capital into the subsidiary.
The balance sheets for these periods are included in Exhibit 5-5.
Leading bankruptcies are quite visual to the average person -- Linens ‘n Things (small home appli-
ances), Circuit City (electronics), Fortunoff  (jewelry and home furnishings), Bennigan’s (restaurants) 
and Chrysler (automobiles) -- particularly as long as the commercial real estate these companies formerly 
occupied remains empty. Surviving businesses have readjusted their finances in the effort to remain viable 
through such actions as reducing staff, negotiating with vendors and landlords, and a variety of  other 
actions.60
Lenders will inevitably make adjustments in their dealings with corporate borrowers, requiring higher 
levels of  documentation, appraisals of  collateral required to support loans, more frequent meetings and 
other communications with borrowers, and greater disclosure of  the basis for pro forma statement fore-
casts. Despite any such modifications, it is inevitable that the analytical techniques previously used to 
evaluate creditworthiness will continue to be utilized, and the mistakes that these procedures permit will 
recur.
loAN AGreeMeNTS AND BuSINeSS orGANIZATIoN CoMPleXITIeS
Before turning to the details of  loan covenants, we comment on the situation where the borrower – called 
the parent -- has subsidiary companies and the possible impact on loan agreements.
Why Companies Have Subsidiaries
Subsidiaries are separate, distinct legal entities that may be established in the same or in a differ-
ent jurisdiction, including other countries. Subsidiaries differ from divisions which are businesses fully 
integrated within the main company and not legally or otherwise distinct from it. Subsidiaries are a 
common feature of  business life, and most if  not all major businesses organize their operations in this 
way.
60  See James Sagner, “How to Measure and Manage Liquidity Today”, Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, Vol. 21 (2009), 
pages 47-50.
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Note that the equity shown in the subsidiary’s year-end statement cannot be $9,000 because that would 
be double-counting. On day 2, the parent invested $5,500 into the subsidiary but had only $2,000 in capital. 
Capital that is added to a subsidiary means that on consolidation you net out the $5,500, so on day 2 you 
have the same assets and liabilities. But by year-end, the subsidiary has made $3,500 in profits that have to be 
added to net worth on a consolidated basis.
Now if  we compare the original borrower on day 1 and at year-end we see it had bank debt of  $5,500 
against equity of  $2,000. At year-end, bank debt is $11,000 and equity is $5,500, so the debt-to equity-ratio 
has decreased. As a result, can we say the risk of  default has decreased to the lender? What we are seeing is the 
movement of  tangible, valuable assets that were directly owned by the borrower to a subsidiary. The question 
is does this make the loan to the borrower riskier and if  so, why?
Structural Subordination in  Parent-Subsidiary Transfers
Several issues arise from this situation. First, does the subsidiary have debt? It does, in the form of  bank 
debt. What might the bank lender to the subsidiary require for the loan? What if  the bank lender to the 
Has the balance sheet of  the borrower strengthened or deteriorated as a result of  these transactions? 
Obviously, the borrower has no cash and no fixed assets but has the same amount of  debt owed to its lender; 
therefore, it has been weakened in terms of  credit repayment strength. When we consolidate these two com-
panies -- parent and subsidiary -- on day 2, we have an issue, i.e. the investment in the subsidiary has to be 
zeroed out upon consolidation on day 2.
The balance sheets at year-end shown in Exhibit 5-6 result from the incurring of  receivables and accru-
als, the acquiring of  inventory, the buying of  fixed assets, the taking on of  trade debt, earning $3,500 (after 
taxes), and borrowing $5,500 from a bank.
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How do lenders address structural subordination and, more importantly, how do they limit credit risks 
in lending to parent companies? Lenders can prohibit debt or severely limit debt at the subsidiary level. In 
addition, the subsidiaries can guarantee the debt of  the parent company and assuming that all debt at the 
subsidiary level is unsecured, the subsidiary guarantees should rank equal or pari-pasu63 to the unsecured debt 
of  the subsidiaries.
BANkS AND PAreNT-SuBSIDIArY ISSueS
Assuming that debt is either prohibited at the subsidiary level or severely limited, leaving the parent as 
the primary borrower, if  the parent is not an operating company, we are left with an additional question, 
i.e., how does the holding company generate cash to pay principal and interest on its own directly borrowed 
money? This is handled primarily through dividends from the subsidiary companies, which has implications 
particularly for bank and insurance holding companies.
Bank Holding Companies and Subsidiaries
If  we have a bank holding company and the subsidiaries are individual regional banks, what might be the 
concerns here? What if  loan losses negatively impact capital ratios of  the regional banks and the regulators 
prohibit upstream dividends until capital levels rebound to more acceptable levels? Even if  the regional banks 
were allowed to give upstream guarantees to the holding company, regulators might stay or temporarily stop 
those guarantees until capital level thresholds were met.
Alternatively, intercompany cash transfers are another way to move money from where it is not needed to 
where it is needed. However, this could be limited if  the parent does not own 100% of  its subsidiary because 
the minority owner could claim it was damaged by money being taken out of  the subsidiary and transferred 
to the parent where the minority owner has no ownership stake.
Could the bank holding company affect a sale of  one or more of  its regional banks? Theoretically yes and 
practically yes too; however, the banking regulators would not bless just any interested acquiring party, i.e., 
regulators would not permit an Iranian bank to acquire a U.S. bank. In essence, it is critical when analyzing 
63  This phrase is Latin for “with equal steps”; referring to being equal in all respects, at the same rate, in the same degree or 
proportion, or enjoying the same rights without bias or preference. 
subsidiary asks for a security interest in all the assets of  the subsidiary? How does that impact the parent’s 
loan? In essence, it removes the ability of  the parent (and its lender) to directly claim against assets of  its 
subsidiary, as a preference is being given to the creditor lending to the parent’s subsidiary.
If  the subsidiary defaults on its loan, what might the lender do? Presumably its lender could accelerate 
the loan. If  so, would it be interested in maximizing the value for the secured assets or simply maximizing the 
value to a sum sufficient to pay off  the loan?  If  it does that, how has the risk changed in respect to the par-
ent’s loan? Obviously, the subsidiary lender is only interested in getting its debt repaid so it will only maximize 
its collection efforts to repay its own loan, not all the debt to the consolidated group. In effect, what we are 
seeing in bank debt or any other debt at the subsidiary level is “structural subordination”.
Structural subordination is distinct from contractual subordination, where the subordinated creditors 
contractually agree to payment after the senior obligations. By allowing subsidiaries to borrow, the lenders 
to those subsidiaries have, in effect, first claims on the assets which, in turn, put the claims by the holding 
company on subsidiary assets in a subordinate position. If  there is structural subordination, how do you think 
the rating agencies would treat parent company debt versus subsidiary company debt? Would they rate parent 
debt higher or lower? The answer is that debt of  the parent is rated lower than subsidiary debt.
A classic example of  structural subordination can be found in an S-4 debt exchange offer for the company 
Freescale Semiconductor.61 The operative phrase is as follows:
 Claims of  note holders will be structurally subordinated to claims of  creditors of  our sub-
sidiaries that do not guarantee the Exchange Notes….Claims of  holders of  the Exchange 
Notes will be structurally subordinated to the claims of  creditors of  our subsidiaries that do 
not guarantee the Exchange Notes, including trade creditors. All obligations of  these subsid-
iaries will have to be satisfied before any of  the assets of  such subsidiaries would be available 
for distribution, upon a liquidation or otherwise ….62 
61  An S-4 form must be submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission in the event of  a merger or an acquisition 
between two companies.
62  At the SEC’s website for public filings, www.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHtml 
Section1?SectionID=5260104-143199-231138&SessionID=3e2VHHHAD_bdFP7
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CHAPTER 6: LOAN 
AGREEMENT COVENANTS 
AND OTHER MEASURES
This chapter discusses the following topics:
1. General covenants affecting the borrower
2. Capital investment and equity covenants
3. Liquidity covenants
4. Debt and leverage covenants
5. Income statement covenants
6. Problems in the use of  ratios in loan covenants
7. Constructing more useful measures for loan agreements
We noted general concepts of  loan agreements in Chapter 5.  This chapter examines the construction of  
covenants in the lending contract between business borrowers and lenders. Covenants may be both positive 
(affirmative), specifying provisions to which the borrower must adhere, and negative, listing prohibited ac-
tions or financial limitations. Although a summary listing was provided in Exhibit 5-3 using this nomencla-
ture, the difference is largely a matter of  how the words are stated in the loan agreement. For this reason, our 
discussion is organized by the business condition and the portion of  the financial statement that is impacted 
by the covenant.
GeNerAl CoVeNANTS THAT AffeCT THe BorroWer
As was noted in Chapter 5, the borrower must provide various representations and warranties, includ-
ing the legal status of  the business, legitimacy to enter into a contract to borrow, and other matters that 
banks to assure that the subsidiaries have the financial balance sheet and operating strength to upstream divi-
dends to the parent.
other Subsidiary Issues in Banking
Another question arises as well from these parent company concerns.  Assuming the lender has success-
fully limited debt at the subsidiary level and the subsidiaries generate substantial cash flow, would it matter if  
the subsidiaries were domestic or foreign and if  it would matter, why would it matter? If  one subsidiary was 
generating about 80% of  the needed cash flow to service the parent company’s debt and if  the subsidiary were 
located in a country where that country’s currency was under attack, what might that country do? Currency 
controls might be imposed, limiting the ability of  the parent to extract funds from that profitable subsidiary. 
A further risk might be nationalization, which has been threatened in recent years by Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez.
Finally, let us assume that you have structured a loan to a parent company and you have secured upstream 
guarantees from all of  the subsidiaries for the underlying loan. The subsidiary guarantees are joint and several, 
and these guarantees will be unsecured senior obligations of  the subsidiaries. What else do you need? You 
want to protect your loan in case a subsidiary is sold, i.e., ideally you would like sale proceeds to repay a por-
tion, the entire loan or at least have the ability to require it.
With regard to asset sales by a subsidiary, you want to assure that they were done at fair market value, and 
you may want an ability to direct such proceeds to reduce debt. If  the subsidiary has subordinated debt on 
its balance sheet, do you want to limit prepayments of  that debt? You also want to prohibit subsidiaries from 
issuing debt in the future or allowing liens on its operating assets. Nor do you want subsidiaries to engage in 
sale/leaseback transactions, as they remove a valuable or perceived valuable asset from the balance sheet of  
the subsidiary and weaken the collateral base.
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reporting and Disclosure Covenants
An essential element of  any effective loan agreement is the requirement that the borrower provide finan-
cial forecasts. These forecasts, including projected (pro forma) income statements, balance sheets and cash 
flow statements, should be for the following fiscal year by month, with forecasts out from two to five years. 
How does one assess appropriate covenant metrics, i.e., should an EBIT debt service ratio be set at two or 
three times, or something lower or higher? If  a company is requested to provide financial projections, how 
would that benefit both the lender and the borrower?
On receipt of  financial projections, the bank would test these estimates by examining historical compari-
sons. The company and its competitors usually have similar attributes; the ratios noted below are illustrative 
of  what is important to an industry and are discussed throughout this section of  the chapter.
• If  the company is capital intensive, the fixed asset ratio is significant and the fixed asset turn-
over ratio is probably relatively constant.
• If  the company is a retailer, receivable turnover is important.
• If  the company is highly reliant on its suppliers, the ratio of  accounts payable-to-sales should 
have historical consistency.
Attention should be paid in projections to sales growth, profit margins and return on assets. Significant 
deviation in projected results from the past is a legitimate concern, and lenders need to focus on such varia-
tions and, absent acceptable explanations, hold the borrower to measures tied to past rather than future (per-
haps overly optimistic) performance.
Dividend Covenants
The payment of  dividends can be restricted by either a set dollar amount or tied to a percentage of  an-
nual profits. Dividends can also be restricted if  other covenants are not met or to prevent the company from 
violating minimum cash level requirements.
might affect the lender’s position should a future dispute occur. Selected matters of  importance include 
current litigation or regulatory proceedings, the event of  default on any loan requirement, or similar 
matters.
• Litigation and/or regulatory proceedings. Is the borrower a party to any litigation or reg-
ulatory actions? Suppose the borrower is a securities firm that receives a so-called Wells 
Notice.64 A charge of  criminal fraud might be the death knell for its survival and a lender 
would want to know immediately of  such an action.
• Default of  a lending agreement covenant. The bank must be informed as soon as possible 
and certainly within “X” number of  days of  any event of  default that has occurred in re-
spect to the borrower’s obligations. What actions, if  any, does the borrower intend to take 
in respect to the default? Here is an actual experience of  one of  the authors who at the time 
was working for a bank that had a large loan to a football stadium. Due to estate issues, the 
stadium was to be sold to a third party, and the third party requested that the lenders issue a 
no default letter to the new buyer. The bank protested that it could not give that representa-
tion as it must come from the seller. The bank did not have complete information and would 
not know if  monies have been subverted or stolen, and therefore only the borrower could 
represent that it is or is not in default.
• Changes in status of  the borrower. Loan covenants typically require a borrower to no-
tify its lender if  any circumstances were to develop that could materially impact its legal 
obligations. For example, such a condition would be if  the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (“PGBC”) were forced to terminate a pension plan of  the borrower, an ob-
ligation specified under ERISA.65 Similarly, lenders will want a covenant that will entitle 
them to information given to other creditors, thereby allow the bank lender to be similarly 
informed.
64  A “Wells Notice” is a letter sent by the SEC or other securities regulator to a company notifying it of  the substance of  
charges that the regulator intends to bring and affording an opportunity to submit a response.
65  ERISA refers to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of  1974, a federal law that establishes minimum standards 
for company pension plans. ERISA protects the interests of  employee benefit plan participants and their beneficiaries by 
requiring the disclosure of  financial and other information concerning the plan; and by providing for appropriate remedies 
and access to the federal courts.
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loans to employees and executives
A loan covenant may restrict insider lending for the convenience of  employees and executives of  the firm. 
Lenders frequently prefer the borrower to focus on its business and not use its liquidity to extend credit to 
its personnel.
Net Worth
A minimum net worth requirement or minimum tangible net worth requirement covenant provides that 
the borrower maintain at all times a net worth of  not less than “X” dollars.  Should the borrower purchase 
another company during the life of  the loan, the purchase price may well exceed the net worth of  the acquired 
company.
This results in the creation of  goodwill, the excess of  the purchase price over the net worth of  the ac-
quired company. If  the company encounters financial problems following the acquisition, how does this affect 
the value of  the goodwill? In a troubled situation, the value of  the goodwill plummets faster than the ability 
of  the borrower to repay the loan. Accordingly, many lenders prefer a minimum tangible net worth require-
ment to a minimum book net worth requirement.
lIQuIDITY CoVeNANTS
Although any current asset or current liability account may be specified in a covenant, those that are 
mentioned most frequently are cash and cash equivalents, and accounts payable.
Working Capital
Some lenders believe that they are protected by stipulating a minimum working capital requirement (de-
fined as current assets minus current liabilities). The language frequently requires that the borrower maintain 
an amount of  working capital of  not less than “X” to “Y”. Occasionally a lender will require that a target 
level of  liquidity – cash and cash equivalents – be maintained, but this is not common.
CAPITAl INVeSTMeNT AND eQuITY CoVeNANTS
Covenants are typical in loan agreements that restrict or control investment activities, net worth or other 
financials of  the borrower.
Capital expenditures
Lenders may restrict borrowers from overspending on capital expenditures. Some loan agreements allow 
expenditures after allowing for depreciation expense, i.e., rather than limiting capital expenditures to say $100 
million a year, the borrower may be able to spend $100 million over and above the annual charge for deprecia-
tion expense. However, a borrower may not want such restrictions if  its business is cyclical and the market is 
growing. Such a restriction limits the potential for future growth.
As an alternative, would the lender and borrower be amenable to a fixed asset turnover ratio? 
Suppose the company forecasts revenues at the start of  each business year and agrees on a fixed asset 
turnover ratio of  three times. Assume that sales in the prior year were $1.2 billion and fixed assets were 
$400 million. If  sales were forecast to be $1.5 billion in the coming year with depreciation expense 
estimated at $100 million, you would allow capital expenditures to be $200 million66 as net fixed as-
sets would become $500 million in that year (based on the three times ratio of  fixed assets to sales). 
If  sales results were not realized, then some clawback (adjustment) against future capital expenditures 
might be considered.
Acquisitions, Mergers and Sale of Assets
An M&A (merger or acquisition) or asset sale covenant prohibits the borrower and its subsidiaries from 
being a party to any merger or consolidation, from selling all or substantially all their assets, and from buy-
ing the assets of  another business. Covenants can also include change in ownership, i.e., if  the company is 
privately held, the lender may be averse to allowing a change in ownership, particularly if  the buyer is inexpe-
rienced in the business.
66  Calculated as $100 million of  depreciation + $100 million of  the excess permitted in the loan covenant.
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The answer is that these companies are looking to display financials at a balance sheet low-end, i.e. when 
borrowings and inventory are most likely near their low point. This puts the company’s balance sheet in its 
best light but for a lender who prefers to measure debt exposure at a debt high point.  If  a company fails, this 
event will occur when debt outstanding is in the latter position. Therefore, an effective covenant would qualify 
for testing at least quarterly and preferably monthly.
Debt-to-Tangible Net Worth
A debt-to-tangible net worth covenant requires the borrower to maintain a ratio of  not greater than “X”. 
A company that has grown more through the acquisition route rather than through internal organic growth 
has paid well in excess of  the book net worth of  the acquired companies. In so doing, it has incurred good-
will, the excess of  the purchase price over the book net worth of  the acquired company.67
long-Term Debt-to-Invested Capital
A long-term debt-to-invested capital covenant uses the ratio of  long-term debt divided by long-term debt 
plus net worth. To illustrate, consider a company with long-term debt outstanding of  $100 million and a 
book net worth of  $150 million, and the lender is considering one of  two debt covenants. The first covenant 
is to limit debt-to-net worth to 100%, i.e. debt cannot exceed 100% of  net worth. As matters currently stand 
the ratio is at 66.7% of  debt-to-net worth.
The company then incurs an additional $70 million of  debt and earns $30 million after-tax during the 
year. After dividends, the total debt is now $170 million and net worth is $180 million or 94.44%, uncomfort-
ably close to the maximum ratio of  100%. Alternatively the borrower could insist on a ratio of  100% long-
term debt-to-invested capital. Under these same conditions, we now have $170 million divided by net worth of  
$180 million plus $170 million or 48.57%, an increase but not as limiting as using debt-to-net worth.
Debt-to-eBITDA
A covenant may specify the maximum total debt-to-EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, deprecia-
tion and amortization). Should this covenant apply to all funded debt or limit it to long-term debt and apply 
67  See the discussion of  goodwill in the previous section on net worth.
Quick ratio
The quick ratio is an alternative to the current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) and 
preferred by many lenders. The borrower is often required to maintain a ratio of  the sum of  (a) cash on hand 
or on deposit in banks, (b) readily marketable securities issued by the U.S., (c) permissible investments as 
defined in the loan agreement, and (d) receivables not more than 90 days old. An important reason for using 
the quick ratio is that it ignores inventory and the possibility of  it being stale or obsolete.
Accounts Payable
A covenant may be required as to the minimum ratio of accounts payables or minimum ratio of trade pay-
ables to inventory. This restriction attempts to minimize the borrower’s “leaning on the trade”. Why might a lend-
er be concerned over the borrower being slow to repay trade creditors? In the event of a bankruptcy filing, trade 
creditors might well defect, insisting on cash in advance before shipping further goods to the bankrupt petitioner.
For the lender, it is then put in unenviable position of  choosing to liquidate the company or adding ad-
ditional credit to allow the firm to keep operating. If  indeed there is a need for additional lending, it often 
takes the form of  a so-called debtor-in-possession financing when additional credit is given to the borrower 
after a bankruptcy filing. This covenant is not often seen in loan agreements
DeBT AND leVerAGe CoVeNANTS
The concept of  financial leverage refers to the use of  debt to finance a company. The typical reference is 
to total debt, that is, current liabilities, which may be free (such as accounts payable) or have a cost (such as 
notes payable), plus long-term liabilities, primarily bank debt and bonds payable.
Debt
A debt covenant requires the lender to minimize the amount of  debt the borrower can have outstanding 
at any time. Would there be any reason for a lender to apply this requirement to any period other than year-
end? Here’s an illustration: the vast majority of  retail stores end their fiscal year after the start of  the new year 
(so as to include the sales of  the holiday season). Why choose a fiscal end date that is not calendar year-end?
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eBIT
A covenant may specify the EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes)-to-interest expense coverage ratio. 
An EBIT coverage ratio requires the borrower to exceed interest expense by some minimum amount. For 
example, a cyclical company with highly volatile revenue and earnings results might be required to have an 
EBIT coverage ratio in excess of  two times. Conversely, a regulated electric utility able to raise rates to levels 
sufficient to generate acceptable returns-on-capital might have a required EBIT ratio of  less than two times.
eBIT-to-Debt Service
The EBIT-to-debt service expense coverage ratio is a variation of  the EBIT covenant. Compared to 
other EBIT ratios, which would the borrower find more flexible? A borrower would prefer EBIT coverage 
tied to interest expense rather than to debt service. For the lender, the primary question for every loan is 
repayment. The ideal situation is for a company borrowing for non-seasonal needs to be able to repay out 
of  surplus cash flow, i.e., after paying out for capital expenditures, working capital needs and dividends, 
leaving the borrower with sufficient surplus cash flow to retire the debt obligation. Failing that, the debt 
must be refinanced.
eBITDA-to-Interest expense
The EBITDA-to-interest expense covenant bolsters coverage over EBIT alone. By using EBITDA rather 
than EBIT, coverage is enhanced by adding back depreciation (and amortization), allowing a company to 
show higher interest expense coverage capability. For companies that are capital intensive, depreciation, a non-
cash charge, is sometimes included in measuring interest coverage.
eBIrT and eBITDAr
A covenant that measures EBIRT (earnings before taxes and interest, adding back operating lease expense 
or “rent”) coverage is useful for companies that are reliant on operating leases. EBIT is not an effective cover-
age ratio because it ignores annual leases. To remedy this defect, lenders often stipulate that a borrower with 
significant operating lease expenses meet a minimum EBIRT coverage ratio, which divides EBIRT by interest 
and rent expense to determine the borrower’s ability to meet these costs.
it to “EBITDA”?  For a lender, which offers the greatest degree of  protection? Many would argue that the key 
to loan repayment is the ability of  a company to service debt, not simply a limit on debt itself. A company 
limited to a smaller amount of  debt but without the ability to service debt, i.e., EBITDA, is probably a great 
risk.
Debt-to-Cash flow
The total debt-to-cash flow covenant may distort repayment ability and, as such, is less useful than other 
debt covenants. Cash flow is defined as all items that produce increases in cash, that is, not just earnings and 
depreciation, but also increases in payables, decreases in receivables, or other cash changes. The ratio allows 
a company to “game” the system by selling receivables or taking other actions with potentially adverse long-
term effects.
Debt-to-Tangible Net Worth
Covenants may require a maximum of  total debt (and pro-forma total debt)-to-tangible net worth. Some 
companies avoid debt through the use of  operating leases. Operating leases currently are revealed through 
footnotes to the financial statements and are not capitalized on the balance sheet. Proposed accounting rules 
will likely change this in the future. Some borrowers may own their buildings but other firms may enter into 
operating leases which understate debt.
Assume two companies, both retailers. Company A owns its 20 stores and has borrowed money to fi-
nance the purchase, incurring $100 million in debt. Company B has leased 20 stores with an annual lease cost 
of  $12 million a year. A rule of  thumb is to capitalize those operating leases at ten times, the assumption 
being that the store leases are a way to avoid debt and that some approximation must be made to translate 
those leases into debt. The Coldwater Creek case (in the Cases section of  the book) challenges the reader to 
assess the debt levels of  this retailer.
INCoMe STATeMeNT CoVeNANTS
The income statement covenants measure earnings before income taxes, with adjustments for deprecia-
tion, amortization, rent and lease expenses.
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What are the Important ratios?
Largely because of  the diversity of  practice among industries, there is no standard set of  bank lending 
covenants. According to a managing director at Standard & Poor’s,68 the five most commonly used financial 
ratios or metrics are as follows:
1. Coverage: minimum levels of  cash flow or earnings relative to specific expenses or charges
2. Leverage: a maximum debt level relative to cash flow or equity
3. Tangible net worth: a minimum tangible net worth69
4. Capital expenditures: a maximum amount that may be spent on capital expenditures
5. Working capital: cash, cash equivalents and accounts payable
Using a sample of  a few hundred bank loans, one study determined that there are several categories of  
covenants, which have been reorganized for Exhibit 6-2. However, there does not appear to be a standard ap-
proach to the use of  financial data.
68  Steven Miller, “Syndicated Loans,” Chapter 30 in Volume I, Handbook of Finance (Frank J. Fabozzi, editor), Wiley, 2008, 
pages 335-336. 
69  Tangible net worth is defined as net worth (owners’ equity) less such intangible assets as goodwill, which involves excess 
value paid in an acquisition; and intellectual property; including patents, copyrights and trademarks.
A covenant that analyzes EBITDAR (earnings before taxes, interest, rent expense and depreciation) cover-
age includes expenses of  leases. For companies that are significantly capital intensive and have lease expenses, 
this ratio, which divides EBITDAR by interest and lease expenses, should allow for greater debt service capacity.
ProBleMS IN THe uSe of rATIoS IN loAN CoVeNANTS
Despite their general acceptance in the financial community, covenants based on balance sheet ratios have 
various problems in application, as summarized in Exhibit 6-1.
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Balance sheet accounts appear in many lending agreements, with the actual frequency dependent on the 
analytical procedures used by the investigator. Sufi reports that 70.6% of  all loans include balance sheet 
covenants, and Paglia reports that the statistic is 96.2%; see Exhibit 6-4 for detailed ratio information. The 
appearance of  balance sheet covenants have not prevented failures, and Davydenko reports that defaults on 
such agreements range from 51.7% to 100% depending on the specific ratio; see Exhibit 6-5. Obviously, 
balance sheet ratios are widely used and yet are unable to predict the ability of  a company to avoid default.
None of  these studies found a measure of  cash flow in the covenants except for debt-to-cash flow, which is 
a substitute for times interest earned (sometimes known as interest coverage).71  In fact, accounting profits are 
used much more frequently in these agreements than actual cash; however, an accrual accounting system makes 
the manipulation of  reported cash flow easier than if  a cash reporting basis of  accounting had been required.
Problems in using the Current ratio
According to Dichev and Skinner,72 the current ratio is the most common of  all financial covenants re-
quirements in loan agreements. The Demiroglu and James study found 956 loans and 506 borrowers using 
71  Times interest earned is often defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by interest expense. The form of  
the numerator accounts for the deductibility of  interest before the calculation of  taxable income.
72  Illia D. Dichev and Douglas J. Skinner, “Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis,” Journal of Accounting 
Research, Volume 40 (2002), pages 1091-1123.
Balance Sheet ratios in loan Covenants
The practice of  making loan decisions and preparing loan agreements has long been known to bankers 
and borrowers, but until recently no systematic study of  the terms of  such arrangements had been conducted. 
Useful reviews of  loans are just being published, some using samples of  thousands of  loans selected from 
Loan Pricing Corporation data.70 
The data include loan maturity, amount, type and various other characteristics, including covenants. The 
frequency of  the appearance of  balance sheet ratios varies depending on the specific study approach and 
database that was investigated, although financial companies were uniformly excluded from the researchers’ 
samples. For the results from three studies, see Exhibit 6-3.
70  Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation (www.loanpricing.com) provides credit market information and analysis for bankers, 
borrowers, and investors. Products include online data, news, and analytics; loan pricing services; and interactive databases.
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company.76 Although TR/CF is not a ratio that is generally considered as a standard financial measure, it 
does reflect industry experience with actual liquidity (rather than the aggregation of  current asset and cur-
rent liability accounts) as measured against revenue. (Total receipts are sales plus any other incoming monies, 
such as from interest or dividend income, rents, and other sources.)
At a time when U.S. economic conditions deteriorated significantly, the total receipts to cash flow (TR/
CF) ratio declined from 9.8 to 6.8 times or 30% while, as noted above, the current ratio did not significantly 
change. The total amount of  cash on U.S. balance sheets rose from 10.2% to 15.4%, a significant increase in 
only three years. This reflects the adjustment of  businesses to the difficulty in securing short-term loans, pri-
marily through bank lines of  credit, as well as cash hoarding to satisfy transactional and precautionary needs.
financial results of Circuit City
Certain leading bankruptcies were mentioned earlier in this chapter. For purposes of  developing an ex-
ample, we use the financials from one of  these -- Circuit City -- for the fiscal years 2005 through 2008.77 It 
is noteworthy that the company had arranged a line of  credit totaling $1.3 billion, secured by its inventory 
and accounts receivable, and that this facility was in effect as recently as the reporting of  its annual report 
for 2008.
Exhibit 6-6 presents current ratio and TR/CF data for the last Circuit City accounting periods. The cur-
rent ratio shows little deterioration either over time or against industry results. Similarly, the debt-to-assets 
and various non-standard balance sheet ratios calculated for the company, as compared with the industry 
result taken from Troy’s Almanac (2009), do not show significant problems through 2007.
Prior to 2008, lenders can discern significant problems only by examining the TR/CF. Furthermore, the 
variation within the current ratio during the period was trivial compared to the TR/CF variation. Exhibit 
76  For this analysis, total receipts are considered primarily as revenues, but include in addition the following: interest, rents, 
royalties, net capital gains and dividends. Cash flow is the difference between cash receipts and disbursements. For practical 
purposes, the calculation of  cash flow can be developed by comparing the change in two successive years of  balance sheet 
reporting of  cash and short-term investments. See the Sagner article in footnote 74.
77  Circuit City filed for bankruptcy protection in early November 2008, and announced its intention to liquidate in Janu-
ary 2009 following a weak Christmas selling season. Many retailing operations conclude their reporting periods one or 
two months after the Christmas season. Following that pattern, Circuit City’s previous fiscal years ended on the last day of  
February.
current ratio covenants, or about 13.2% of  the loans and 27.9% of  the borrowers that were included in their 
sample.73 Generally, larger borrowers do not have current ratio requirements as frequently as do medium and 
smaller sized companies, most likely because of  the perception that risk is greater with the latter segment of  
borrowers.
Despite the prevalence of  balance sheet covenants and access to data through the LPC databases, little 
insightful analysis has been attempted on the usefulness of  balance sheet ratios on predicting business per-
formance and loan repayment. An evaluation of  the current ratio by one of  the authors in a previous study74 
suggested that there is minimal information content in such data. Furthermore, companies with competent 
management not only adjust to deteriorating economic conditions but also manage their liquidity positions 
to comply with loan covenants regarding liquidity.
The current ratio actually increased by 2% based on a sample of  18.5% of  all industries in the period 
2006-2009, the most severe period of  the recent credit crisis.75 This result reflects both the adjustment of  
working capital by businesses to changing conditions and their acknowledgement of  the requirement to main-
tain a specified ratio per existing loan covenants.
CoNSTruCTING More uSeful MeASureS for loAN AGreeMeNTS
It is inherently more accurate and useful to measure liquidity using at least one account derived from the 
income statement, which covers the activities of  an entire fiscal year rather than the status as of  a single date. 
Total receipts-to-Cash flow (Tr/Cf)
The TR/CF ratio indicates the effectiveness with which a firm uses cash to manage its revenues as 
compared to its industry; that is, the less cash required for each dollar of  sales, the more efficient is the 
73  The sample included 7,237 loans from 1,813 borrowers. Demiroglu and James, footnote 6, page 89.
74  Calculations were based on a sample of  current ratios (#30) and ratios of  total receipts-to-total cash Flow (#42) for 25 
industries (of  a total of  about 135 industries);  Leo Troy, Almanac of Business and Industrial Ratios (CCH, 2006 & 2009), Table 
1: Companies with and without Net Income. For the complete study, see James Sagner, Global Review of Accounting and Finance, 
Vol. I (Sept. 2010), pages 112-120, at page 114 (Exhibit 1). 
75  In a period of  deteriorating economic conditions, it would be logical to assume that the current ratio would decrease, not 
increase. 
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6-7 includes the coefficient of  variation (CV) for the two ratios; the CV of  the TR/CF is 13.74 times the 
CV of  the current ratio!
Systems of Credit Analysis
Various credit analysis systems have been developed in recent years to predict the likelihood that a firm 
will face financial distress or enter bankruptcy during the period of  the loan; see Exhibits 6-8 and 6-8Ref  for 
a partial list of  such systems. Arguably the most well-known of  these procedures is Altman’s Z-score, which 
uses various corporate income statement and balance sheet values to evaluate a borrower’s financial condition. 
The Z-score is a linear combination of  five common business ratios, weighted by coefficients which were es-
timated by identifying a set of  firms which had declared bankruptcy and then collecting a sample of  ongoing 
businesses, matched by industry and size.
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loan Covenant Ideas
There are several conclusions that develop from this analysis.
• Balance sheet ratios used as financial covenants in loan agreements have little predictive or 
control value when applied to loan defaults. However, they do assist in preventing the exces-
sive leveraging of  assets to limit loan losses in the event of  insolvency.
• Any financial covenant should include an income statement-to-cash measure. Our analysis 
uses total receipts-to-cash flow, although it is certainly possible that others may be useful.
• Federal regulators of  commercial banks could consider mandatory financial covenants in 
loan agreements, and/or require a minimum standard of  credit training with appropriate 
oversight.
• A specific loan default situation – Circuit City – analyzed using this methodology con-
firmed these general findings.
As we have noted throughout this chapter, it appears that there may be overdependence by bankers on 
loan covenants without adequate consideration for efficacy and appropriateness. These covenants cannot pre-
dict the riskiness of  a borrower; rather they can provide a warning that the financial situation of  a company 
has deteriorated to the point that appropriate remedies must be considered including calling (terminating) 
the loan. Given recent global credit problems, it may be useful to thoughtfully reexamine these practices.
It is comforting that U.S. industry has generally responded quite well to the present credit crisis by taking 
the necessary actions to build cash reserves to replace credit facilities obtained from lenders during normal 
economic times. The holding of  cash for U.S. industry in normal economic times appears to be about 10%, 
although this varies widely by specific industries. In stressful periods, the withdrawal of  lender credit has 
forced companies to increase their cash holdings to about 15%.
Altman applied discriminant analysis78 to datasets for publicly-held manufacturers, private manu-
facturers, non-manufacturing companies and service companies. The model was thought to be approxi-
mately 70 to 90% accurate in predicting bankruptcy shortly before the event, and has been accepted by 
auditors and some banks in support of  credit analysis. Careful studies of  other systems of  credit analysis 
have generally disparaged these approaches as too simplistic and not capable of  consistent prediction 
of  credit outcomes in a dynamic economic environment.79 Forecasting the financial and loan payment 
performance of  corporate borrowers continues to be the purview of  informed input of  experienced loan 
officers.
other Credit Analysis Measures
As we noted in Chapter 3, certain banks have developed technical knowledge of  specific industries due to 
historical, geographical or other factors. This expertise (along with innumerable mistakes) has enabled banks 
to develop metrics of  a borrower’s ability to pay that may only apply in certain industries or in certain situa-
tions. It is beyond the scope of  this book to address all such measures.
However, we have included case material that expands the possible analysis to additional measures that 
may assist in the credit decision. For example, we provide several techniques in the Chemical Companies Case 
that assist in identifying potential problems for those types of  firms including the net trade cycle, fixed as-
set turnover, the Dupont system, goodwill and intangibles, debt-to-EBITDA and concerns in footnotes to 
financial statements (illustrated by discussing using pension obligations).
78  Discriminant analysis is a statistical procedure that attempts to find a linear combination of  features which characterize or 
separate two or more classes of  objects or events. 
79  See, for example, Alec Johnson, Boris Nenide and Robert W. Pricer, “Determining the Ability of  Firms to Use Debt to 
Finance Operations: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Approach to Financial Analysis and Strategic Decision Making,” Journal of 
Applied Business and Economics, Vol. 4 (2004), pages 7–25, at www.fintel.us/download/JABE%20Publication%20on%20FIN-
TEL%20Credit%20Analysis%20Techniques.pd. This article provides an excellent survey of  techniques like Altman’s and 
others, and suggests a nine-step process to predict loan performance. The simplicity of  Altman’s model appears to explain 
the general preference for his approach.
CHAPTER 7: RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND THE 
BANK LOAN PORTFOLIO
This chapter discusses the following topics:
1. Lending economics: are loans profitable?
2. Bank costs of  capital
3. Are banks acting irrationally?
4. Bank tying arrangements
5. Loan review
6. Loan workouts
7. Loan syndications, sales and securitizations
Banks have become fairly aggressive in managing the risks inherent in their loan portfolios, both because 
profits on lending are narrow and because certain of  these techniques allow the risk to be transferred to other 
market participants. In this chapter we discuss the seeming illogic of  financial institutions in making margin-
ally profitable loans, bank tying arrangements as a consideration in managing bank relationships, and various 
risk management techniques banks use to mitigate credit risk.
leNDING eCoNoMICS: Are loANS ProfITABle?
In considering issues relating to managing the bank loan portfolio, it is important to consider whether 
loans are profitable and to review some of  the actions banks can take to improve their returns from lending. 
This may seem like an unnecessary exercise, because lending has to be a profitable business; otherwise it would 
only be logical for banks to stop lending or to increase their pricing.
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As we have noted, until the 1990s banks in the U.S. were limited to their traditional activities of  provid-
ing credit and non-credit products, and they faced a competitive market that controlled interest rates that 
could be charged on loans. Significant profits were earned on non-credit products through the 1970s and 
1980s, but the maturity of  the market and the development of  similar offerings from banks and vendors 
began to lower the prices that could be charged and the returns that were earned.
Modeling Bank Profitability
In Chapter 3 we discussed the types of  loans financial institutions make to businesses, noting that lines 
of  credit are among the most important of  these products.  While the various global banking organizations 
(such as central banks) do not specify the extent of  lines of  credit activity in their publications, available sta-
tistics in the U.S. (as reported by the Federal Reserve) show that commercial and industrial (C&I) loans are 
typically 20 to 25 percent of  all loans and leases, and lines of  credit are the most important lending mecha-
nism within the C&I sector, probably constituting 15 percent of  all bank lending activity.
Returns on lines of  credit were previously estimated by one of  the authors;80 the methodology used 
in his model was substantially revised for the purposes of  developing the analysis reported in this chapter. 
Risk-adjusted returns are provided in Exhibit 7-1, showing returns on committed lines, and in Exhibit 7-2, 
showing returns on uncommitted lines.  The allocation of  capital to each loan type is based on standard risk-
adjusted return on capital standards as required in the Basel protocols; see the discussion in Chapter 2. The 
revenue to the bank is net of  the costs of  officer calling, credit review and loan documentation but before any 
defaults from non-performing loans.
80  James Sagner, The Real World of Finance, Wiley, 2002, pages 85-88.
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It is apparent from these data that, in the U.S., banks have traditionally been perceived as substantially 
less risky as other investments; in this sample, the difference between American country and banking industry 
equity costs was 17.7% during the period under study. The fallacious perception by investors that U.S. bank-
ing is not risky – as we now know from the failures and rescues that began in 2008 – has led to heroic efforts 
to prevent systemic failure.
As is shown in the foregoing analyses, banks in the U.S. can only make break-even (not positive) returns 
when at least a nominal committed fee is earned and before default losses are included. Uncommitted lines 
return about 7.3%, which is substantially below the bank cost of  capital even given the customary impreci-
sion in compiling these calculations. It is very difficult to obtain equivalent data for banks outside of  the 
U.S., so that effort awaits future research. However, the authors’ experience as bankers with money-center 
U.S. financial institutions is that credit is essentially fungible, and while slightly higher fees may be earned 
by lending activities in other countries, the addition return would not notably move the situation toward 
profitability.
BANk CoSTS of CAPITAl
The calculation of  the weighted average cost of  capital for any business – a concept basic to corporate 
finance – is based on the separate determinations of  the cost of  debt capital for borrowings and the cost of  
equity capital for stock sales that finance the company and for retained earnings. This concept was discussed 
in Chapter 4.
Costs of Debt and equity
The cost of  debt capital is taken directly from the contractual interest payments for bank loans, bonds 
or other sources of  long-term borrowings.  The cost of  equity capital is the sum of  the cost of  dividend 
payments and the expected growth in the retained earnings of  the business or in the value of  the company’s 
stock (normally measured over one year). The theory of  equity capital is that stockholders acquire stock for 
two types of  returns: dividends, representing a share of  net income, and capital gains, representing the ap-
preciation in the price of  the stock.81
Global Costs of Capital
Exhibit 7-3 presents costs of  capital for ten countries and specifically for the banking sector based on 
work previously published and recalculated by the authors. A substitute for the cost of  debt capital is the 
long-term interest rate on corporate debt as adjusted by the prevailing country corporate tax rate. It is signifi-
cant that in seven of  the countries (excepting Japan, Canada and Great Britain), the after-tax cost of  capital 
for the banking sector during the study period was between 11 and 12 percent.
81  This is the so-called dividend growth model. An alternative method to calculate the cost of  equity capital is the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model, which was described in Chapter 4.
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Selected Profitable Borrowers
Some groups of  companies are profitable to banks for credit products. This group includes middle market 
and small businesses, and situations where reasonable returns can be earned in specific industries due to the 
absence of  lending competition. Examples of  the latter include the brokerage industry, where certain banks 
dominate securities lending, e.g., Bank of  New York Mellon and J.P. Morgan Chase, and commodities lend-
ing, J.P. Morgan Chase, Northern Trust and Bank of  America; and factoring, which has been largely provided 
by non-bank financial companies (i.e., GE Capital) and a few selected banks.
Improved Bank Portfolio Management
The extremely difficult conditions described so far in this chapter make it imperative that banks imple-
ment two actions to restore reasonable profitability.
1. Credit products need to be more rationally priced with full consideration for a bank’s cost 
of  capital, for the riskiness of  the borrower and for the opportunity to “tie” non-credit 
products to credit, the legal issues of  which are discussed in the next section.  This involves 
careful calculation of  the cost of  capital and the required loan pricing implied by those costs, 
certainly well above recent pricing history. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that credit is 
an acceptable loss “leader” that will result in other, more profitable business through the 
relationship that develops with a company.
2. Bankers must manage the before- and after-loan processes so that renegotiations, defaults 
and underpricing -- that is, pricing below cost -- are minimized. There are several actions 
that can be taken to assure that loans are repaid and/or that loans are sold to other investors. 
These actions are addressed in this chapter.
BANk TYING ArrANGeMeNTS
We will be discussing bank relationship management in Chapter 8 with an emphasis on the role of  the 
borrower in proactively creating a bank-company partnership. Relationship management is a long-established 
Are BANkS BeHAVING IrrATIoNAllY?
Why would banks offer credit at a loss at worse, or at break-even, at best? This seemingly illogical deci-
sion appears to be due to various factors.
Strong Borrower Control
Banks have used profitability models only since about the mid-1980s, and the assumptions in these 
models are of  questionable validity given the strong negotiating position of  large corporate borrowers, at 
least until the present credit crisis. In other words, a strong corporate can negotiate reductions in commit-
ment fees and loan covenant conditions, and U.S. banks have been unwilling to hold the line on cost recovery 
strategies.
The largest companies take uncommitted lines, paying no fees, on the assumption that they are in a buy-
ers’ market – that banks will provide credit lines because of  the cache of  the relationship and the potential 
for other product sales. It is only since 2008 that credit has become scarce and the control of  the market – at 
least temporarily – has swung to the lenders.
Subsidization of Credit by Non-Credit Products
Credit products have been subsidized in the past by non-credit products (which we list in Chapter 8) 
and by investment banking products since the passage of  the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Banks may know-
ingly (or unknowingly) provide no or low return credit products such as credit lines in order to have the 
opportunity to sell higher return non-credit products. However, recent attempts at price increases to cover 
costs for certain non-credit bank services have experienced buyer resistance, and non-bank vendors offer 
competitive versions of  several of  these products.82 The strongest hope for the realization of  this assumption 
clearly lies in investment banking fees, particularly given the collapse or forced merger of  such institutions 
in the past few years.
82  For data on pricing, see www.phoenixhecht.com/treasuryresources/Products/Blue_Book.html. For vendor information, 
see the website of  Politzer & Haney’s parent company, ACI Worldwide, at www.aciworldwide.com; or that of  Fiserv, at 
www.fiserv.com. 
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What Do the laws Permit?
A recent analysis concludes that there are several relationship banking scenarios applicable to the BHCA, 
only one of  which violates the anti-tying prohibition.90 This sole prohibition – the tying of  the desired prod-
uct to a non-traditional bank product--is illegal because the bank has created a “condition or requirement” 
that customers must purchase an additional product.
Recent concerns about anticompetitive tying practices have focused on commercial loans to large, sophis-
ticated companies. Borrowers in this market are often multinational corporations with the resources to nego-
tiate on equal terms with banking organizations.91 Loan syndicate members (discussed later in this chapter) 
frequently include commercial and investment banks with no other relationship with the loan customer. Such 
independent participation in a syndicate makes it unlikely that the lead bank(s) would underprice a loan as a 
“loss leader” to secure additional business that would benefit only itself.
There are no legal cases that deal directly with the tying of  credit and non-credit banking services in the 
sense of  the concerns of  finance professionals. A partial list of  the “ties” to credit permitted by courts include 
the purchase of  real estate, guarantees of  business indebtedness, relinquishing of  financial control, requiring the 
services of  a financial advisor or a management services arrangement, and the sale and leaseback of  a building.92
loAN reVIeW
The loan has been made and the credit agreements were signed. The funds have been credited to the 
company’s bank account or will be in stages based on the terms of  the loan. The papers have been completed 
assigning collateral to the bank. Now what? It is essential for the bank to monitor the loan and for the 
90 The six permitted situations are: 1.) the customer requests multiple products; 2.) the customer conditions the purchase of  
a bank product on obtaining additional product (a customer-initiated tie); 3.) the bank terminates its relationship with 
an insufficiently profitable customer; 4.) the nonbank subsidiary of  a bank holding company conditions product on the 
customer obtaining additional product; 5.) the bank conditions product on the customer obtaining a traditional bank 
product; and 6.) the bank conditions product on the customer obtaining either traditional or non-traditional bank products, 
at the customer’s choice. See, “Legality of  Relationship Banking Under Bank Antitying Restrictions,” Covington and Burl-
ing Memorandum (2003); at www.aba.com/NR/ rdonlyres/ EBCFA68E-ED93-11D4-AB70-00508B95258D/31619/ 
DuganRelationshipBankingMemo52804.pdf.
91 Donald J. Mullineaux, ”Tying and Subsidized Loans: A Doubtful Problem” (2003); at www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/
EBCFA68E-ED93-11D4-AB70-00508B95258D/31616/ MullineauxTyingSubsidizedLoans52804.pdf.
92 Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange National Bank of  Chicago. 693 F.Supp. 666 (1988), aff ’d. 877 F.2d 1333. 
business practice, with the legislative history of  the banking laws containing various positive references. For 
example, the Senate Committee Report on the Bank Holding Company Amendments Act of  1970 (BHCA) 
recognized that a customer should be able
  … to continue to negotiate with the bank on the basis of  his entire relationship with the 
bank,” and “where the customer uses multiple banking services... the parties may be free to 
fix or vary the consideration for any services upon the existence or extent of  utilization of  
such banking services …83
The BHCA goes considerably further than the Sherman and Clayton Acts84 by making a tying arrange-
ment illegal per se, that is, without regard to the economic impact of  the seller or other rule of  reason balanc-
ing.85 The relevant language is as follows:
 A bank shall not in any manner extend credit…on the condition or requirement--that the 
customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or service from such bank [or bank 
holding company].86
Congress did not intend to interfere with traditional banking activity;87 instead, the objective was to 
prohibit anticompetitive practices that could force customers to accept certain services or to refrain from 
dealing with other financial institutions to obtain the desired services.88 Statutory assurance was provided 
that the economic power of  a bank in a community or region would not result in an unfair business 
practice.89
83 Senate Report No. 91-1084, at 17 (1970). 
84  The Sherman Antitrust Act of  1890 was the first antitrust act, and made it illegal to monopolize and to restrain trade in any 
U.S. industry. The Clayton Act of  1914 added further clarification to the Sherman Act to prevent anticompetitive practices.
85 Gage v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of  Hutchinson, Kan., 717 F.Supp. 745 (1989). 
86 At 12 U.S.C. §1972. 
87 S & N Equipment Co. v. Casa Grande Cotton Finance Co.. 97 F.3d 337 (1996).
88 Dannhausen v. First National Bank of  Sturgeon Bay, 538 F. Supp. 551(1982).
89 Fredco of  Wilmington, De., Ltd. V. Farmers Bank of  State of  Del., F. Supp. 995 (1980). 
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d. Suggesting changes in company management
e. Requiring that planned expenditures by the borrower be postponed until business con-
ditions improve
3. Developing written policies for senior management to systematically assess credit risk in the 
loan portfolio including:
a. Qualifications and independence of  staff  assigned to loan review
b. Scope and content of  loan reviews
c. Adequacy of  documentation of  loans
4. Evaluating the activities of  calling officers and their support functions including frequency 
and cost of  calling, deficiencies in the lending process and appropriate corrective actions. 
Among the indications of  poor lending practices of  staff  are:
a. Excessive travel and entertainment expenses or making calls merely to meet some arbi-
trary call quota
b. Calling on prospective borrowers that are clearly unable to meet the bank’s minimum 
credit standards
c. Incomplete credit files
d. Inadequate defense of  lending applications at loan review committee meetings
5. Preparing reports to senior management and the board on credit reviews including adherence 
to internal procedures and to regulations
Credit Grading Systems
A credit grading system should be developed to assess credit quality, identify problem loans and institute 
corrective actions. There are several steps in creating credit grades.93
• Examination of  historical performing and non-performing loan results, focusing on such 
measurable factors as size of  the balance sheet, profitability of  the business, financial leverage 
and other key determinants
93  See Eddie Cade, Managing Banking Risks, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1999, pages 111-118.
corporate borrower to make certain that the provisions of  all covenants are met. General economic conditions 
may change; new competitors may introduce breakthrough technologies; a key senior manager may resign or 
develop health problems; a government may pass legislation to more strongly regulate the industry. Any of  
these variables may change the likelihood that that the loan can be repaid.
elements of the loan review Process
A comprehensive loan review process requires several elements to help financial institutions to understand 
changes in the business environment.
1. Periodically reviewing the status of  all major loans and a sample of  smaller loans. In doing this 
analysis, the bank should examine various factors that affect the likelihood of  loan servicing.
a. Is debt service – that is, principal and interest amounts based on the provisions of  the 
loan agreement – being paid regularly or has there been some deterioration in the timeli-
ness of  these remittances?
b. Has the collateral pledged against the loan essentially retained its value?
c. Have loan covenants deteriorated or been breached? Has the bank acted and what is the 
borrower’s response?
d. Have borrower credit ratings provided by independent rating agencies been downgraded?
e. Is the borrower using the bank’s funds as agreed at the time of  the loan, or is the loan 
being used for purposes that were not intended?
f. Has the bank retained adequate documentation on the loan, which will be necessary 
should legal action against the borrower become necessary?
g. Is the borrower meeting its financial goals as to sales, cost controls, the development of  
new products and other important business activities?
h. Does the loan conform to standards expected by bank examiners or other regulators?
2. Taking proactive steps to assist borrowers that may become non-performers in the repay-
ment of  interest or principal. This could include:
a. Renegotiating or otherwise altering terms of  the loan
b. Reviewing important financial statement accounts to determine the causes of any deterioration
c. Demanding additional collateral for the loan
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Workout Issues
A major problem in reaching a successful conclusion to a loan workout is the diversity of  interests in many 
large lending arrangements, with lenders, other creditors and stockholders all demanding their share of  the 
available resources of  the borrowing companies. Furthermore, certain participants in a workout negotiation 
may insist on a disproportional allocation in exchange for their consent. This situation creates instability and an 
unwillingness to engage in the complex and time-consuming negotiations necessary to reach a fair settlement.
There is no statutory or regulatory requirement for such agreements (except for court mandated settle-
ments under U.S. bankruptcy law). The voluntary nature of  the process requires a sequence of  actions that 
may be difficult to attain: 1.) a moratorium on credit obligations, 2.) a reduction in the obligations of  the 
company, 3.) an extension of  the time period permitted to service remaining debt, 4.) new financing, and 5.) 
a restructuring of  the company to eliminate the products and lines of  business, the offices and the managers 
that helped to create the problem.
Banker Workout Strategies
For lenders, the complicated nature of  a distressed credit requires an independent workout group within 
the bank’s credit control function and separated from normal relationship banking activities. A decision point 
should be established at which problems loans are transferred to that group. One approach to arriving at this 
conclusion is the establishment of  a quantitative early warning system that measures:
• Loans considered to be high risk as measured by mediocre performance on debt servicing 
and the modeling of  the probability of  default
• Poor company management practices such as a domineering CEO, a rubber-stamp board of  
directors, several poor decisions and sudden departures of  senior executives
• Aggressive growth strategies that cannot be supported by business conditions or require 
capital beyond the company’s capacity
• Inadequate financial planning or forecasts based on questionable assumptions
• Development of  default rate experience by characteristic of  the borrower
• Calculation of pricing of the loan sufficient to compensate for losses of the indicated risk category
• Adjusting future pricing so as to adhere to the credit grades that have been determined
• Assigning preferred borrowers to a “fast-track” credit decision process, while placing those 
less attractive on a “watch list” governed by policies appropriate to safeguard the bank’s 
position
Basel 2 recommends that banks develop internal risk measurement systems including credit grading. Such 
systems would enable a bank to identify and monitor changes in the credit standing of  its loan portfolio as 
situations develop. According to the Basel regulators, the development of  credit grades facilitates controls 
over the enterprise’s exposure to credit risk.
In a typical situation where credit grades are used, a bank employs a comprehensive credit grading system 
that allocates grades to borrowers. Each grade is calculated using a matrix determined by the nature of  the 
customer’s activity and constructed using quantitative and qualitative criteria; collateral coefficients may be 
assigned that represent the extent to which the loans are secured.
THe PurPoSe of loAN WorkouTS
Despite the efforts of  bankers to prevent problem loans, the outcome of  nonperforming loans may 
occur. According to Federal Reserve statistics, delinquent loans have more than tripled in the past decade 
to 7.3%, while the percentage of  charge-offs have varied between about ½ of  1% to nearly 3% in recent 
periods.94 The term “loan workouts” is applied to the process of  attempting to recover funds in such situ-
ations. Lenders inevitably cite rapid detection and firsthand knowledge of  deteriorating situations as most 
important in defending the bank’s position, and to this end, bankers should review the ideas developed in 
the previous section.95
94  Charge-offs are the value of  loans and leases removed from the books and charged against loss reserves. Charge-off  rates 
are annualized, net of  recoveries. Delinquent (non-performing) loans are those past due 30 days or more and still accruing 
interest as well as those in non-accrual status. Federal Reserve System, “Charge Off  and Delinquency Rates on Loans and 
Leases in Commercial Banks,” at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff.
95  For a full discussion of  workouts, see Subhrendu Chatterji and Paul Hedges, Loan Workouts and Debt for Equity Swaps: A Frame-
work for Successful Corporate Rescues, Wiley, 2001.
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The lead Bank
The function of  the lead bank is to use this temporary freeze to negotiate with other banks and major 
creditors to:
• Stabilize the company’s short-term financial position
• Coordinate the activities of  the bank/creditor group
• Determine the positions of  the participants
• Provide information to the participants
• Negotiate conflicting positions
• Develop a financial restructuring plan
The obvious conflict between the lead bank’s own position and the interests of  the bank/creditor group 
requires impartiality and independence, evidenced by thoughtful responses to inquiries, transparency in de-
veloping conclusions and recommendations, and similar behaviors. The lead bank is usually supported in this 
effort by a steering (creditors’) committee of  perhaps seven or nine members96 to maintain the integrity of  
the process, assess information provided by accountants and other professionals, evaluate restructuring op-
tions and display solidarity in dealing with the company’s representatives. In cases where lenders believe that 
the bankrupt company can be rehabilitated, the lead bank may provide additional financing in the form of  
debtor-in-possession credit.
loAN SYNDICATIoNS, SAleS AND SeCurITIZATIoNS
So far in this chapter we have discussed the risk management of  the bank lending function by internal 
controls and procedures to minimize loan defaults. In this section, we review the techniques of  loan syndica-
tions, sales and loan securitizations, which partially or completely convey ownership to other entities. 
loan Syndications
In situations where the size of  the requested loan is too large and/or too risky for the bank, a group of  
lenders (a syndicate) may be organized to provide the loan. In this arrangement, no single bank bears the risk 
96  An odd number is preferred in order to facilitate voting.
Loan workout specialists should be utilized to confer with borrowers on possible options, including 
stringent expense controls, particularly over cash outlays. The banker should determine that loan documents 
are sufficient to seize collateral should that outcome be indicated. A search for other unpaid debts should 
occur to protect the bank’s seniority in these claims. However, unless the situation is hopeless, it is usually in 
the bank’s interest to maintain the borrower as a going concern.
THe loAN WorkouT BANk/CreDITor GrouP
A successful workout environment requires that negotiations be conducted among the banks and 
major creditors, and then between the bank group and the company. The financial institutions that have 
provided credit, and in some cases, noncredit services, are involved; small non-bank creditors typically 
are not.
Who Should Be Included?
The first task is to determine who the lenders and major creditors are and the extent of  the indebtedness. 
A related activity is to decide on those parties that should be included in the bank/creditor group, based on 
the size of  the exposure; the jurisdictions involved and governing law or practice, particularly if  any non-U.S. 
banks are included; and the posture of  the banks regarding active or passive participation.
The credit bank(s) with the largest exposure(s) may become(s) the lead coordinator/ negotiator in an 
arrangement often referred to as a “moratorium”.  A credit moratorium is basically a standstill period of  
perhaps two or three months during which loan repayments are frozen along with certain regular payables to 
larger creditors. Normally payroll will not be affected, although senior managers are often required to take 
a reduction in pay. The moratorium is designed to prevent individual banks or creditors from insisting on 
their rights to commence legal action. During the moratorium period, banks and creditors agree to avoid the 
following actions:
• Commence any legal action for recovery against their borrower/customer
• Reduce or withdraw credit
• Require additional collateral
• Alter the terms of  any lending facility
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Until the recent credit crisis, loan sales had slowed as borrowers sought funds from non-traditional 
sources, such as finance companies, sales-and-leasebacks and commercial paper. At the present time, observers 
suspect that loan sales will revive due to the increased capital adequacy requirements of  Basel 2 and a decided 
interest by global banks in trading assets rather than more traditional credit activities.
loan Securitization
Securitization is a process in structured finance that manages risk by pooling assets and then issuing new 
securities backed by the assets and their cash flows. These securities are sold to investors who accept the risk 
and the reward associated with the underlying assets. With most securitized structures, the investors’ rights 
to receive cash flows are organized into tranches. Credit derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDSs) are 
sometimes used to enhance the credit quality of  the asset portfolio. A CDS is a swap contract in which the 
buyer of  the CDS makes a series of  payments (often referred to as the CDS “fee” or “spread”) and, in ex-
change, receives a payoff  if  a credit event is experienced.
There are various types of  assets that back securitized investments, including mortgages, credit 
cards, student loans, and other situations where a regular stream of  interest and principal repayment 
occurs. Securitization segments relevant to corporate lending include collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), equipment leases and commercial mortgages. CDOs are a type of  structured asset-backed 
security (ABS) the payments and value of  which are derived from a portfolio of  underlying income-
producing assets.
Securitization Mechanics
In a securitization, a suitably large portfolio of  similar assets is “pooled” and transferred to a “special 
purpose vehicle” (SPV) formed for the specific purpose of  funding the assets. To buy the assets from the 
originator, the SPV issues tradable securities to investors to fund the purchase.  Fluctuations in the perceived 
value of  these securities is directly linked to the underlying assets, and deterioration in performance, as hap-
pened in the residential mortgage market when mortgagees stopped making debt service payments, affects the 
market price as well as the credit rating of  the securities.
of  the loan. These types of  loans may be drawn (used) similar to any conventional business loan, or may be 
undrawn (unused) but intended to serve as a line of  credit to back the borrower’s commercial paper program 
or in support of  other activities.
Loan syndications traded in the secondary credit markets at rates of  about 2 to 3% above LIBOR until 
the 2008 credit crisis, with current spreads even higher due to perceived credit risk and the financial insta-
bility of  certain euro countries. The size of  these programs makes them a target for careful review by bank 
examiners.
loan Sales
Leading sellers of  loans include the major U.S. and global commercial banks, with various institutional 
investors acting as buyers. Many of  these loans carry short-term maturities with interest rates based on the 
usual benchmark rates (see Chapter 5). The seller of  the loan may retain servicing rights, allowing that insti-
tution to generate fee income while monitoring the performance of  the original borrowers. There are three 
common types of  loan sales:
• Participations where the investor is essentially a passive investor without any influence over 
the terms of  the loan unless there is a substantial change to the original loan. The advan-
tages of  these types of  transactions to the original lender include diversification of  the loan 
portfolio and continuing support for a major borrower when legal lending limits have been 
reached.
• Assignments which transfer a direct claim on the borrower to the investor. In these arrange-
ments, the borrower may be required to formally agree to the loan sale.
• Loan strips which sell short-term amounts of  longer-term loans to investors.
The sale of  a loan presumes that the bank knows its borrower and its industry, and that the pricing of  
the loan, the collateral and the risk are superior to alternative investments. To protect the investor, the selling 
bank may provide recourse in the event of  a delinquency in the servicing of  the debt.
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CHAPTER 8:  
RELATIONSHIP BANKING
This chapter discusses the following topics:
1. 21st century banking
2. Finance’s control of  banking
3. Approaching lenders
4. The relationship plan
5. Selecting banking partners
6. The RFP process
7. Financial institution risk
A partnership must develop between a bank and a company in selecting and using credit and non-credit 
services. Bank relationship management involves the marketing of  a financial institution by a relationship 
manager or calling officer who attempts to meet a company’s needs with a complete package of  financial of-
ferings. In addition to credit products, the calling officer will offer such non-credit products as domestic and 
international treasury management, shareholder services, custody, information services, trade finance, invest-
ment services, trust, foreign exchange, derivative instruments and capital markets. For an explanation of  these 
products, see Exhibit 8-1.
A servicer receives payments and monitors the assets that are the basis of  the structured financial deal. 
Servicers are often originators, because the required expertise is quite similar. Unlike the practice with some 
corporate bonds, most securitizations arrange for the principal amount borrowed to be paid back gradually 
over the specified term of  the loan – that is amortized – rather than in one lump sum at maturity. This assures 
investors of  a predictable cash flow.
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efforts frequently involved entertainment events and other venues to create a sociable business environment. 
This strategy worked as long as the banks could generate revenues or the expectation of  future business, par-
ticularly as banks were restricted in their use of  capital and could not pursue more lucrative business, such as 
investment banking, insurance or banking in another geographic location.
When the regulatory environment changed, financial service companies were allowed to pursue a broader 
range of  business opportunities, reducing their reliance on credit products and marginally profitable non-
credit services. Profitability models were introduced to analyze whether adequate returns were earned by 
various cuts of  customer data. For-profit companies – including banks – must earn a reasonable profit from 
their customers and will terminate a relationship if  acceptable returns cannot be earned in the long run. As 
a result, a relationship management plan demonstrating a reasonable return is necessary for companies to 
satisfy their bankers, who can then justify the business “partnership” and the use of  scarce capital to their 
senior management.
Today’s relationship management involves:
• Access to adequate credit to meet short and long-term financing requirements
• A complete range of  non-credit product offerings
• Pricing that is competitive but sufficient for the bank to make a fair return on the relationship
• Service quality that minimizes inquiries and requests for adjustments or changes
• Consideration for the risks of  the financial institution
Transaction Banking
There has been significant progress toward interstate banking in the U.S. in the decade and one-half  since 
the 1997 implementation of  the Riegle-Neal Act. For geographic coverage of  the largest banks, see Exhibit 
8-2 for branches and offices of  the four largest banks (excluding ATM locations).  Wells Fargo has the most 
extensive network, with locations in 30 states, but only slight representation in the Northeast. The greatest 
balance among the four regions of  the U.S. is probably Bank of  America.
However, no bank yet has a true national footprint. As a result, the need continues to exist for transac-
tional bank accounts for local deposits, payroll and certain other disbursements. Many organizations have 
21ST CeNTurY BANkING
The 1990s marked the end of  regulations on interstate banking and on certain types of  services that 
could be offered by financial institutions. Prior to that time, larger companies may have needed several banks 
in their relationship to provide credit and other services. The significant decline in the population of  U.S. 
banking speaks to the effect of  deregulation: in 1992 there were 11,500 U.S. banks; by mid-2010 that num-
ber had been reduced to fewer than 6,700.97
Developments in relationship Banking
Until the mid-1980s, most financial institutions had a limited understanding of  profitability by cus-
tomer, geographic region or product line. Traditional bank calling involved repeated attempts at getting 
“face time” with senior financial managers at companies until some service had been successfully sold. These 
97  Data on banking are available from the FDIC at “Statistics on Depository Institutions,” at www2.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp, 
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• Specialized activities such as stock loan, custody, shareholder services and escrow or tax ser-
vices may be bid to the investment, tax or real estate departments.
• Technology-based bank services are of  interest to the systems or information technology 
(IT) department.
Impacts of Weakened finance
This weakening of  the treasurer’s position can have two serious impacts on a business:
1. Commitments made by non-financial areas can have financial repercussions that could con-
ceivably compromise a company’s position, particularly during periods of  difficult economic 
conditions (such as 2008-2010). Some vendors require multi-year contracts to justify their 
start-up expenses, and our experience is that such agreements may be signed in the absence 
of  a manager’s formal authorization to so commit his or her organization.
2. Relationship banking involves the entire set of  financial services required by a company and 
offered by a bank. Allowing a non-financial organization to commit to a vendor outside 
of  that relationship could jeopardize the partnership concept and may lead to the refusal 
of  a bank to offer credit. When treasury acts as the gatekeeper for all financial institution 
contact, this enhances the likelihood that an attractive package of  profitable business can be 
assembled for the bank.
For example, a company’s human resources department signed a long-term contract with a payroll 
vendor without investigating state laws on check encashment. The company has a manufacturing facility in 
a state that requires payroll checks be issued off  of  a bank domiciled in that state. The agreement had to 
be renegotiated at considerable additional expense once treasury became aware of  the problem. In addition, 
the relationship bank was excluded from the payroll check, direct deposit and ATM business that it could 
have been offered.
branch offices or other locations distant from corporate headquarters that require nearby banking, such as 
the depositing of  money that is locally received or supporting employees who need access to an encashment 
facility. These situations are not considered as a part of  a relationship banking program, and are primarily 
for convenience.
fINANCe’S CoNTrol of BANkING
It is important that all financial activities used by a company be managed by the treasurer or chief  finan-
cial officer, whose responsibilities include the safeguarding of  cash and near-cash assets. While this may seem 
obvious to most readers, access has been permitted to other functional areas as banks have broadened their 
product offerings.
Dilution of the Authority of finance
Too often, the dispersion of  finance’s responsibilities occurs without the approval or even the knowledge 
of  its staff, and vendor agreements are approved before the treasurer has even been informed.
Here are some examples of  where this can occur.
• E-commerce, purchasing (procurement) cards and disbursement outsourcing (known ge-
nerically as “comprehensive payables”) may be sold to purchasing and accounts payable 
managers.
• Payroll services (such as those offered by ADP and Paychex) and payroll ATM cards may be 
offered to the payroll department or human resources.
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• What is the history of  the bank in providing these services? At which locations are the ser-
vices offered?
• What is your bank’s expectation in terms of  being awarded business for the relationship to 
be sufficiently attractive and profitable?
Specify a response date, and provide contact names and telephone numbers for follow-up questions and 
contacts.
The responses to the ITB are used to select the banks to be included in the bidding process. This de-
termination is usually based on demonstrated competence in banking services, a commitment to providing 
credit, and a clear desire for a long-term relationship.
Purpose of the loan
Financing is required for four purposes, the first three of  which involve bank lending:
• Working Capital. Funds are used to meet seasonal needs that will be repaid during the 
company’s next operating cycle, generally one year. Working capital requirements tend to 
fluctuate with the buying patterns of  customers, and are often in a borrowing position at 
the time of  the peak of  the selling season. By the time that customers have completed much 
of  their purchasing, a company is likely to be in a positive cash position and can repay these 
types of  loans.99
• Interim Capital. A lending arrangement may be required to bridge a gap until permanent 
debt or equity financing can be obtained. Money from that financing is generally used to 
“take out” (pay back) the bridge loan. Bridge loans may have higher interest rates than other 
types of  loans, fees and “sweeteners” such as equity participation by the lender.
• Growth Capital. Borrowing may be required to meet general business needs that will be re-
paid with profits earned beyond the current year and continuing for several years (although 
99  For a complete review of  working capital issues, see James Sagner, Essentials of Working Capital Management, Wiley, 2010.
APProACHING leNDerS
Given the current difficulties businesses have reported in obtaining financing, it is critical to approach 
a lender (or investor) with a comprehensive plan for the relationship.98 The bank must be convinced that 
participating in a lending arrangement will be profitable, that there will be the opportunity to sell non-credit 
products and that there is the likelihood of  a long-term partnership. This takes the initiative from the lender, 
where it has historically been, to the company, which may feel unequipped to think like a banker. However, 
we are now in a sellers’ market for credit and all of  the rules have changed.
The Invitation-to-Bid
Sometimes called a request-to-bid or request-for-information, the invitation-to-bid (ITB) is an of-
fer to candidate financial institutions to state that they are willing and capable of  providing the services 
required by the interested company. Candidate ITB recipients can be developed from previous calling 
efforts, contacts at conferences and meetings, and referrals from accountants, attorneys and business 
colleagues.
The ITB letter should explain the purpose and intention of  the company in establishing a long-term 
banking relationship for credit and non-credit services. Basic descriptive and financial data is provided, in-
cluding contact names, business locations, credit requirements, volumes of  current services, technology used 
in financial transactions, and other relevant information. The letter should then solicit indications of  interest 
in bidding on the services required by the company.
Questions might be phrased as follows:
• Is your financial institution interested in being considered as the relationship bank for the 
company?
• Do you provide the various credit and non-credit services that are required?
98  It should be noted that commercial banks have understood this for decades, having done business in a long-term buyers’ 
market for financial services, and would work with their most important customers to develop a relationship plan for the 
coming period. See Michèle Allman-Ward and James Sagner, Essentials of Managing Corporate Cash, Wiley, 2003, pages 201-223, 
particularly pages 220-222.
Handbook of Corporate Lending: A GuIDe for BANkerS AND fINANCIAl MANAGerS
150
CHAPTer 8: relATIoNSHIP BANkING 
151
THe relATIoNSHIP PlAN
The relationship plan for the company-bank partnership enumerates the major concerns that must be 
addressed to interest the bank. A plan provides information on the business and evaluates its feasibility as a 
going concern while demonstrating the capability of  management to be successful. An objective, analytical 
plan convinces lenders that the managers of  the business are capable, prudent and conservative. A mediocre 
effort that is poorly researched, makes unsupported assumptions, or draws questionable conclusions will 
suggest to lenders that the business is not managed by mature, serious people. The plan should contain the 
following elements.
executive Summary
This portion summarizes the major elements of  the relationship plan to convince the lender that the loan 
and complementary activities are sound and advisable. Basic information about the loan should be presented, 
including amount, purpose, duration, and source of  repayment. Other bank products that are required should 
be noted, including uses, volumes, current providers and opportunities for additional business.
organization and Management
This section describe the history of  the business, including the legal form of  organization, states and 
countries of  incorporation and location, significant changes since the previous plan, subsidiaries, and brief  
biographies of  senior management. An organizational chart should be provided.
Products/Services/Markets
 It is important to describe the company’s present or planned products, services or lines-of-business, in-
cluding sales projections, domestic and international market penetration, channels of  distribution and other 
factors. Cite major competitors, the products or services they provide, what they do better or worse, and their 
market shares.  Discuss the outlook for the industry noting the likely effects of  any major socioeconomic 
trends, technological developments or regulatory changes.
banks prefer not to lend to their business clients for lengthy periods). When seeking growth 
capital, borrowers are required to demonstrate how money will be used to increase profits so 
that the loan can be repaid.
• Equity Capital: A fourth reason to obtain financing is to meet permanent needs. However, 
banks do not lend for this purpose; instead, equity capital must be raised by investment 
banking firms from shareholders who will take an ownership position in the hope of  receiv-
ing dividends or capital gains through the sale of  shares at a profit.
financing required and the Cash Budget
Although it may not be the most appropriate way to do business, the amount of  a requested loan some-
times becomes a negotiation between the banker and the financial manager. A company may ask for $100,000 
in a line of  credit, and the banker may offer $50,000 with an offer to revisit the topic if  the company meets 
its projections over the coming period. This is foolish for both parties because underfunding a business can 
have dire consequences during periods of  negative cash flow.
The issue that should be addressed is how much total capital is needed to operate the company on a 
sound financial basis. This involves a careful projection of  working and growth capital requirements supple-
mented by equity capital, as previously discussed. These estimates should be based on cash budgeting, a 
forecasting technique that converts accrual accounting100 to cash amounts for future periods, often weeks or 
months.101
The forecast requires firm data on expected receipts and disbursements for operations and investments, 
supported by detailed schedules of  expected sales and expenses. Sales forecasts are converted into cash col-
lections by assigning the historical experience of  customer payment histories as applied to actual sales. In a 
similar manner, expenses become cash disbursements. Non-recurring cash events are then added, including 
dividends, taxes, capital investments and similar activities.
100  Accrual accounting attempts to match revenues (sales) to the costs of  developing those revenues. Nearly all large compa-
nies use accrual accounting and its conventions, such as depreciation. Cash accounting, used primarily by small businesses, 
recognizes revenues as cash is received and expenses as cash is disbursed.
101  See Essentials of Working Capital Management, Chapter 8, footnote 99, pages 45 – 48.
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It is not necessary to repeat all of  the content of  the relationship plan each time that a credit negotia-
tion occurs. The borrowing company need only modify content to reflect the current situation with regard 
to each topic, while referencing the original document. Another approach is to create a notebook containing 
each section of  the plan, with revised pages inserted and shown by using a different color typeface or paper.
SeleCTING BANkING PArTNerS
The choice of  banking partners assumes that current financial institutions may be inadequate to meet 
a company’s complete requirements, or that there are significant limitations such as insufficient amount of  
credit, unsatisfactory treasury management products, inadequate global coverage or a waning interest in serv-
ing the company’s needs. It is essential to include all current and expected banking activity in this assessment, 
particularly when a company may have decentralized operations where local transactions may not be under 
the direct management of  the treasurer.
Companies report that credit drives relationships, with loan pricing based on a complex interrela-
tion of  factors, including the cost of  funds, the perceived risk of  the borrower, total loans committed 
and outstanding, service fees derived from non-credit products, deposit balances, and the range of  other 
services used. There are at least five other significant factors that should be considered in choosing a 
bank, with decisions usually prioritized based on company and industry concerns. The first three of  
these can be critical in choosing a bank; the other two are important considerations but are usually not 
determinative.
Audited and Pro forma financial Statements and Cash Budgets
The required past financial statements are the income statement, the balance sheet, and the statement of  
cash flows. The term “pro forma” refers to forecast results for coming periods. The cash budget was described 
in the previous section. See any standard accounting text for an explanation of  these documents.
Banking Services
While bank pricing and other confidential information must not be disclosed, the search for a new 
financial institution should list banking services currently used. This should include credit and non-credit 
products, and specifics of  cash and information flows. Some of  these data can be summarized from the in-
voices – called account analyses – that banks provide monthly on balance activity and products used. For an 
illustration of  the account analysis, see Exhibits 8-3 and 8-3Ref.
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hundreds of  banks were used by a company, and a few with over a thousand banks each! A banking system 
this large cannot be managed properly, and the fees are inevitably considerably higher than necessary.
4. Service Quality
The quality of  a bank’s service involves several issues that must be examined. How does the bank measure 
and report on quality issues? What error rates are reasonable?  How is the bank organized for customer service 
inquiries? Are there dedicated service representatives or teams of  service staff  who can answer questions? Is 
there a commitment to resolve inquiries within a specified time period? Are the hours of  contact appropriate 
for a company with a national or global presence? Does the bank provide an automated inquiry capability? 
Remember, it often costs far more to resolve a quality problem than the cost of  the service.
Review the contracts required by the bank as an essential part of  the relationship. Each product is gov-
erned by a service level agreement (SLA) that addresses the various obligations and requirements of  each 
party, to protect both the bank and the company in the event of  a dispute. The contracts have been drafted by 
the bank’s attorneys, and are based on long-standing precedent and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
adopted by all states. The bank requires these documents to instruct it on how to handle any transactions that 
are initiated, and to protect itself  in the event of  a dispute or attempted fraud.
5. Stability of Banking Personnel
There was a time in U.S. banking when the relationship manager was likely to be in his or her position for 
an extended period. This was helpful to the company-bank partnership in assisting that each party to really 
understand the bank and the company, the personnel and any peculiarities that may not be understood by 
outsiders. This stability has largely disappeared due to bank consolidation, the abandonment of  markets or 
regions, and the recent higher turnover among bank staff. There may not be much of  an option for a company 
with regard to turnover, but stability should at least be considered as banking decisions are made.
THe rfP ProCeSS
Until about the time of  the recent credit crisis, companies regularly used a request-for-proposal (RFP) 
process that originated several decades ago for procurement by the federal government. RFPs were developed 
1. Bank Non-Credit Capabilities
A company’s non-credit requirements must be matched to the bank’s capabilities. This is particularly im-
portant as credit often depends on the likelihood of  other business, and it would be illogical for a borrower 
to make a credit arrangement but not have access to a treasury management, custody, trade finance or other 
needed service. Money-center banks generally offer most of  the non-credit products any corporate borrower 
may require; the overlay of  needs and offerings may not be quite so extensive if  a regional or community bank 
is in the relationship.
2. Comprehensive Processing Costs
The total cost of  banking services should be considered, including related internal company costs and 
banking costs. While the cost of  banking services is a significant decision factor, the financial manager should 
consider the total cost including the company’s own expenses as well as banking charges. In addition, compa-
nies should review internal processes to determine if  reengineering can reduce total costs.
For example, with wholesale lockbox, the company’s internal costs involve the receiving and processing 
of  remittance advices, applying payments to open accounts receivable, and managing cash balances. The bank 
expense for this product per transaction is typically about $1 including all related bank charges, while the 
company’s costs could be another $1. Imaging could apply these documents to the company’s records in a 
computerized environment, saving perhaps one-half  of  the $2 of  per transaction costs.102
3. Geographic Coverage
U.S. money-center banks have extensive but not total coverage of  American markets. Gaps in domestic 
or global geographic coverage require secondary relationships with local banks. This will not cause a problem 
with the primary relationship bank, but it should be considered in choosing that bank so that the number 
of  these additional financial institutions is minimized. As consultants, we have encountered situations where 
102  Wholesale lockbox provides check copies and original remittance documents to the client. Imaging involves the capture of  
an electronic picture of  the check and/or the remittance document received, which can be archived, retrieved and transmit-
ted to the company.
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• Logistics of  proposal: when must the proposal be submitted and in what format(s)?
• Bidder authorization: who is authorized to sign for the bank?
• Date of  award: when will the business be awarded?
• Non-discrimination clause
• Confidentiality of  submission
• Contract duration and cancellation
• Use of  subcontractors
General issues pertain to the financial stability and credit ratings of  the bank as well as operational con-
siderations that would apply to the organization for delivery of  services. Selected product-specific issues are 
noted below.
Non-Credit Product Issues
The issues pertaining to each product will of  course be specific to each product. Some examples for 
treasury management products follow.
• Lockbox: At what times is the mail retrieved from the main post office? Does the bank have 
a unique zip code to speed mail sorting? How are remittances processed when they arrive at 
the bank? How is availability assigned to each deposited check?106 How are exception items 
handled?
• Controlled Disbursement: At what time in the morning are customers notified of  their daily 
clearings?  How many notifications of  clearings are made each day, and what percent of  the 
dollars and items was included in each notification during the previous quarter? What funds 
transfer mechanisms are permitted for the daily clearing debit amount? Does the bank sup-
port positive pay?
• ACH (Automated Clearing House): What procedures are used to assure that ACH trans-
missions are accurate and secure? Can the bank automatically redeposit items returned for 
106  Availability is defined in Exhibit 8-3.
to assure that all potential bidders had fair and equal access to consideration in the buying decision. An RFP 
is the issuance of  an invitation for suppliers to submit a proposal on a specific commodity or service.
Credit facilities have not generally been bid through an RFP process; instead, they are requested using 
elements of  the process described in the previous section. Companies began to adapt RFPs for non-credit 
banking products in the mid-1980s, and an author of  this text wrote one of  the earliest guides to using RFPs 
that was modified for the first volume of  treasury product RFPs.103
recent Changes in the rfP Process
The original intention to extend opportunities to banks (and vendors) outside of  the existing relation-
ship group has changed significantly.  The disappearance of  credit and the ending of  interstate banking 
restrictions have forced financial managers to concentrate their business to a single or a few banks, effectively 
ending a bidding process based on price, technology or other non-credit features.
For example, ten years ago companies might insist on using a bank for its positive pay notification times 
for controlled disbursement,104 or for its comprehensive payables product if  the decision is to outsource 
payment activities.105 The current emphasis is on finding bank relationships that offer most or all of  the 
necessary functions at a fair price; on meeting the bank’s need for adequate profitability; and on outsourcing 
non-core activities.
When RFPs are used, requirements are usually presented as lists of  questions regarding general banking 
concerns and specific attributes relating to each product being bid. Conditions for contracting for services are 
included in the RFP; for example-
103  James Sagner and Larry Marks, “A Formalized Approach to Purchasing Cash Management Services,” Journal of Cash Manage-
ment,” (now AFP Exchange), 13, Nov.-Dec. 1993, pages 68-73; revised by Sagner for Standardized RFPs, Association of  Finan-
cial Professionals, 1996, at www.afponline.org.
104  Controlled disbursement is a checking account service capable of  providing a total of  the checks that will be charged to 
a company’s account(s) early each business day. The company sends an issued file to its bank of  serial numbers and check 
amounts against which clearing items are matched (“positive pay”). A period of  time is allowed by the bank (usually one-
half  day) to approve or reject the payment (the clearing) of  those checks; rejection would imply that fraud is suspected.
105  Comprehensive payables involves the company resolving all payment decisions and sending a transmission to a bank or ven-
dor which processes the payment, including issuing checks or electronic payments and remittances advices, mailing payments 
and reconciling clearing checks. 
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Market (Credit) risk
Banks hold significant asset positions in loans to businesses and consumers (about 57%), and in govern-
ment debt (about 13%) of  total assets.110 The primary risk to the latter asset is a general rise in interest rates, 
lowering the value of  fixed-debt instruments in a directly inverse relationship. There is little long-term risk 
with government securities as most held by banks are backed by the full faith and credit of  the issuer, e.g., the 
U.S. Treasury, and these securities are often held to maturity.
The other category of  risky assets – non-performing or underperforming loans -- is of  particular con-
cern of  the markets and the regulators. Bank managers attempt to manage this risk through a due diligence 
review of  a borrower’s income and collateral; securitization, the packaging and sale of  loans to investors; and 
by diversifying the types and locations of  loans made to various borrowers.
When banks have large and potentially catastrophic loan losses, it is usually because of  loans that did not 
meet these criteria. For example, Wachovia Bank’s loan portfolio showed a significant jump in real estate loans 
during the mid-2000s with an increase in non-performing loans from 2006 to 2007 of  nearly four times.111 
This warning was available if  observant readers read the reported financial statement statistics carefully. The 
problem is that few financial managers have the time or the training to wade through a 150 page annual report 
and an equivalent-length 10K.
Many financial institutions have attempted to measure market risk using value-at-risk (VaR) models that 
quantify the potential loss from market price movement over a designated period at a specified statistical 
confidence level.112 Limiting the effectiveness of  VaR is the bank’s inability to accurately price most loans as 
there is no liquid market for such loans. As an example, Wachovia Bank’s one-day VaR limit in the first seven 
months of  2007 was $30 million, later increased to $50 million. The total one-day VaR was $62 million at 
year-end with the VaR limit exceeded on 27 days that year. While this appeared to be adequate to the bank’s 
managers, the VaR models relied on past market behavior and could not anticipate the credit stresses that 
110  See “Assets and Liabilities of  Commercial Banks in the United States,” H.8, at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/cur-
rent/default.htm.
111 See “Management’s Discussion and Analysis - Nonperforming Assets,” 2007 Annual Report, page 32, at https://www.wacho-
via.com/common_files/2007_Wachovia_Annual_Report.pdf.
112  Wachovia calculated one-day VaR at the 97.5 percent and 99 percent confidence levels, and 10-day VaR at the 99 percent 
confidence levels. 2007 Annual Report, see previous footnote, pages 39-40.
insufficient or uncollected funds?  What are the computer requirements for ACH, including 
hardware, software, encryption and virus protection?
review of Non-Credit Pricing
Recent experience has seen a decline in the importance of pricing in bank selection for the following reasons.
• Maturity of  the product cycle. Because many non-credit products are in the mature phase 
of  the product cycle, there is not much variation in the price charged by most banks. 
Furthermore, information on pricing is published in the Phoenix-Hecht Blue Book of Pricing 
(www.phoenixhecht.com), making such data available to all interested parties.
• Vendor competition. As the number of  banks has declined, there has been a significant in-
crease in the product offerings from non-bank vendors. The result has been a fairly competi-
tive market for most bank products, keeping prices realistic and profit margins thin. Two lead-
ing vendors that sell directly to companies and/or distribute private-labeled products through 
financial institutions are P & H Solutions (formerly Politzer and Haney)107 and FISERV.108
• Unbundling. Banks have unbundled pricing for these products,109 making line-by-line ac-
count analysis comparisons meaningless. Some banks charge for each specific service, while 
others include the service in the fee for the underlying product. For example, controlled 
disbursement may include positive pay, or it may be priced separately.
fINANCIAl INSTITuTIoN rISk
As we have seen in the recent credit crisis, banks can fail, and it is unwise to choose a financial partner 
without appropriate concern for that possibility. The risks that must be considered include market (credit), 
operating, reputation, legal and compliance, and funding (liquidity) risks.
107  For case studies of  bank and corporate P&H applications, see the website of  their parent company, ACI Worldwide, at 
www.aciworldwide.com/igsbase/igstemplate.cfm/SRC=SP/ SRCN=sharedcontent_casestudies_overview.
108  For additional information, see www.fiserv.com.
109  Unbundled pricing refers to the separation of  the elements of  the product instead of  quoting a composite fee. See the ac-
count analysis in Exhibit 8-3 for an example of  the unbundled pricing of  deposited collection items.
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manage such risk was Citigroup’s agreement to pay $1.66 billion to settle lawsuits alleging fraud and mislead-
ing accounting leading to the failure of  Enron.
funding (liquidity) risk
Funding (liquidity) risk is not having sufficient funds or access to funds to meet depositor and counter-
part demands. There are various measures that banks can take to quickly obtain liquidity, including accessing 
the Fed’s discount window, borrowing from other banks in the Federal (Fed) funds market, not making new 
loans, and selling loans or bonds from its portfolio of  assets. Longer-term actions include paying higher 
interest than competitors to attract depositors, reducing headcount, and selling physical assets such as branch 
offices or entire lines of  business.
What Companies Should Do
It is difficult for financial managers to measure and monitor these risks; for example, few observers 
considered that Wachovia would be forced into a takeover by Wells Fargo due to its weak real estate loan 
portfolio.115 Treasurers should consider subscribing to such independent bank credit rating services as Bauer 
Financial (at www.bauerfinancial.com), bankrate.com, Fitch (at www.fitchratings.com), Morningstar (at www.
morningstar.com) and Lace (at www.lacefinancial.com).
115 Observers attributed Wachovia’s problems largely to non-performing adjustable-rate mortgages it acquired from its merger 
with Golden West Financial in 2006. See “Wells Fargo to Buy Wachovia in $15.1 Billion Deal,” NY Times, Oct. 3, 2008, at 
dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/wells-fargo-to-merge-with-wachovia.
caused the real estate loan losses that the bank faced in early 2008. The bank had to be rescued by Wells Fargo 
in 2008.113
operating risk
Banks have experienced operating failures due to weather, power failures, terrorist attacks, computer 
malfunctions, and other events. The standard risk management response is to establish backup sites at dis-
tant locations, and to periodically test those sites to assure that operations can be quickly reestablished. The 
Comptroller of  the Currency requires banks to develop confidential disaster recovery plans to protect the 
institution against these occurrences.
reputational risk
While any company may suffer from adverse publicity due to a negative public incident, fiduciaries like 
banks are particularly susceptible to a deterioration of  public and customer confidence. Companies are par-
ticularly wary of  dealing with such financial institutions as their deposits will typically far exceed the maxi-
mum Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) maximum guarantee.
An incident could lead to a run on the bank such as occurred during the Panic of  1907 that led to 
legislation creating of  the Federal Reserve System. While the Fed stands ready to support troubled financial 
institutions, such as the Abacus Savings Bank situation in 2003,114 the solution is to proactively safeguard the 
reputation of  the bank and avoid any perception of  trouble.
legal and Compliance risk
Banks may be in violation of  laws or contracts (legal risk) or may fail to monitor compliance with regula-
tions established by the Comptroller of  the Currency or other regulators. A recent example of  the failure to 
113  For an insightful account of  VaR, see Joe Nocera, “Risk Mismanagement,” New York Times, Jan. 2, 2009, at www. nytimes.
com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html?ref=economy.
114  News spread through Chinese-language media that an Abacus manager had embezzled more than $1 million. Although 
the bank was financially sound, frightened depositors – largely Chinese immigrants -- withdrew their savings. See James 




AND THE BANKER’S 
RESPONSIBILITIES
This chapter discusses the following topics:
1. A case on what is best for the company: Appliance Station
2. Appliance Station: critical issues
3. Possible solutions for Appliance Station
4. Lessons for financial managers
5. Lessons for bankers
Cock a doodle doo!
My dame has lost her shoe;
My master’s lost his fiddle stick,
And knows not what to do.
   Anonymous: Nursery Rhymes
The banker and the financial manager should not make the mistake of  choosing debt (or equity) financ-
ing without considering all of  the issues facing a business. Financial analysis can only go so far – the competi-
tive circumstances that a company encounters must be evaluated as well as any viable alternatives that may be 
better choices. Having stated the obvious, let’s look at a case involving a financing decision. After suggesting 
the appropriate course of  action, we will address the issue of  why suboptimal choices are often selected.
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• A combination of  a stock issue and a bond issue. This is a mix of  the stock and debenture 
options described, in some proportion to be decided by senior management and Appliance 
Station’s investment bankers.
The company has previously used the services of  the Last National Bank for advice and to raise debt and 
equity capital. The bank has sent you to attend a board of  directors meeting to assist in reaching a decision. 
At the meeting, you realize that the board is split on which alternative to choose. 
APPlIANCe STATIoN: THe CrITICAl ISSueS
The board of  directors is split on which alternative to choose. A summary of  a recent board of  directors 
meeting shows the various positions; board members are noted as BOD; other attendees were invited to be 
present by the board. Exhibits 9-1 through 9-4 provide relevant financial data.
THe APPlIANCe STATIoN CASe
Appliance Station is a major producer of  household appliances, often referred to as consumer durables, 
including dishwashers, ranges, toilets, sinks, showers, washers, dryers and refrigerators. Most of  each pro-
duction run is manufactured for such national brands as GE and Maytag, although the company distributes 
its own line of  appliances for selected discount stores under the brand “Royal Flush”. There are two major 
manufacturing plants—in Phoenix AZ and Roanoke VA—with a total of  1½ million square feet.
Sales Prospects
Over 60% of sales are to chains like Wal-Mart. Though sales have increased nearly five times in the last 35 
years, they have fallen twice over the same period. The 1978 sales drop was due to severe inflation and a reces-
sion, and because one of  the larger customers reduced its purchases when it became upset at a price increase con-
sidered too aggressive. Sales also fell in 2000 – 2001, due to a recession and the September 11, 2001, attacks.
Fortunately, the net income of  Appliance Station has been positive for the last 25 years. Three years ago 
the company hired Sarah Charles as CEO. One of  her objectives was to broaden the retail base because she 
felt the company was too reliant on a few long-time dealers.  She was also concerned with Appliance Station’s 
relatively low profit margins.
raising New Capital
Appliance Station must now raise $75 million to modernize the two plants and expand the Phoenix fa-
cility in order to accommodate expected sales increases in Appliance Station’s business in the housing market 
in the Nevada and Arizona markets. It was expected that the modernization would reduce costs and achieve 
improved profit margins. Possible financing alternatives to raise the needed $75 million are being considered:
• A stock issue. This involves the sale of  700,000 new common shares at a price of  $115 per 
share. Appliance Station would net $75 million after $5.5 million of  costs of  flotation.
• A bond issue. The bonds would be ten-year debentures bearing an interest rate of  8%. The 
indenture requires that the current ratio cannot fall below 1.75, the debt ratio cannot exceed 
50%, and yearly dividends are limited to 40% of  net income.
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Ms. Tort, senior vice president and legal counsel. She is worried about the contractual obligation of  debt 
and the risk of  financial distress if  the economy continues in a recession. That outcome could badly hurt 
consumer durables and housing.
Ms. Brownwood, director of  marketing. She sees a fairly mixed forecast for the sales of  durables with 
the West Coast particularly susceptible. Also notes that there has been significant competition from durables 
manufactured in Mexico at labor costs about one-fifth those of  the U.S.
Ambivalent as to Debt or equity
Mr. Cutler, chief  operating officer, BOD. He worries about all of  these issues but knows that something 
has to be done to stay competitive.
Ms. Charles, chairman and CEO, BOD. She has a preference for debt to increase earnings per share but 
can appreciate the arguments for equity.
You are an experienced lender representing a large commercial bank. You have been asked to advise the 
board of  directors on this decision. What do you suggest? In developing your recommendations, consider 
whether the board has explored all possible options.
APPlIANCe STATIoN: PoSSIBle SoluTIoNS
The ratios in Exhibit 9-4 suggest that the company has a relatively conservative capital structure. However, 
the market for consumer durables is sensitive to economic downturns, and Appliance Station’s ability to ser-
vice existing and new debt could be jeopardized in a weak economy. It could therefore be argued that the 
current capital structure is appropriate when additional risk is considered.
The Debt option
There are limitations to financial calculation. The debt option will cost $6 million in interest alone ($75 
million times 8%) on a pretax basis, and $3.6 million on an after-tax basis ($6 million times [1 – 40%]). 
In favor of Debt
Dr. Asher, a finance professor, BOD. Supports debt because the company does not have enough financial 
leverage (is underleveraged), causing too high a cost of  capital. He notes that the current and quick ratios are 
above industry norms, and the debt ratio is “well below” average.
Ms. Wagner, treasurer. Agrees with Asher and believes that the firm’s stock is not appealing to investors. 
She wants to drive earnings per share using leverage and through large sales to real estate companies furnish-
ing their developments.
Mr. Sterling, chief  financial officer, BOD. Chooses debt because inflation will allow any money borrowed 
to be repaid with “cheap” dollars. Feels that the company will be profitable in the next real estate boom, and 
it would be dilutive to current stockholders to sell stock. He knows that the equity markets are weak and that 
a new issue may face a difficult reception from investors.
 In favor of equity
Mr. McCloud, retired chairman of  Moral Launch Securities, BOD. McCloud has been through periods 
of  credit scarcity, particularly in late 2007 and early 2008. He is concerned that the low profitability of  the 
company may not adequately support additional debt.
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capital; and the possible bias of  the investment bankers toward equity (given the higher fees generated). The 
combination of  portions of  both debt and equity financing would involve considerably higher flotation costs 
and should be abandoned.116 While the company’s ratios are consistent with the industry,117 it would not be 
prudent to leap to the conclusion that Appliance Station should issue debt as it slightly underleveraged.
On balance, neither debt nor equity is hugely attractive, particularly given the risk of  a soft economy. 
Either debt or equity may put severe constraints on future business opportunities and could be too risky to 
pursue. This is one of  those situations where any decision should be made only after a thorough review of  
all options.
Some of  these options could include leasing equipment, joint venturing with a foreign competitor anx-
ious to increase its U.S. position, and even a merger with a U.S. company. This last idea would be consistent 
with the Whirlpool-Maytag merger (2006) in the consumer durables industry as these companies had been 
looking to reduce fixed costs. Drivers include the following:
• The weakness of  the American housing market, particularly in the markets Appliance Station 
hopes to serve.
• The maturity of  the appliance business, with few new product innovations driving replace-
ment sales of  appliances. The convection oven was briefly popular, but there has not been a 
significant new product idea in about two decades. Unless North Americans get serious about 
savings energy, they will keep their old appliances until the repair bills become unaffordable.
• Likely trends in consumer spending (currently very weak) and in the general economic 
recovery.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2002 demands active board involvement in company decision-making. It is 
entirely appropriate for senior managers to participate in board discussions, allowing a free and full hearing 
of  all concerns.
116  Most studies indicate that the flotation cost of  equity is about four times that of  debt.
117  The company’s significant ratios are: current ratio, 2.77 times; quick ratio, 1.22 times; debt ratio (total debt-to-total assets), 
0.41; and times interest earned, 9.84 times. The industry’s ratios were provided in Exhibit 9-4.
While the tax deduction is an important consideration, the company must earn and pay the $6 million even 
in years where losses occur.
Another factor to consider is that the sale of  new debt would raise the debt/assets ratio to nearly 45% 
(calculated as [$407 + $75]/$1,069 in millions), which would be within three percentage points of  the 
industry average. This would not leave any significant room for additional debt, whether as bank loans or an 
expansion of  current liabilities. Although the case does not mention the options for retiring the bonds, the 
company must either establish a sinking fund or purchase bonds in the open market, so that the after-tax 
interest cost is only a portion of  the total cash outflow for new debt.
The equity option
If  new stock were issued, the company would almost certainly be forced to retain or increase the current 
dividend of  $2.20 cents per share. Assuming that 700,000 new shares would be issued, dividends on the new 
stock would cost $1.54 million. There would not be any contractual requirement to pay the dividends, unlike 
the interest payment obligation with debt.
However, the current dividend policy may not be sustainable, as investors may demand a greater return 
than about 2% ($2.20 divided by the $115 stock price). In fact, the underwriters should probably advise the 
board of  this reality and suggest perhaps an increase to $2.50. At $1.75 million (700,000 shares times $2.50 
a share), this is approximately one-half  of  the after-tax cost of  debt.
The price-earnings (P/E) ratio is significantly below that of  the industry (see Exhibit 9-3). Is this 
the low valuation because of  lower financial leverage, lack of  consumer name recognition or other factors? 
Driving the P/E to industry levels would cause the stock to rise to nearly $150 (17.2 times $8.62) vs. the 
current price of  $115. However, it is not clear that this can be easily accomplished, particularly given the 
recent history of  the company’s P/E performance.
other Important Issues
Other issues to consider are flotation costs, that is the expenses incurred in issued debt or equity through 
the bond and stock markets; how to find the optimal proportion of  debt to equity to minimize the cost of  
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to the planning for the financial decision on this manufacturing facility.) In this way, the 
banker can use the full resources that are available to develop alternative proposals, con-
sider various types of  loans and equity offerings, and assist the client in making the proper 
decision.
2. The company’s financial managers must be knowledgeable about trends, products, offerings 
from bankers and other vendors, and their company’s situation. Too many companies pro-
mote managers who are unqualified for a position. As one example, a Fortune 50 corpora-
tion that was a client of  one of  the authors had a new treasurer who previously was a top 
salesman for that company. Senior management hoped to groom him for a top level position, 
perhaps a vice-chairmanship. However, it quickly became apparent that he knew nothing 
about finance and little interest in learning anything.
 Reread Alliance Station. Does the position of  Mr. Sterling (the chief  financial officer, and 
board member make sense regarding debt (because inflation will allow any money borrowed 
to be repaid with “cheap” dollars) and equity (if  the company is profitable in the next boom 
it would be dilutive to sell stock)?
• Debt is priced based on the yield curve relationship between maturity and risk, and incor-
porates inflationary expectations by pricing longer-term debt higher than short-term debt.
• Dilution occurs in a secondary stock offering if  earnings are reduced on a per share basis 
as a temporary effect. If  the new plant does not throw off  adequate earnings to be accre-
tive once it is operational, why is it even being considered?
3. The company’s senior managers must provide a feeling of  competence in the context of  
a strategic perspective.  Bankers are at a disadvantage in assessing a prospective borrower 
because they generally have not spent time during their career running a business or dealing 
with the myriad of  management issues. Although the case is brief, it provides two insights to 
the competence of  management:
• Do you sense that the company has a written strategic plan for a period beyond the next 
one to two years? More important, has a contingency or worst-case plan been prepared 
in the event of  competitive, economic or internal problems?
APPlIANCe STATIoN: CoNCluSIoNS AND SoMe leSSoNS for 
fINANCIAl MANAGerS
We deliberately did not choose debt or equity financing for Appliance Station, preferring to consider 
other strategies for the company. Is this realistic? Investment and commercial bankers are primarily compen-
sated by their ability to close deals, which at times may not be in the best interests of  their client; and by the 
linearity of  their thinking, which may involve finding products to offer that support their specific area within 
the financial services business rather than what the client requires.
Dynamics of the Board Meeting
The perceptive banker should observe some interesting interactions that are occurring at this board meet-
ing. The various directors and senior managers do not seem to have any real long-term perspective or strategic 
plan in mind other than to develop a financing mechanism for the proposed manufacturing facility. Important 
questions that should have been addressed somewhere were not – at least in the case materials.
The authors acknowledge that Appliance Station – like any business case – is an excerpt from the totality 
of  the ebbs and flows an organization and its communications, reports, oral and formal history, interpersonal 
dynamics and successes (or failures). However, a banker would be remiss in merely agreeing to (“selling”) a 
loan or an equity issue, because the orientation cannot be on the next deal but on a long-term partnership 
with a company. In addition, financial advisors have been sued for providing bad advice.
What Company Managers Must Do
The authors’ experience with lending arrangements indicates several important conditions that need to 
be present for a satisfactory financial relationship.
1. The company’s senior managers must make themselves available to bank officers in meetings 
preliminary to the request for credit or an equity offering. In other words, the board meet-
ing that is at the heart of  Appliance Station occurs long past the time when a $75 million 
project was being developed. (Obviously, this is a short case and not a complete history; 
however, the last sentence of  the case implies that you – the banker – have not been a party 
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management. The extent of  management competence and preparation for the future 
drives the viability of  any new credit that is offered.
  Deterioration in the company’s position. The repayment of  outstanding loans could be 
jeopardized should the company’s business condition deteriorate since existing credits 
were approved. While periodic financial  reports and the analysis of  loan covenants as-
sists in reviewing this possibility, such data is historical and may be as much as months 
old. The banker must be sufficiently perceptive to interpret conditions on-site and initi-
ate an appropriate response.
• In support of  both the client and the bank.
  Advice on financial matters. The banker must counsel clients on a variety of  financial 
matters, from the use of  non-credit services to the appropriate mix of  debt and equity 
to the management of  working capital to risk management techniques. In providing this 
advice, the banker assists the client in improving its financial management and the bank 
in developing new revenue opportunities.
  Advice on regulation and contractual obligations. The banker can assist clients in under-
standing requirements for compliance on corporate governance, the issuance of  equity, 
regulations specific to the industry, bank lending agreement covenants, and various other 
issues. While companies depend on legal counsel or other advisors for this information, 
the banker should be the expert on finance. It serves neither the client nor the bank for 
any failure to occur with regard to these matters.
The Theory and the Practice
There are no surveys on the behavior of  bankers, so Exhibit 9-5 provides a compilation of  observations 
from our combined 50 year career in the industry.
• Was any key ratio in the prospect’s income statement or balance sheet significantly below 
the industry, and if  so, what is the company doing about it? Calculate the company’s ra-
tios and compare the results to those of  the industry (Exhibit 9-4). These metrics clearly 
show that insufficient attention has been paid to the management of  working capital 
and the various actions that could reduce inventory and receivables and extend payables. 
The company’s low price-earnings ratio (Exhibit 9-3) is a clear indication of  insufficient 
profitability and inadequate attention to business basics.
 These problems clearly suggest an inability to recognize that the company is operating below 
industry norms and/or an inability to resolve the problems that caused the company to fall 
below those norms.
AND SoMe leSSoNS for BANkerS
The banker must be ready to assist his or her clients in choosing the most appropriate course of  action 
and to support the bank in achieving its objectives. In reviewing Appliance Station, do you believe that the 
officer from Last National Bank was aware of  any of  the following principles?
• In support of  clients.
  Client information. See the discussion of  credit files in Chapter 3. The banker must 
know everything that can be determined about the client, whether from a credit his-
tory, data bases, colleagues knowledgeable about the industry or other sources. A talking 
document should be developed to guide the discussion and to address essential issues.
  Economic information. Company strategies nearly always assume positive economic 
growth. The years since 2008 (and earlier periods of  recession) are stark evidence of  the 
fallacy of  these optimistic outlooks. The banker must understand forecasts and be able 
to steer companies toward appropriate decisions.
• In support of  the bank.
  Repayment of  proposed loan. The banker is the financial institution’s representa-
tive, which means that the current situation at the client must be reported to bank 
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one Solution: Credit Training
Bankers – particularly newer bankers – cannot be expected to act as if  they were knowledgeable lenders, 
a term we use throughout the cases in this handbook. To give them that experience, financial institutions have 
historically used credit training in the form of  readings and case studies. What went right and more impor-
tantly, what went wrong in actual lending situations?
The training should parallel the material covered in this handbook, and such additional topics as the 
business operations of  the borrower; understanding notes to financial statements; project finance (see the 
Florida Turnpike case); cost of  capital; elements of  loan support and pricing; collateral, control, monitoring, 
the role of  competition, and customer profitability; credit discipline; and the components of  an effective 
administration process leading to a quality loan portfolio. Bankers must attempt to manage the lending rela-
tionship to position the lender as a trusted advisor.
A Second Solution: Marketing Training
Marketing training is critical to emphasize the benefits and techniques of  selling solutions to problems 
rather than simply selling products.  Participants should be led through a series of  discussions and case stud-
ies designed to improve their problem identification and product association skills, while increasing their 
ability to adapt to various personalities and marketing situations.  A focus should also be on the negotiation 
skills bankers need to close sales.
Specific marketing techniques are chosen to work within the parameters of  the selected industry or target 
market. These techniques include direct mailings that integrate with media advertising or public relations; 
redeveloped sales management procedures; instructional seminars for customers and prospects; new or revised 
“drop” brochures and mail brochures; and private label newsletters.  Calling techniques should be empha-
sized, focusing particularly on the failures and omissions noted in the previous section.
As a critical part of  the training, the bank’s customers should be interviewed to develop a qualitative as-
sessment of  current marketing and sales efforts.  This research could be broadened to all, or part, of  a bank’s 
customer and prospect base using a combination of  telephone, face-to-face, and mail interviews. An assess-
ment of  the current linkage existing between banking services and bank customers can then be prepared from 
While we have worked with some excellent bankers, the overall record is not very positive. Clients tend 
to accept the general mediocrity because they need financing. However, opportunities have been missed in as-
sisting a client to reach an optimal solution, in developing additional revenue for the bank, and in enhancing 
the bank’s reputation. It is no surprise that the role of  banking is no longer as dominant as it was in the first 
two-thirds of  the 20th century, and that other sources, as shown in Exhibit 9-6, have become major providers 
of  financing.  These statistics are only intended as indications of  the importance of  financial intermediaries 
other than commercial banking. For example, not included are the commercial paper market or private equity 
investors, both important sources of  funds for companies.
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the data collection and surveys. An action plan is developed to achieve this linkage and to optimize the mix 
of  product offerings deemed profitable for the bank’s target market.
The Banker’s responsibility
The idea that mathematical certainty follows from financial calculations is appealing, but does not neces-
sarily mean that such an exercise is correct. For example, debt may be less expensive than equity on an after-tax 
basis, but companies have to meet their loan agreement obligations or face default. The banker must never 
forget that any business organization and its competitive environment are complex, with the number of  vari-
ables implicit in any decision or course of  action makes simplistic analysis largely futile.
This is why relationship banking – the subject of  Chapter 8 – is such an important concept, and one that 
helps both the corporate financial manager and the banker. Doing the job in a responsible manner creates a 
long-term partnership between the parties, and offers revenue opportunities to the bank through an M&A 
deal, financing for a joint venture, equipment leasing or other outcome.
There is every reason to be a good corporate citizen, but the financial institution has to make it a part of  
the culture and the company has to ask hard, probing questions while exploring all possible actions. Not all 
of  us can be Jamie Dimon (chairman of  J.P. Morgan Chase) or Jack Welsh (former chairman and CEO of  
General Electric). However, all of  us can try to think longer-term and outside of  the box to find the optimal 






The text portion of  this book contains three cases. In Chapter 1, O’Reilly Automotive acts as an in-troduction to the various issues faced in a credit decision with areas for analysis but no single point 
of  concern. In Chapter 4 we present Barely Edible to demonstrate procedures used in credit analysis. 
Appliance Station is used in Chapter 9 to show that a company and its bankers must consider all essential 
factors before deciding on an appropriate course of  action. O’Reilly is a real company, while Barely Edible 
and Appliance Station are fictionalized accounts of  actual situations at public companies that have been 
clients of  the authors.
The cases in this section of  the book attempt to highlight specific business problems that need to be eval-
uated before making a loan commitment. They are based on actual company results derived from the website 
of  the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) at www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml, although certain facts were 
modified for purposes of  creating educational materials. The reader should attempt to consider each request 
for credit in the context of  the year of  the case without the perspective of  hindsight.
The case material includes financial data for each company and its industry. It is not the intention of  
these cases to detail every credit concern. Rather, the concept is to illustrate methods to gain further insight 
into a company and to think of  ways to add to the protective capability of  a loan agreement.
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The purpose of  a case is to integrate the external environment with the company’s situation. In other 
words, one cannot evaluate a case as if  it were in finance, or marketing, or manufacturing, or other business 
discipline. Merely calculating the significant ratios, or developing a cash flow analysis, or determining the 
optimal cost of  capital, is only a part of  the puzzle. You must consider whether internal company functions 
are doing a reasonable job and if  the organization is responding in an appropriate manner to known and likely 
changes in the global marketplace.
Case Analysis: Defining the Problem
As an experienced banker, financial manager or regulator, you should use a logical sequential process to 
analyze cases on lending.
1. What is the business of  the company? What should the business of  the company become? 
These are not idle questions, because companies may sell products and/or offer services at 
break-even or a loss to gain access to a related, profitable line of  business. As we noted in 
Chapter 7, banks often offer credit to be able to offer more profitable non-credit services. 
Similarly, an industrial organization may market electric equipment on a break-even basis in 
order to sell the financing of  that equipment. Incidentally, this has been the very successful 
strategy used by GE.
 As Levitt so clearly explained in his important Harvard Business Review article,118 the railroads 
should have appreciated that they were really in the transportation business. If  they had, the 
concept of  trucking for short-haul and intermodal for long-haul freight would have been 
under their control. Similarly, the oil companies should have realized long ago that they were 
in the clean energy business. While bank loans are short-term in duration, a relationship 
with a financial institution can last for decades, even a century.
2.  What are the company’s goals? How will senior management develop strategies that are 
consistent with these objectives? Is the firm pursuing goals in a logical and consistent man-
ner? In developing your analysis, consideration must be given to whether these objectives are 
118  Theodore Levitt, “Marketing Myopia,” Harvard Business Review, July-Aug. 1960, pages 45-56, reprinted at business.usi.edu/
WEByu/SuppReadings/Levitt1960.pdf.
The cases are presented in the following order with the notations for the accompanying exhibits.
• Chemical Companies (exhibits notated as ChCo):  considers various credit issues in the con-
text of  the comparative results of  three publicly-traded chemical companies
• Krispy Kreme (exhibits notated as KK):  examines the artificial boosting of  earnings through 
shipments of  inventory and equipment to company-owned stores and franchisees, and non-
recurring earnings from the exercise of  employee stock options
• Coldwater Creek (exhibits notated as CoCr): discusses the use of  operating leases in contrast 
to the ownership and financing of  assets and a company’s ability to repay debt
• Lear Corporation (exhibits notated as L): reviews the effect of  securitization on a company’s 
ability to justify a loan in that certain assets have been removed from the balance sheet
• Florida Turnpike (exhibits notated as FL): explains project finance for a public entity and the 
role of  the banker (including an explanatory note on project finance)
The analyses of  the cases developed by the authors are located in the Solutions Section that follows each case.
The Concept of the Banking Case
Every case starts with a statement of  “your assignment” as if  this were a real-life banking decision. The 
reader should assume that he or she is an experienced lending officer (or relationship manager) working for a 
money center or super-regional U.S. bank. Alternatively, you could be a financial manager (perhaps the CFO 
or treasurer) at a company that is negotiating with a bank, or a regulator who is charged with overseeing the 
credit markets to assure their functioning and efficacy.
 Regardless of  your point-of-view, assume that a bank has been approached by a large corporate prospect 
interested in continuing or changing its major financial provider (perhaps due to dissatisfaction with its current 
fees or services). Although not all of  the facts you might want to know are provided in these cases (or in fact in 
any case), there is sufficient information to arrive at a decision or to at least pursue additional areas of  inquiry.
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finance this growing and largely obsolete inventory. The problem could have been avoided 
years earlier if  appropriate practices had been established.120
6. What is your responsibility in diagnosing the case?  You should be a sort of  management 
consultant/business doctor. You must provide a statement of  the problem that can be 
fixed by company managers. To accomplish this, you need data in the same way that a 
physician uses such metrics as blood pressure, temperature, an electrocardiogram (EKG), 
a chest x-ray and laboratory tests to determine the nature of  an illness. Finance requires 
spreadsheet skills and the use of  the analytical techniques described in this text and in 
basic finance books.
7. Which facts bear on the problem? A case can overwhelm the reader with the quantity of  
facts, particularly when Internet and library research is used to supplement the case data. 
Remember, data are not information; they are knowledge elements that may or may not 
be relevant to the problem. The correct definition of  the problem will drive the research to 
develop useful facts and approaches.
 For example, if  you suspect that the requested financing is supporting an inappropriate 
policy on inventory (the critical problem), you could compare the company’s inventory turn-
over ratio to its competitors and to results of  earlier years. In addition, you can investigate 
whether modern inventory management techniques are being used, such as economic order 
quantity (EOQ) or just-in-time (JIT).
8. What are the logical alternatives to solve the critical problem? Which one do you recom-
mend? And relevant to the credit request, should the loan be made? If  so, on what terms? 
Your listing of  possible recommendations should be exhaustive and should explore pos-
sibilities that may not be on the mind of  the bank or the company. The more realistic 
alternatives should then be tested for likely impacts on the situation, and a decision 
reached.
120  This example is explored in greater detail in James Sagner, Essentials of Working Capital Management, Wiley, 2010, 
pages 119-120.
attainable, are logical, and are consistent with the resources and competence of  the company. 
For example, the goal of  becoming a global company in five years may be realistic for a 
publicly-held national firm, but beyond the reach of  a regional business whose customers are 
primarily in four or five states.
3. What is the critical problem? What is the one thing that must be changed or altered before 
anything else can be changed? In other words, what situation underlies the case presentation 
as a problem and not just as a symptom? Be judicious in your selection of  this problem; don’t 
merely consider an ambiguity, such as “management” or “the business environment” or some 
similar broad generalization.119 To test your statement of  the problem, consider whether 
solving it will largely wipe away the difficulties facing the company.
4. What will happen if  nothing is done? That is, assume that the company does not receive the 
loan. Will it manage to survive and prosper, albeit at a rate of  growth that is lower than if  
it had access to and use of  the requested financing? Or will the company’s current problems 
conceivably topple the organization if  allowed to continue uncorrected. In other words, are 
we considering providing credit to a healthy or to an ailing business?
Case Analysis: Developing recommendations
5. What could have been changed at the time the problem first appeared? Our experience is that 
some loan requests have the purpose of  covering poor decisions or practices that have been 
allowed to become established in the culture of  a company. One of  the authors consulted 
with a large manufacturing company and discovered that parts were being purchased in an-
ticipation of  pricing increases or shortages.
 This problem surfaced when metrics were developed on materials utilization that showed 
a significant increase in the days of  materials held in inventory. The requested loan was to 
119  The classic authority on business case analysis is Peter F. Drucker. See, for example, his The Practice of Management, Harper & 
Row, 1954, Chapters 5-7 and 28.
THE CHEMICAL 
COMPANIES
As an experienced lending officer, you have been asked to review and either recommend or reject your bank’s renewal of  credit facilities for certain companies in the chemical industry. These companies en-
tered into unsecured bank credit facilities to refinance certain existing debt and increase borrowing availability 
for general working capital purposes and other financing and investing activities.
Your Assignment: Your bank’s management expects you to prepare a credit report regarding the three 
chemical companies. In your analysis incorporate the following:
• Your recommendation to continue lending or to terminate the facilities. Include any new con-
ditions to the loan agreement should such conditions make the credits stronger for your bank.
• A description of  the analytical techniques you will be using to measure the risk, competitive 
position and confidence in management for each company.
• A discussion of the differences between the business activities of the companies, with a comment 
on the relevance of these differences in terms of revenue and earnings volatility. Will each of  
these companies be able to repay the credit facilities in the event of adverse business conditions?
PurPoSe of THe CASe
This case analyzes three companies in the chemical industry, Dow Chemical (stock symbol: DOW), 
DuPont (stock symbol: DD), and Huntsman Corporation (stock symbol: HUN). The case illustrates the dif-
ficulty a banker faces in analyzing otherwise stable companies and an industry that have experienced difficult 




Those industrial companies that have survived began to restock in 2009 in preparation for a slow eco-
nomic recovery, although global overcapacity continued to restrain growth. The banker considering a lending 
arrangement should investigate the end-users of  chemical products and whether any particular company can 
expect to sell into those markets. The attractive markets will likely be those that are largely recession-proof, such 
as pharmaceuticals; those that are essential industries, such as energy; and those that appear to be in recovery, 
such as technology. By geographic market, it is likely that Europe will be a laggard, particularly given on-going 
fiscal and monetary problems and uncertainty regarding the euro, and because of  global competitive imports.
Each chemical company has to come to terms with the changes in the future demand and the inevitable 
industry transformations. For purposes of  this case, we chose two large basic chemical companies, Dow and 
DuPont, and one smaller diversified company, Huntsman. The larger companies are experiencing recoveries 
from the 2008-2009 period, supported by such trends as global demand for food production, alternative 
energy and other market drivers. Huntsman suffers from high financial leverage and flat sales given its special-
ization in such product lines as polyurethane, titanium dioxide and petrochemicals.
fINANCIAl reSulTS
The total sales and profit margins in the aggregated chemical industry have just about recovered to 2008 
levels. As shown in Exhibit ChCo-1, Dow and Huntsman are experiencing much higher manufacturing ex-
penses (cost of  goods sold) than its peers, offset to some extent by lower operating expenses. This reflects 
the capital intensity of  the chemical industry, as manufacturing costs continue despite temporarily depressed 
business conditions. Dow in particular has experienced very low income before taxes (1.0%) compared to the 
industry (10.2%) or to two of  its competitors (DuPont, 8.0%; Huntsman, 6.2%).
All three companies are considerably more financially leveraged (at 67.0% to 78.1%) than the industry 
(at 53.2%121), causing concern for debt service payments; see Exhibit ChCo-2. This conclusion is support-
ed by the debt-to-net worth ratios and EBIT-to-interest ratios (see Exhibit ChCo-3), which also shows that 
none of  the three companies has adequate asset turnover (sales-to-total assets). Dow has experienced seri-
ous deterioration in receivables turnover (sales-to-receivables), while Huntsman’s is well below the industry.
121  The “industry” statistics used in this case combine organic and inorganic chemical data as reported by RMA for NAICS 
325199 and 325188, respectively.
economic period. Does the banker rigidly follow the financial results from this period, or can assumptions 
reasonably be made that profitable and efficient operations will resume as the global economy improves?
Furthermore, the purpose of  this discussion is to review various analytical tools to measure the compe-
tence of  management and the competitive position of  each company as measured by working capital efficien-
cy, fixed asset turnover and other evaluative tools. This case also suggests procedures used to measure risk. The 
analytical processes discussed are in addition to those developed in the textual part of  this handbook. Bankers 
should understand that not every technique applies to every type of  company, and as noted in Chapter 3, 
larger banks are usually organized so as to develop and maintain industry expertise.
BACkGrouND of THe INDuSTrY
The credit crisis that began in early 2008 affected nearly every industry, and the demand for chemical 
products declined to five-year lows before the industry was able to stabilize output. The three business sec-
tors most impacted by economic conditions – general manufacturing, automobiles and construction – ex-
perienced substantially reduced chemical demand, exacerbated by inventory destocking resulting from an 
anticipated decline in commodity prices.  As the result, earnings fell, and in fact, Dow Chemical experienced 
serious declines in profitability; between 2005 and 2009, its net income fell from $4.3 billion to $0.6 billion. 
For the past two fiscal years of  income statements, see Exhibit ChCo-1.




sold by 365 days and divide that result into accounts payables. Adding the average collection period to the 
days of  inventory held less the days of  payables outstanding results in the net trade cycle.
The calculations for the three chemical companies are shown in Exhibit ChCo-4.
As analysts, we would want to know why Dow Chemical has such dramatic shifts in its trade cycle. In 
meetings with the company, the banker should inquire about how such trends might impact working capital 
needs. For instance, longer cash conversion cycles suggest more short-term bank borrowings. How much of  
a range can one expect? Readers are encouraged to search out the variances by industry and by company; one 
suggested calculation would be for Amazon’s net trade cycle. Is it short or is it long and what could explain 
that result?122
fixed Asset Turnover
A sign of  management efficiency is how rapidly a company can turn its fixed assets, particularly for a 
capital intensive industry such as the chemical business. The year 2009 may be an outlier due to the economic 
recession and perhaps is not characteristic of  normal periods. In 2008, Dow achieved substantially higher 
fixed asset turnover than its two competitors. See Figure ChCo-5 for these calculations.
122  For 2009, Amazon’s net trade cycle is an astonishing -51.3 days, comprised of  receivables days of  14.7 plus inventory days 
of  41.8 days less payables days of  107.8 days. However, retail Internet sales are a completely different business model from 
industrial chemical manufacturing.
effICIeNCY AND rISk MeASureS
The relevant measures of  efficiency and risk are noted in the sections that follow.
Net Trade Cycle
A method to measure working capital efficiency is through ratios designed to determine the net trade 
cycle (also known as the cash conversion cycle). The analyst must first calculate the average collection period 
for receivables by determining average daily sales (total sales divided by 365 days) and then dividing that 
number into receivables. For inventory, the cost of  goods sold is divided by 365 days, which is then divided 
into inventory for the days of  inventory held. For accounts payables outstanding, divide the cost of  goods 





In addition to management efficiency, managerial ability in terms of  achieving profits needs to be evalu-
ated. A measure in frequent use is to calculate a company’s return-on-equity, i.e. taking after tax profits and 
dividing by the book equity of  the firm. Some analysts prefer taking the after tax profits and dividing by the 
average of  year-end equity for the current year and the prior year, but for purposes of  the analysis below, we 
will simply use current year-end equity.
However, there is a systematic flaw in this calculation, as it ignores leverage in the calculation of  return 
on equity (ROE). If  a company is only marginally profitable as measured by a low return on total assets but 
is highly leveraged, that is, with very little equity, the company could have a high ROE. The Dupont System 
attempts to show if  leverage is a factor in the ROE calculations.  It does so by the following equation:
(Net Income/Total Assets) times (Total Assets/Stockholders’ Equity) = ROE
All calculations are from the financial statements for the three companies for 2009.
Dow Chemical: $648/$63,979 X $63,979/$16,555 = 0.0101 X 3.864 = 3.9% This is 
not a very high return but leverage was not high; had leverage been much higher, then the 
return would have been in excess of  10%.
123  This is not to be confused with the DuPont Corporation, although the concept is credited to a legendary DuPont senior 
executive, Donaldson Brown, who introduced it in the 1920s. 




• The trend of  debt-to-EBITDA. As shown in Exhibit ChCo-8, Dow (and to a lesser extent 
Huntsman) added substantial new debt in 2009, and the credit analyst needs to exercise care 
in examining this trend. It could well be that the debt incurred will show increased sales and 
profit increases in the years to come, reducing debt-to-EBITDA. However, these companies 
may become overly financially leveraged, which could jeopardize their ability to service debt.
• Pension obligations. Lenders and bank analysts need to spend some time reviewing the foot-
notes of  the financial statements. One area in need of  particular scrutiny relates to pension 
obligations for defined benefit programs.124 The onus is on the company to invest pension 
funds successfully to supply the necessary payments to retirees, without being required to use 
the company’s own cash flow.
 Many companies have underfunded pension funds, i.e. the projected benefits are often 
in excess of  the monies invested in the pension fund. One of  two things can happen: 
either the pension fund is able to achieve higher returns and reduce the shortfall, or 
124  Because of  the cost of  these plans, many companies have converted all or newer employees to defined contribution plans in 
which the amount of  the employer’s annual contribution is specified. Individual accounts are established for participants and 
benefits are based on the amounts credited to these accounts through employer and employee contributions which suppos-
edly generate investment earnings.
DuPont: $1,755/$34,945 X $34,945/$6,978 = .0502 X 5.008 = 25.2% DuPont is sig-
nificantly more profitable whether measured by net income or ROE than Dow, but its higher 
ROE is due to higher leverage.
Huntsman: $107/$8,488 X $8,488/$1,844 = ROE or .0126 X 4.603 = 5.8% Higher 
leverage helped Huntsman (and DuPont) to achieve a higher ROE than Dow.
It is useful to measure management’s ability using ROE but with a key caveat: how much did leverage as-
sist in the ROE result?  These calculations are in Exhibit ChCo-6.
Measures of risk
Although this material is not intended to detail every significant difference in credit quality among these 
chemical companies, there are three measurements which may be instructive in examining credit quality: good-
will and intangibles, debt-to-EBITDA and pension obligations.
• Goodwill and other intangibles as a percentage of  net worth. When companies falter, intan-
gibles tend to lessen and even disappear in value. Bankers need to think worst case, and if  
intangibles do disappear, what is the likelihood of  full repayment of  bank debt if  intangibles 
and net worth represented most of  book net worth. On liquidation, assets may bring less 
than 70 cents on the dollar.
 As shown in Exhibit ChCo-7, Dow Chemical has substantial goodwill and intangibles-to- 
net worth. This is not a reason to decline a credit request but an issue that should concern 
lenders. One suggestion is to insert a covenant in future loan agreements capping this per-
centage at something well less than 100% of  book net worth?




The banker must be cognizant of  recent financial results (as previously discussed), but should assume 
that economic conditions will improve sufficiently to pull the three companies back to normal profitability. 
The concerns that can be addressed in the loan covenants are financial leverage, pension fund obligations, 
intangibles and receivables turnover.
financial leverage
An important loan covenant is debt-to-EBITDA, an important risk setting covenant for lending. Although 
the chemical industry is capital intensive, i.e. capital expenditures are a substantial drain on cash flow, chemical 
companies historically generate decent profits and substantial depreciation. Recall that EBITDA represents 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. If  EBITDA is strong, higher debt levels can 
and should be tolerated. Lenders should find agreement with borrowers on this because as EBITDA grows, 
so does permissible debt levels. It is in the interest of  the borrower to be able to borrow more money for new 
projects, and it is in the interest of  the lender to advance such funds if  the borrower remains creditworthy. 
This covenant achieves that objective.
Pension fund obligations
A second loan covenant that needs to be inserted is to limit pension fund shortfalls. The concern for 
lenders is the claim of  pension obligations that are superior to bank debt in the event of  a bankruptcy filing. 
To protect the bank from this situation, a covenant could address the difference between plan assets (what is 
available to pay pensioners) and pension obligations (what is owed). As the gap increases, lender risk increases, 
and it is in the interest of  the bank to limit that gap.
However, an offset to that requirement is that it may put the bank in a difficult position, i.e., if  the bor-
rower has to defer principal repayment to the bank because of  a need to inject further funds into its pension 
funds, is the bank well served by this covenant? Perhaps the best solution is to allow a pension fund shortfall 
requirement to be offset by the bank through a bank waiver.
Intangibles
With regard to limitations on intangibles and goodwill, the lender could:
the money will eventually have to come out of  the company’s own cash flow. In today’s 
current environment, higher bond yields are not in the immediate future and stock re-
turns have been erratic in recent years. So measuring the shortfalls against stockholders’ 
equity seems a prudent endeavor. The results for these three chemical companies are 
shown in Exhibit ChCo-9.
 The DuPont Company is obviously at greater risk than Dow or Huntsman given the sub-
stantive size of  the pension fund shortfall relative to book net worth. Again, this is not a 
cause to reject the credit but may warrant a loan covenant requiring the company to reduce 
its shortfall relative to book net worth over a selected time frame.
SuGGeSTeD SoluTIoNS
All three companies are creditworthy. The primary goal of  a loan agreement is not to insure or guarantee 
loan repayment. If  it were true that a loan agreement could insure repayment, we would not have credit losses 
in the banking industry. What effective credit agreements can do is to contain losses and protect the lender 
from further exposure. It does so by limiting the bank’s exposure to certain risks, while at the same time, giv-
ing the lender the ability to call for a default with the additional right of  acceleration of  debt service. This 
lending threat is key in the banker’s saying that there no further funding will be provided.
This industry is an example of  derived demand, which suffers more than other industries in times of  re-
cession. Minor changes in consumption translate to major changes in the related industrial demand. Industrial 
companies can take various  measures to manage this problem, including globalizing and broadening their 
markets, raising or lowering prices as consumer demand changes, and emphasizing long-term stability over 
concern for quarterly earnings.
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 CASE STUDY: KRISPY 
KREME DOUGHNUTS
As an experienced lending officer, you have been asked to review and either recommend or reject your bank’s renewal of  Krispy Kreme Doughnuts’ revolving credit and term loan (the credit facility). Krispy 
Kreme (the Company) (stock symbol: KKD) previously entered into a $150,000,000 unsecured bank credit 
facility (“credit facility”) to refinance certain existing debt and to increase borrowing availability for gen-
eral working capital purposes and other financing and investing activities. The credit facility consists of  a 
$119,338,000 revolving facility (“revolver”) and a $30,662,000 term loan (“term loan”).
Your Assignment: Your bank’s management expects you to prepare a credit report regarding Krispy Kreme. 
In your analysis incorporate the following:
• Your recommendation to continue lending or to terminate the facility and why you are either 
for or against. If  you are recommending renewal, include any new conditions in the loan 
agreement should such conditions make the credit stronger for your bank.
• How do you envision the loan being repaid? Do you conclude that primary sources (defined 
as cash flow from operating activities) are sufficient to meet anticipated capital expenditures, 
future acquisitions and dividends over the next three years?
• If  you believe primary sources are sufficient and you still recommend against making the 
loan, explain your reasons.
PurPoSe of THe CASe
The Krispy Kreme case examines the artificial boosting of  earnings through shipments of  inventory and 
equipment to retail company-owned stores and franchises. Another aspect to this case involves the impact of  
1. Simply cap total goodwill and intangibles
2. Limit goodwill and intangibles to a percentage of  book net worth
3. Limit interest-bearing debt or all liabilities to tangible net worth, i.e. book net worth less 
intangibles and goodwill.
Banks do not like to tie management’s hands by writing absolute restrictions in loan covenants, and so 
capping goodwill and intangibles would not be a typical solution. Solution number 2 or 3 can be used to 
address this concern, and the choice could be the result of  a bank-borrower negotiation.
receivables Turnover
The problem that Dow and Huntsman have experienced in receivables turnover may be solved as their 
customers begin to see improving business conditions. The lender may wish to protect itself  in collecting on 
past sales by requiring aging schedules and including a covenant on sales-to-receivables, i.e., this ratio may not 
fall below 5 times implying that average sales are collected within 72 days, or even 5.5 times (equivalent to 65 
days). This will force the two companies to become more aggressive regarding credit and collections, and to 
consider dropping slow paying customers.
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The Company’s principal business, which began in 1937, involves owning and franchising127 doughnut 
stores where over 20 varieties of  premium quality doughnuts are made and sold. Each of  the Company’s tra-
ditional stores is a factory with the capacity to produce from 4,000 dozen to over 10,000 dozen doughnuts 
daily. Consequently, each factory store has considerable fixed or semi-fixed costs, and margins and profitabil-
ity are significantly impacted by doughnut production volume and sales. The Company’s doughnut stores are 
versatile in that most can support multiple sales channels to more fully utilize production capacity.
Krispy Kreme’s key component in its growth is franchising. The reader should be wondering why that is. 
In other words, why restrict the profits you can retain through franchising to only receive small portions of  
store revenues and other income. Companies often franchise because they cannot readily raise the capital re-
quired to set up company-owned stores. John Y. Brown, former president of  Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), 
maintained that it would have cost KFC $450 million to establish its first 2,700 stores, a sum that was not 
available to the corporation in its initial stages. It is interesting to note that even though KFC can now readily 
raise capital through traditional commercial means, it still continues to franchise.
A firm seeking growth may be able to raise capital, but it may lack the managerial resources required to set 
up a network of  company-owned stores. Recruiting and training store management accounts for a significant 
percentage of  the cost of  growth of  a firm. Franchisees supply labor and capital together; often the joint cost 
of  both labor and capital to the franchisor is lower than what it would be if  the two inputs were obtained 
separately. This hybrid nature of  franchising enables firms to overcome the managerial resources and capital 
constraint problems concurrently.
Another argument for franchising is that franchisees are better able to set appropriate pricing.  Pricing, 
a key marketing function, is often competition-based. For example, when setting prices, a gasoline station 
has to take into consideration the prices of  its competitor across the street. It would not be feasible for the 
management of  a large oil company to set competitive prices in hundreds of  gas stations across the country. 
In contrast, the initiative and profit involvement of  franchisees ensures that they will perform the pricing 
function more effectively than company managers.
127  Franchising is a business strategy where control exerted by the company owning the property (the franchisor) is dominant 
and the freedom to operate the retail business is nearly non-existent for the acquirer of  the franchise (the franchisee). The 
franchisee must pay an upfront fee to the franchisor, often in the hundreds of  thousands of  dollars, and must acquire the 
necessary property and make required leasehold improvements. The franchisee’s employees are then trained in the various 
operating methods to assure customer satisfaction and profitability.
the exercise of  employee stock options on the company’s cash flows. The boosting of  earnings through artifi-
cial inventory and equipment shipments first received prominence with the Sunbeam Corporation, when the 
then-chairman, “Chainsaw” Al Dunlap, decided to hype the company’s profits beginning in 1996 by shipping 
and billing consumer products to retailers.
Sunbeam executed a “side” agreement with these customers to accept any unsold merchandise for full 
credit. This allowed Sunbeam to report sales and earnings that met or surpassed stock analysts expectations, 
driving the stock from $12 to $52. When the situation unraveled, Sunbeam’s stock plummeted, Dunlap was 
fired by his board of  directors (in 2001), and he was investigated and fined by the SEC.125
In 2005, Krispy Kreme investigators, led by two board members, reported a willful falsification of  ac-
counting records.  Their report stated that … “the number, nature and timing of  the accounting errors 
strongly suggest that they resulted from an intent to manage earnings.” The company then experienced greatly 
reduced sales and had difficulty meeting its loan obligations. Among the misstatements were several instances 
of  the price the company paid to acquire franchisees being increased to allow the franchisee to pay the com-
pany for equipment fees or other liabilities owed to Krispy Kreme. Upon the completion of  the transaction, 
the money flowed back to the company where it was booked as revenue.126
THe BuSINeSS of krISPY kreMe
Krispy Kreme is a leading branded, specialty retailer of  premium doughnuts and complementary prod-
ucts. The Company established itself  as a leading consumer brand with a loyal customer base through its 
longstanding commitment to quality and consistency. The combination of  its well-established brand and its 
one-of-a-kind doughnuts creates significant opportunities for continued growth. Furthermore, customers 
enjoy a theatrical event, featuring in-store fully displayed production process in a doughnut-making theater. 
The Company’s vertical integration and strong franchise system support the expectation for the development 
of  future revenue opportunities.
125  See Floyd Norris, “S.E.C. Accuses Former Sunbeam Official of  Fraud,” New York Times, May 16, 2001, at www.nytimes.
com/2001/05/16/business/sec-accuses-former-sunbeam-official-of-fraud.html.
126  For a report of  the situation, see Melanie Warner, “Report Details Some Failures That Hurt Krispy Kreme,” New York Times, 
August 11, 2005, at www.nytimes.com/2005/08/11/business/11place.html?_r=1.
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Through acquisitions of  associate and area developer franchisees’ market rights and related stores in 
recent years, as well as through new store construction, the number of  Company stores located outside the 
Southeast has increased. Of  the 24 stores owned by area developers in which the Company has a control-
ling interest, seven are owned by Freedom Rings, in which the Company owns a 70% interest, and 17 are 
owned by a separate subsidiary, in which the Company has about a 75% interest. The terms of  Company 
arrangements with area developers are applicable to the Company’s agreements with these joint ventures 
as well.
Associates
The Company had 18 associates who operated 57 stores as of  February 1, 2004. Associate stores have 
attributes which are similar to those of  company stores located in the Southeast. This group generally con-
centrates on growing sales within the current base of  stores rather than developing new stores or new ter-
ritories. With two exceptions, associates are not obligated to develop additional stores within their territories. 
The Company cannot grant licenses to other franchisees or sell products bearing the Company’s brand name 
within an associate’s territory during the term of  the license agreement.
Associates typically are parties to 15-year licensing agreements, which generally permit them to operate 
stores using the Company’s system within a specific territory. Associates pay royalties of  3% of  on-premises 
sales and 1% of  all other sales, with the exception of  private label sales for which they pay no royalties. Most 
associates also contribute 1% of  all sales to the company-administered public relations and advertising fund. 
The Company’s associates who were shareholders prior to the Company’s initial public offering in April 2000 
have franchise agreements which were extended automatically for a period of  20 years following that offering.
Area Developers
Under an area developer franchise program that was introduced in the mid-1990s to strategically expand 
nationally into new territories, the Company licenses territories, usually defined by metropolitan statistical 
areas,128 to area developers who are capable of  developing a prescribed number of  stores within a specified 
128  A metropolitan statistical area is a geographical region with a relatively high population density and close internal economic 
ties. Such regions are not legal entities (like a city or county) and are used for the collection and analysis of  statistical data 
by the Bureau of  the Census and other governmental agencies.
The decision of  whether to franchise ultimately depends on the relative importance a firm places on 
the pros and cons associated with franchising. For example, Midas, a leading brake and muffler shop chain, 
is a franchise system; Monro Muffler Brake, another well-known chain, is company-owned. The Monro 
chain was started by a former Midas franchisee, whose analysis may have led him to prefer a company-
owned system.
STore oWNerSHIP
The Company’s stores can be divided into three categories of  ownership: owned stores, associate stores 
and area developer stores. The Company refers to associates and area developers as franchisees collectively. 
Store counts include retail factory stores and commissaries and exclude satellite concept stores. For a sum-
mary of  store counts, see Exhibit KK-1.
owned Stores
As of  February 1, 2004, the Company owned 141 stores, including 24 which are operated by consoli-
dated joint ventures. Many of  these stores were developed between 1937 and 1996 and are located predomi-
nantly in the Southeastern U.S. The stores were designed as wholesale bakeries and generate a majority of  
their revenues through off-premises sales.
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In addition to a franchise agreement, all area developers have signed development agreements which re-
quire them to develop a specified number of  stores on or before specific dates. Generally, these agreements 
have a five-year term. If  area developers fail to develop their stores on schedule, the Company has the right to 
terminate the agreement and develop company stores or develop stores through new area developers or joint 
ventures in the territory.
Generally, the Company does not provide financing to its franchisees other than in its capacity as an 
equity investor. When the Company is an equity investor, it contributes equity or guarantees debt or lease 
commitments of  the joint venture generally proportionate to the Company’s ownership interest.  In addition, 
for area developers in which the Company owns a majority interest, the Company may provide loans to fund 
these operations and store development.
ACCouNTING ISSueS
The Company’s financial statements are provided in Exhibits KK-2 through KK-4. There are various ac-
counting issues which are essential to an understanding of  the business of  Krispy Kreme.
time period. Area developer stores typically are designed and developed in locations favorable to achieving 
high volume on-premises sales.
 As of  February 1, 2004, the Company had 26 area developers operating 183 stores. These area develop-
ers have contractual commitments to open over 250 stores in their territories during their initial development 
schedule. Of  these 26 area developers, the Company had a controlling interest in two and a minority equity 
interest in fifteen. Those in which the Company has a controlling interest operated 24 stores in 2004, and 
those in which the Company has a minority interest operated 66 stores. The Company believes equity invest-
ments in its area developer territories more closely align its interests with its area developers and also creates 
greater financial opportunity for the Company.
Many of  the area developers are multi-unit food operators with a high level of  knowledge about the lo-
cal territory or territories they will develop and a proven financial capability to fully develop their territories. 
The Company’s strategy, in part, is to grow through area developers. The Company’s area developer program 
includes a royalty and fee structure that is more attractive to the Company than that of  its associate program, 
as well as territory development requirements.
Each of  the Company’s area developers is required to enter into two types of  agreements: a development 
agreement which establishes the number of  stores to be developed in an area, and a franchise agreement for 
each store opened. Area developers typically pay development and franchise fees ranging from $20,000 to 
$50,000 for each store they develop.
The franchise Agreement
The Company’s standard franchise agreement is renewable subject to its discretion and can be terminated 
for a number of  reasons, including the failure of  the franchisee to make timely payments within applicable 
grace periods (as subject to applicable state law). Area developers generally pay a royalty fee of  4½% to 6% 
on all sales and are required to contribute 1% of  all sales to a company-administered public relations and 
advertising fund.
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revenue recognition
A summary of  the revenue recognition policies for each segment of  the Company is as follows:
• Company store operations revenue is derived from the sale of  doughnuts and related items 
to on-premises and off-premises customers. Revenue is recognized at the time of  sale for 
on-premises sales. For off-premises sales, revenue is recognized at the time of  delivery.
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commitments under non-cancellable operating leases as of  February 1, 2004. Rental expense, net of  rental 
income, totaled $10,576,000 in 2002, $13,169,000 in 2003 and $19,574,000 in 2004.
kkM&D
In addition to its stores and franchises, the Company has another entity: KKM&D. This business 
unit buys and processes ingredients used to produce doughnut mixes and manufactures doughnut-making 
equipment that all of  the Company’s factory stores are required to purchase. KKM&D also includes the 
Company’s coffee roasting operation, which supplies drip coffee product to all of  the Company’s stores. 
Production in this facility was expected to increase in fiscal 2005 with the growth in store count, and as 
the other components of  the Company’s expanded beverage program was introduced in its existing and 
new stores.
The KKM&D business unit also purchases and sells essentially all supplies necessary to operate a 
Company store, including food ingredients, juices, signage, display cases, uniforms and other items. Generally, 
shipments are made to each of  the Company’s stores on a weekly basis by common carrier. Expenses for this 
business unit include all expenses incurred at the manufacturing and distribution level along with direct gen-
eral and administrative expenses.
Intangible Assets
Goodwill represents what was recorded in connection with the acquisition of  Montana Mills in fiscal 
2004. Intangible assets include the value assigned to recipes, trademarks and trade names and reacquired 
franchise rights recorded in connection with acquisitions. Recipes are generally amortized over their ex-
pected useful lives, which was determined based upon management’s plans as well as general industry 
experience.
• Franchise operations revenue is derived from: (1) development and franchise fees from the 
opening of  new stores; and (2) royalties charged to franchisees based on sales. Development 
and franchise fees are charged for certain new stores and are deferred until the store is opened 
and the Company has performed substantially all of  the initial services it is required to pro-
vide. The royalties recognized in each period are based on the sales in that period.
• Company revenue is derived from the sale of  doughnut-making equipment, mix, coffee and 
other supplies needed to operate a doughnut store. Revenue is recognized at the time the title 
and the risk of  loss pass to the customer, generally upon delivery of  the goods. Inventory is 
valued at a FIFO (first-in, first out) basis.
Accounts receivable
The Company generates accounts receivable from franchisees as a result of  royalties earned on their 
sales as well as the Company’s weekly shipments of  mix, other ingredients, coffee and supplies to each store. 
Therefore, as the number of  franchise stores grows, so have the corresponding accounts receivable balances. 
Payment terms on franchisee receivables are 30 or 35 days from the date of  invoice, depending on the fran-
chisee’s payment method (traditional check or electronic payment arrangements).
The Company also generates accounts receivable from franchise stores whenever they build a new store, as 
the Company supplies the doughnut-making equipment and other capital expenditure items necessary to op-
erate a store. Payment terms on these items are 54 days from the date of  installation of  the doughnut-making 
equipment. Accounts receivable generated from a new store opening are typically in excess of  $550,000 per 
store. If  franchise store openings are heavily concentrated in a particular quarter, the sales of  the doughnut-
making equipment and other capital expenditure items the Company sells to franchisees can cause an increase 
in accounts receivable balances.
lease Commitments
The Company conducts some of  its operations from leased facilities and, additionally, leases certain 
equipment under operating leases. Generally, these leases have initial terms of  three to 20 years and con-
tain provisions for renewal options of  five to ten years. Exhibit KK-5 shows future minimum annual rental 
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$3. During fiscal 2005, the Company experienced first a slowing in the rate of  growth in sales in its company 
stores segment and, later in the year, declines in sales compared to the comparable periods of  fiscal 2004. The 
Company’s franchise and KKM&D segments experienced revenue trends similar to those experienced in the 
company stores segment. These sales declines continued in fiscal 2006, during which the Company’s revenues 
declined to $543.4 million from $707.8 million in fiscal 2005, reflecting, among other things, lower revenues 
at KKM&D, store closures and lower revenues at remaining stores.
These trends adversely affected operating margins because of  the fixed or semi-fixed nature of  many of  the 
Company’s direct operating expenses. In addition, litigation had begun against the Company and certain cur-
rent and former officers and directors, and investigations have been initiated by the SEC and the U.S. Attorney 
for the Southern District of  New York. In October 2004, the Company’s Board of  Directors appointed a 
Special Committee to conduct an independent investigation of  certain matters, including accounting matters. 
In August 2005, the Company’s Board of  Directors received the report of  the Special Committee, a summary 
of  which was filed as an exhibit to a Current Report on Form 8-K dated August 9, 2005.
The loss incurred in fiscal 2005 reflects charges of  approximately $159.0 million related to goodwill, 
other intangible assets and property and equipment associated with the company stores business segment, and 
approximately $35.1 million related to the a discontinued business (Montana Mills). The loss for fiscal 2006 
reflects a net provision of  $35.8 million for anticipated settlement of  certain litigation; lease termination 
costs of  $55.1 million, of  which $51.0 million relates to long-lived assets and leases principally associated 
with closed or disposed stores; and $4.1 million relates to intangible assets.
In addition, substantial expenses have been incurred to defend the Company and its officers and direc-
tors in connection with pending litigation, to cooperate with the investigations of  the Special Committee, the 
SEC and the U.S. Attorney, to undertake the Company’s internal investigation of  accounting matters, and to 
indemnify certain current and former officers and directors for certain legal and other expenses incurred by 
them. These expenses were significantly greater in fiscal 2006 than in fiscal 2005, and continued in fiscal 2007.
In January 2005, the Company’s Chairman, President and Chief  Executive Officer retired, and the Board 
of  Directors engaged a corporate recovery and advisory firm to provide interim executive management ser-
vices to the Company. Since that time, the Company has undertaken a number of  initiatives designed to 
improve the Company’s operating results and financial position. These include closing a substantial number 
Trademarks, trade names and reacquired assets were determined to have indefinite lives based princi-
pally upon a history of  revenue and cash flow performance that is expected to continue for the foreseeable 
future. Reacquired franchise rights represent the value assigned to certain franchise markets acquired by the 
Company. Effective fiscal 2003, the Company adopted SFAS No. 142, “Goodwill and Other Intangible 
Assets,” which addresses the accounting and reporting of  goodwill and other intangible assets subsequent to 
their acquisition.129
SuGGeSTeD SoluTIoNS
Given the information about franchising and the amount of  money that the Company derives from that 
strategy, is there see anything noteworthy in the company’s income statement in terms of  revenue and operat-
ing profit? What about the balance sheet? Why have reacquired franchise rights changed so significantly? Why 
spend all this money to reacquire franchises unless the company’s growth ambitions are waning?
This is a situation where the customary process of  financial ratio and common-size financial statement 
analysis is not terribly revealing. We know from the financials – without even doing these industry com-
parisons – that profitability and existing bank debt are significant concerns. The issue is the source of  these 
problems and whether the situation is temporary or endemic to the Company.
In the statement of  cash flows we see that the company generated almost $77 million in 2004 through 
primary sources (net income and depreciation) against capital expenditures of  almost $80 million. In ad-
dition, the company spent over $122 million to acquire franchises. Part of  the shortfall of  primary sources 
exceeding primary uses was offset through the “tax benefit from exercise of  stock options”. If  a company’s 
stock appreciates after granting employees stock options, the company benefits in two ways: one the exercise 
of  the options generates additional equity into the company; and second, the exercise of  those options allows 
the company the advantage of  a significant tax deduction.
In 2003 and into early 2004 the stock hit a high of  over $50 a share, up from under $10 in 2001. By late 
2004, the stock price was under $10, then hit $1 in the crash by 2008-2009, and now trades for less than 
129  SFAS No. 142 requires intangible assets with definite lives to be amortized over their estimated useful lives, while those 
with indefinite lives and goodwill are no longer subject to amortization, but must be tested annually for impairment or more 
frequently if  events and circumstances indicate potential impairment.




As an experienced lending officer you have been approached by the chief  financial officer (CFO) of  Coldwater Creek (“the Company”) (stock symbol: CWTR). Notwithstanding their current relation-
ship with Wells Fargo Bank, the Company is unhappy with the terms and conditions relating to its revolving 
line of  credit from that bank. For one thing, the advance rate on inventory130 is, according to the CFO, far 
too limited. For example, Wells will only advance 40 cents on a dollar of  inventory. He wants an advance rate 
of  75%. He would also like to have a maturity for the facility of  2015 rather than the current maturity of  
2012. He would also prefer a more reasonable interest rate.
Your Assignment: Your bank’s management expects you to prepare an offer for Coldwater Creek. You 
must prepare a detailed loan proposal, listing and explaining the type of  covenants you would put into the 
loan agreement. Management also wants you to detail what risks you see in lending to this company and how 
you would limit those risks.
PurPoSe of THe CASe
The use of  operating leases is considered in contrast to the ownership and financing of  assets, in this 
situation, retail stores. How does the use of  operating leases affect the initial assessment of  debt-to-book net 
worth? Should some adjustment be made for the use of  operating leases and, if  so, what adjustment should 
be made? Should the operating leases be capitalized, and how should those operating leases be capitalized if  
that is an appropriate analytical step? Coldwater also requires the analyst to examine a company’s ability to 
130  The advance rate is the maximum amount of  lending that will be made to a company as a percentage of  the value of  col-
lateral, in this case, inventory.
of  underperforming stores, reducing corporate overhead and other costs to bring them more in line with the 
Company’s current level of  operations, recruiting new management personnel for certain positions, restruc-
turing certain financial arrangements associated with franchisees in which the Company has an ownership 
interest and with respect to which the Company has financial guarantee obligations, and selling certain non-
strategic assets.
There were many control failures including assuring that revenue was recognized in the proper period for 
sales of  equipment to franchisees in connection with new store openings. In addition, there was inadequate 
analysis of  receivables from franchisees in order to identify and estimate required allowances for uncollectible 
accounts in accordance with accounting rules. Given the experience at Sunbeam, a banker would be making a 
serious mistake in not delving into these issues at Krispy Kreme and declining the extension of  a credit facility.




offerings, shifts in the timing of  certain holidays, including Valentine’s Day, Easter, Mother’s Day, 
Thanksgiving and Christmas, and weather related influences. As of  January 30, 2010, Coldwater 
Creek had 2,832 full-time employees and 6,699 part-time employees. During the peak selling season, 
which includes the months of  November and December, they hire a substantial number of  temporary 
employees.
The Company faces substantial competition from retailers for elements in its merchandise lines, and net 
sales may decline or grow more slowly if  they are unable to differentiate their merchandise and shopping 
experience from those of  other retailers. In addition, the retail apparel industry has experienced significant 
pricing declines over the past several years largely due to the downward pressures caused by discount retailers 
and, more recently, by declining consumer spending. The result has been increased promotional and competi-
tive activity. Coldwater Creek expects this price deflation to continue as a result of  the recent expiration of  
quota restrictions on the importing of  apparel into the U.S. from foreign countries that are members of  the 
WTO (World Trade Organization).
These pricing pressures may make it more difficult for Coldwater Creek to maintain gross margins and 
to compete with retailers that have greater purchasing power than they do. Furthermore, because Coldwater 
Creek continues to source a significant percentage of  its merchandise through intermediaries and from sup-
pliers and manufacturers located in the U.S. and Canada, where labor and production costs, on average, tend 
to be higher, its gross margins may be lower than those of  competing retailers.
IMPorTANT ACCouNTING PolICIeS
Key accounting policies for Coldwater Creek are discussed in the sections that follow.
revenue recognition and Sales return estimate
The Company recognizes sales, including shipping and handling income and the related cost of  those 
sales, at the time of  the estimated receipt by the customer for orders placed from a catalog or on its e-com-
merce website and at the point of  sale for retail store transactions. Excluded are the related sales taxes from 
revenue, as these amounts are recorded on a net basis.  An allowance for sales returns is maintained based on 
historical experience and future expectations.
repay debt; that is, on which key measures should the analyst focus regarding debt repayment? Of  the three 
basic financial statements, which is best utilized to measure the ability of  a company to repay debt?
THe BuSINeSS of ColDWATer Creek
Coldwater Creek is a national specialty retailer of  women’s apparel, accessories, jewelry and gift items. 
Founded in 1984 as a catalog company, today it is a multi-channel specialty retailer generating $1.039 bil-
lion in net sales in fiscal 2009. Its proprietary merchandise assortment reflects a sophisticated yet relaxed and 
casual lifestyle.  The company’s commitment to providing superior customer service is apparent in all aspects 
of  its business.  Customers are served through retail and direct segments. The merchandise assortment, retail 
stores, catalogs and e-commerce website are designed to appeal to women with average annual household 
incomes in excess of  $75,000.
Coldwater Creek’s mission is to become one of  the premier specialty retailers for women 35 years of  age 
and older in the U.S. by offering its customers a compelling merchandise assortment with superior customer 
service. Since the opening of  their first premium retail store in November 1999, they have gradually evolved 
from a direct marketer to a multi-channel specialty retailer. 
Merchandise is offered through two distinct operating segments, retail and direct. Their retail segment 
includes premium retail stores and outlet stores along with their day spa locations, while the direct segment 
encompasses their direct-to-consumer business through e-commerce and phone and mail operations. In ad-
dition, catalogs are prominently displayed in each premium retail store to encourage customers to continue 
shopping with them even after they have left the stores.
This multi-channel approach also allows Coldwater Creek to cross-promote their brand and to provide 
customers with convenient access to their merchandise, regardless of  their preferred shopping method. As 
part of  their commitment to superior customer service, they accept returns virtually at all times and for any 
reason through any channel regardless of  the initial point of  purchase.
Competition and Market factors
Coldwater Creek’s quarterly results and cash flows can fluctuate significantly depending on a num-
ber of  factors, including the particular seasonal fashion lines and customer response to merchandise 




of  property or equipment, are charged to operations as incurred. The net book value of  property or equip-
ment sold or retired is removed from the asset and related accumulated depreciation accounts with any result-
ing net gain or loss included in the results from operations.
Depreciation and amortization expense is computed using the straight-line method.
The estimated useful lives for buildings and land improvements are 15 to 30 years. The estimated 
useful lives for furniture and fixtures, technology hardware and internal use software and machinery and 
equipment are three to 12 years. Leasehold improvements are amortized over the contractual lives of  the 
underlying operating leases or the estimated useful lives of  the improvements, currently three to 20 years, 
whichever is less. Depreciation for the latest fiscal year was $63.7 million and for the prior year it was 
$61.8 million.
leASeS AND BorroWING
Coldwater Creek has entered into various leasing and borrowing arrangements in support of  its expan-
sion plans.
leases
Coldwater Creek leases its distribution center, customer contact centers, and all of  its premium retail, 
outlet and day spa space, as well as certain other property and equipment. Nearly all of  these leases are ac-
counted for as operating leases. During 2009, 2008 and 2007, aggregate rent expense under operating leases 
was $78.5 million, $73.9 million and $64.4 million, respectively, including $15.2 million, $14.1 million and 
$11.5 million, respectively, of  common area maintenance costs (CAM), of  rent expense which is classified as 
store pre-opening costs, and an immaterial amount of  contingent rent expense.
Aggregate rent expense under operating leases does not include related real estate taxes of  $10.6 million, 
$9.5 million and $7.3 million for fiscal years 2009, 2008 and 2007, respectively. Minimum lease payment 
requirements are provided in Exhibit CoCr-1. These include the predetermined fixed escalations of  the mini-
mum rentals and exclude contingent rental payments, common area maintenance, real estate taxes and the 
amortization of  lease incentives for operating leases, and capital leases.
Trade Accounts receivable
Trade accounts receivable are associated primarily with credit card sales to individuals and are recorded 
at the invoiced amount. These receivables do not bear interest and are generally converted to cash in two to 
three days.
Inventories
Inventories primarily consist of  merchandise purchased for resale. Inventory in distribution centers and in 
premium retail stores, outlet stores and day spas is stated at the lower of  average cost or market.
Advertising Costs
Direct response advertising includes catalogs and national magazine advertisements that contain an iden-
tifying code which allows the tracking of  related sales. All direct costs associated with the development, pro-
duction and circulation of  direct response advertisements are accumulated as prepaid marketing costs. Once 
the related catalog or national magazine advertisement is either mailed or first appears in print, these costs are 
reclassified as deferred marketing costs. These costs are then amortized as selling, general and administrative 
expenses over the expected sales realization cycle, typically several weeks. Direct response advertising expense 
was $54.5 million, $57.3 million and $107.8 million for the fiscal years ended 2010, 2009 and 2008, 
respectively.
Advertising costs other than direct response advertising include store and event promotions, signage ex-
penses and other general customer acquisition activities. These advertising costs are expensed as incurred or 
when the particular store promotion begins. Advertising expenses other than those related to direct response 
advertising of  $22.3 million, $22.9 million and $26.3 million for the fiscal years ended 2010, 2009 and 
2008, respectively, are included in selling, general and administrative expenses.
Property and equipment
Property and equipment, including any major additions and improvements, are recorded at cost. Minor 
additions and improvements, as well as maintenance and repairs that do not materially extend the useful life 




percentage of  the value of  eligible inventory, plus a percentage of  the value of  eligible credit card receivables, 
as reduced by certain reserve amounts that may be required by the lender. The proceeds of  any borrowings 
under the Agreement are available for working capital and other general corporate purposes.
Borrowings under the Agreement will generally accrue interest at a margin ranging from 2.25% to 2.75% 
over a reference rate of  either LIBOR or a benchmark rate at the Company’s election. The marginal rate is 
determined according to the average unused availability under the credit facility. Commitment fees accrue at a 
rate of  0.50%, which is assessed on the average unused portion of  the credit facility maximum amount. There 
is also an in-place subordinated bond issue that matures on April 15, 2014.
CreDIT reQueST froM ColDWATer Creek
The CFO believes strongly in a V-shaped economic recovery. To that end, during the meeting with you 
and other bank officers he stated that:
 The key driver of  our growth strategy continues to be retail expansion. We believe there 
is an opportunity for us to grow our premium retail store base to between 500 to 550 
stores in more than 280 identified markets nationwide. In fiscal 2009, we opened 42 pre-
mium retail stores, increasing our total premium store count to 348, covering 201 markets. 
Approximately 42.5% of  these stores are located in traditional malls, 52.6% in lifestyle 
centers and 4.9% in street locations. In addition to our 348 premium retail stores we also 
had 35 merchandise clearance outlets in operation at the end of  fiscal 2009.
He estimates that capital expenditures (primarily lease improvement efforts) will approximate $30 
million a year for the next five years in keeping with the Company’s strong growth philosophy. He expects 
profits for the current year to be up to $15 million and expects sales growth for this year to increase 
by 10%. He anticipates sales to grow by not less than 15% in the following four years and expects net 
income to match sales growth. As to how the loan would be repaid, the CFO believes the cash flow, net 
income and depreciation will be more than adequate to repay the facility by the end of  2015. Complete 
financial data are provided in Exhibits CoCr-2, CoCr-3 and CoCr-4. Given the above information, how 
would you respond?
Subsequent to January 30, 2010, the Company entered into additional retail leases with minimum 
lease payment requirements, which include the predetermined fixed escalations of  the minimum rentals. 
As of  March 26, 2010, lease commitments increased by $1.7 million. Certain operating leases contain 
predetermined fixed escalations of  the minimum rental payments over the lease. For these leases, the re-
lated rental expense is recognized on a straight-line basis over the term of  the lease, which commences 
for accounting purposes on the date the Company has access and control over the leased store. Possession 
occurs prior to the making of  any lease payments and approximately 60 to 90 days prior to the opening 
of  a store. In the early years of  a lease with rent escalations, the recorded rent expense will exceed the 
actual cash payments.
The amount of  rent expense that exceeds the cash payments is recorded as deferred rent in the consoli-
dated balance sheet. In the later years of  a lease with rent escalations, the recorded rent expense will be less 
than the actual cash payments. The amount of  cash payments that exceed the rent expense is then recorded 
as a reduction to deferred rent. Deferred rent related to lease agreements with escalating rent payments was 
$45.3 million and $52.2 million in 2010 and 2009, respectively.
Borrowing
On February 13, 2009, Coldwater Creek entered into a new credit agreement (the “Agreement”) with 
Wells Fargo. The Agreement provides for a $70.0 million revolving line of  credit, with sub-facilities for the 
issuance of  up to $70.0 million in letters of  credit and swingline advances131 of  up to $10.0 million. The 
credit facility has a maturity date of  February 13, 2012. The actual amount of  credit that is available under 
the Agreement is limited to a borrowing base amount that is determined according to, among other things, a 
131  A swingline loan is used to repay certain of  the outstanding debts of  a company.








See Exhibit CoCr-5 for ratio results; none of  the standard ratios display metrics that are outside the 
interquartile range. The revealing comparison (and one that should be used in any credit analysis) is in the 
common-size financial statements. As shown in Exhibits CoCr-3 and 4, percentages of  net fixed assets, long-
term debt and gross profits lie well outside of  average results.
Turning to the company itself, what do we see as the risks?
• Leverage? We need to capitalize the operating leases, adding perhaps another $800 million 
in pro-forma debt to the Coldwater Creek’s balance sheet. The critical step is to “translate” 
operating leases, which are off  the balance sheet currently, to balance sheet equivalents. One 
standard method is to capitalize these leases at some reasonable level; many bankers and 
rating agencies apply a factor of  10 times in estimating their balance sheet impact. As the 
common-size balance sheet shows a problem with long-term debt before this adjustment, the 
situation after capitalizing the leases will be significantly worse.
• Net trade cycle? The figures for the past two years are shown in Exhibit CoCr-6:
 The trade cycle is increasing, not decreasing. Does this suggest the company will need ad-
ditional borrowing or need to borrow less? As the trade cycle increases in duration, it is more 
SuGGeSTeD SoluTIoNS
This case illustrates the risk in lending to the women’s clothing industry both in the instability of  credit 
ratings of  these companies and in financial comparisons. A critical philosophical question is how volatile is 
the risk in women’s fashion? For instance, is ‘rating migration’ (the underlying change in a credit rating by 
a rating agency) more or less likely for Coldwater Creek than, say for a Proctor & Gamble (P&G), Intel or 
Caterpillar?
Most bankers would agree that published credit ratings are likely to change faster and more often for a 
Coldwater Creek than for companies in disposable consumer goods (P&G), computer technology (Intel) or 
construction and agricultural equipment (Caterpillar). We would probably conclude that Coldwater Creek 
and its industry may have inherently higher credit risks than other industries.
This case also demonstrates the limited usefulness of  ratio analysis (as discussed in Chapter 4), in that 
the results of  the ratio comparisons with the industry – other than profitability – do not provide much guid-
ance as to how well or how poorly the company is performing. The profitability results show considerable 
variation: positive income in years 2009 and 2007, and losses in 2010 and 2008.




advances on whether trade payables are being paid on time and cash discounts accepted. Historically, some 
vendors in this industry offer a 2% discount off  the face value of  the invoice if  the buyer pays within ten 
days of  the invoice date.133
If  we decide to offer a higher advance rate (subject to a lower advance rate if  credit metrics deteriorate) 
than offered by the existing bank, the problem is that if  business conditions deteriorate, what does the bank 
do if  the company cannot meet the new (lower) advance rate. If  the suppliers tighten, any covenant regarding 
a lower advance rate may have to be eliminated.
Here are other possible covenants:
• Limit aggregate lease expenses, and tie pricing of  the loan to a ratio coverage such as EBIT 
or EBIRT.
• Set the leverage ratio by including pro forma operating lease capitalization. Tie this metric 
to monthly (not year-end) results to protect against “seasonal risk”.
• Calculate the advance rate on inventory based on a variety of  factors, i.e. perhaps require 
management to provide an aging schedule for inventory. To illustrate, if  inventory on day 
one is $100 you agree to advance, say, $50, but on inventory that remains after 30 days, the 
advance rate declines. Inventory that is off  season, i.e., Fall fashions that remain when the 
Spring fashions begin, should not have any advance rate.
• Limit inventory advances on a per store requirement basis, i.e., if  500 stores have 5,000 
square feet each, depending on anticipated volume, restrict advance rates accordingly.
• Specify reports that management must provide, and perhaps require an outside party to 
monitor collateral.
133  This is called a cash discount, and is quoted as 2/10, net 30 (or whatever normal payables terms are in the industry). The 
value of  a 2/10, net 30 discount is 36%, calculated as 360 ÷ 20 (the non-discount period) times 2%. If  the terms are 
2/10, net 60, the value declines to 14.4%. (On a 365-day basis, the values are 36.5% and 14.6% respectively.) The result 
would then be compared to the cost of  capital (discussed in Chapter 4) and taken if  above that amount.
likely that the company will need to borrow in the future. In addition, trade payables are de-
creasing. Have suppliers tightened terms? What do suppliers know that you as the company’s 
banker may not know?
• Future debt servicing? Although no debt of  any type is currently outstanding, if  the pro-
posed credit facility is used, what ability does the company have to repay the loan?
 As seen in Exhibit CoCr-7, the company is not cash flow positive. If  the company does draw 
down monies from the proposed revolving credit, it is highly unlikely that the loan can be 
repaid from internally generated cash flows based on past results.
 Absent sufficient cash flow, the loan is properly viewed as ‘evergreen’, reflecting its potential 
permanency. Although some borrowers will perhaps be ‘permanent’ debtors, we should ask 
what the appropriate advance rate is for inventory. Would the advance rate be greater if  
cash flow could repay the loan and should the advance rate be scaled back if  repayment is 
unlikely?
• In-store inventory and payables? Is the inventory in equal amounts per store or is inventory 
skewed, with too much in some stores? We would want to know this distribution or have an 
aging schedule for inventory showing the time in stores.
Provisions in the loan Agreement
Granting this credit has significant risk, and many companies in the apparel business have been forced 
to rely on the factoring of  receivables for this reason.132 If  we do proceed with a loan, given our concerns 
regarding inventory and the net trade cycle, we may need to structure advances tied to sales. We can condition 
132  Factoring is described in Chapter 3.
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CASE STUDY: LEAR 
CORPORATION
As an experienced lending officer you have been approached by the chief  financial officer of  Lear Corporation (“the Company”) (stock symbol: LEA). Lear Corporation intends to extend the maturity 
of  its credit facility provided by a syndicate of  banks.
Your Assignment: The Company has $600 million in outstanding senior notes maturing in 2005 and 
is looking for a bank or syndicate of  banks to offer a $600 million bank term loan to finance repayment of  
these notes. As an experienced lending officer having  Lear Corporation as your client, delineate your terms 
and conditions including loan covenants that you would require, along with an explanation of  why you would 
insist on such covenants. In your analysis, discuss what would be your definitions of  applicable debt, and what 
would be your definition of  EBIT (and EBIRT if  applicable) coverage ratios and why. What pricing would 
you suggest?
PurPoSe of THe CASe
In making a lending decision, bankers need to consider asset quality and the key assets on a company’s 
balance sheet. For instance, in the event of  liquidation, more hard assets remaining on a company’s balance 
sheet are, on balance, better than less. However, if  a borrower enters into a transaction where receivables are 
securitized, i.e. sold without recourse back to the borrower, those receivables are removed from the balance 
sheet and a key asset is not there in the event of  liquidation.
In reading through the case, the analyst should think about whether that risk is present and, if  so, what 
should a future loan agreement contain to deal with this activity, i.e. receivables securitization.  Focus should 
also be given to goodwill and to deferred tax assets. The analyst should think about how deferred taxes exist 
• Consider the use of  projections in setting up advance rates, i.e., if  sales exceed forecasts, 
perhaps a higher advance rate will be permitted.
• Limit dividends, especially when suppliers are not being paid on a timely basis.
• Require monthly financial statements and projections of  financial statements to assess 
Coldwater Creek’s ability to manage inventory and payables.
Another point to consider in this case is that all companies do not report their financial results (i.e., have 
their fiscal year) as the same as the calendar year. One reason is that many companies, particularly those in the 
retail industry, have significant seasonality, i.e. inventory levels vary substantially on a monthly basis, rising to 
a high point in December for Christmas and then receding by the end of  January.
If  you were the chief  financial officer of  the company, would you choose a December 31st close of  busi-
ness for reporting, or would you choose January 31st (the actual fiscal year used by Coldwater Creek)?  An 
interesting exercise is for the reader to choose a sample of  retailers and determine what month is usually 
chosen for accounting purposes.
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interior integrator program by General Motors for the 2006 Buick LeSabre and Cadillac DeVille models. 
As a interior integrator, the Company works closely with customers on design and is responsible for the 
engineering, component/module sourcing, manufacturing and delivery of  the automotive interiors for these 
two full-size passenger cars.
Lear is focused on delivering high-quality automotive interior systems and components to its customers 
on a global basis. In order to realize substantial cost savings and improved product quality and consistency, 
automotive manufacturers are requiring their suppliers to manufacture automotive interior systems and com-
ponents in multiple geographic markets. In recent years, the Company has followed its customers and ex-
panded its operations significantly in Europe, South America, South Africa and Asia. As a result of  its efforts 
to expand worldwide operations, revenues outside of  the U.S. and Canada have grown from $3.7 billion in 
1998 to $7.3 billion in 2003.
Business Strategy
Lear’s principal objective is to expand its position as a leading global supplier and integrator of  automo-
tive interior systems, including seat systems, interior components and electrical systems. It pursues this objec-
tive by focusing on the needs of  its customers who face continuing competitive pressures to improve quality 
and functionality at a lower cost and to reduce time to market and capital needs. These trends have resulted 
in automotive manufacturers outsourcing complete automotive interior systems. Lear believes that the crite-
ria for selection of  automotive interior systems suppliers are not only cost, quality, technology, delivery and 
service, but also, increasingly, worldwide presence and full-service capabilities.
Products
Lear conducts its business in three product operating segments: seating; interior; and electronic and elec-
trical. Net sales by product segment for the year 2003 as a percentage of  total net sales were as follows: 68% 
seating, 18% interior and 14% electronic and electrical. Within each of  its operating segments, the Company 
competes with a variety of  independent suppliers and automotive manufacturer in-house operations, primar-
ily on the basis of  cost, quality, technology, delivery and service.
as an asset and the credit implications to lenders of  such assets. Additionally, the banker should consider 
how pension liabilities occur, the impact this has regarding the lender’s risk, and, in the event of  liquidation, 
whether insufficient pension assets impact the repayment of  unsecured and secured lenders.
THe BuSINeSS of leAr CorPorATIoN
Lear is the world’s largest automotive interior systems supplier based on revenues. Net sales have grown 
from $9.1 billion for the year ended December 31, 1998, to $15.7 billion for the year ended December 31, 
2003, a compound annual growth rate of  12%. The major sources of  this growth have been new program 
awards and the completion of  the acquisition of  UT Automotive, Inc. (“UT Automotive”) in May 1999. 
The Company supplies every major automotive manufacturer in the world, including General Motors, Ford, 
DaimlerChrysler, BMW , Fiat, PSA, Volkswagen, Renault/Nissan, Toyota and Subaru. For income statement 
data, see Exhibit L-1.
Lear has capabilities in all five principal segments of  the automotive interior market: seat systems; 
flooring and acoustic systems; door panels; instrument panels and cockpit systems; and overhead systems. 
It is also one of  the leading global suppliers of  automotive electronic and electrical distribution systems. 
As a result of  these capabilities, Lear can offer its customers fully-integrated automotive interiors, includ-
ing electronic and electrical distribution systems. In 2002, the Company was awarded the first-ever total 
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Accounts receivable
The Company records accounts receivable as its products are shipped to its customers. The Company’s 
customers are the major automotive manufacturers in the world. Lear records accounts receivable reserves for 
known collectibility issues, as such issues relate to specific transactions or customer balances. As of  2003 and 
2002, accounts receivable are reflected net of  reserves of  $30.6 million and $31.5 million, respectively. The 
Company writes off  accounts receivable when it becomes apparent based upon age or customer circumstances 
that such amounts will not be collected.
Inventories
Inventories are stated at the lower of  cost or market. Cost is determined using the FIFO (first-in, first-
out) method. Finished goods and work-in-process inventories include material, labor and manufacturing 
overhead costs. The Company records inventory reserves for inventory in excess of  production and/or fore-
casted requirements, and for obsolete inventory in production and service inventories. As of  2003 and 2002, 
inventories are reflected net of  reserves of  $55.8 million and $44.5 million, respectively.
Goodwill
On January 1, 2002, the Company adopted Statement of  Financial Accounting Standards (“SFAS”) 
No. 142, “Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets,” which requires that goodwill no longer be amortized but 
subject to annual impairment analysis. The Company’s initial impairment analysis compared the fair values of  
each of  its reporting units, based on discounted cash flow analyses, to the related net book values. As a result of  
the adoption of  SFAS No. 142, the Company recorded impairment charges of  $310.8 million as of  January 1, 
2002. These charges are reflected as a cumulative effect of  a change in accounting principle, net of  tax, in the 
consolidated statement of  income for the year ended December 31, 2002. The Company’s annual SFAS No. 
142 impairment analysis was completed as of  September 28, 2003, and there was no additional impairment.
lease Commitments
The Company’s operating leases cover principally buildings and transportation equipment. Rent expense 
was $119.5 million, $116.3 million and $116.8 million for the years 2003, 2002 and 2001, respectively. The 
Company’s lease commitments going forward are as follows:
Customers
The Company serves the worldwide automotive and light truck market, which produced over 58 mil-
lion vehicles in 2003. It has automotive interior content on over 300 vehicle nameplates worldwide. General 
Motors and Ford, the two largest automotive and light truck manufacturers in the world, and their respective 
affiliates, accounted for approximately 36% and 24%, respectively, of  Lear’s net sales.
keY ACCouNTING PolICIeS
Important accounting policies are discussed in the sections that follow. Balance sheets are provided in 
Exhibit L-2.
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based on legal requirements, tax considerations and local practices. As of  2003, the company’s benefit obliga-
tion was $509.4 million and plan assets were $327.2 million, and for the prior year, the benefit obligation 
was $397.2 million and plan assets were $219.6 million.
Primary Credit facility
As of  2003, the Company’s primary credit facilities consisted of  a $1.7 billion amended and restated 
credit facility, which will mature in 2006, and a $250 million revolving credit facility, which will mature 
in 2004. As of  2003, the Company had no borrowings outstanding under its primary credit facilities and 
$42.6 million committed under outstanding letters of  credit, resulting in more than $1.9 billion of  unused 
availability under its primary credit facilities. The Company pays a commitment fee on the $1.7 billion credit 
facility and the $250 million revolving credit facility of  0.30% per annum.
Guarantees and Covenants
The senior notes of  the Company are unsecured obligations and rank pari-passu134 in right of  payment 
with all of  the Company’s existing and future unsubordinated unsecured indebtedness. The Company’s obli-
gations under the senior notes are guaranteed, on a joint and several basis, by certain of  its significant subsid-
iaries, which are primarily domestic subsidiaries. The Company’s obligations under its primary credit facilities 
are guaranteed by the same subsidiaries that guarantee the Company’s obligations under the senior notes. The 
Company’s obligations under the primary credit facilities are also (and solely) secured by the pledge of  all or 
a portion of  the capital stock of  certain of  its significant subsidiaries.  In the event that any such subsidiary 
ceases to be a guarantor under the primary credit facilities, such subsidiary will be released as a guarantor of  
the senior notes.
The Company’s primary credit facilities contain numerous covenants relating to the maintenance of  cer-
tain financial ratios and to the management and operation of  the Company. The covenants include, among 
other restrictions, limitations on indebtedness, guarantees, mergers, acquisitions, fundamental corporate 
changes, asset sales, investments, loans and advances, liens, dividends and other stock payments, transactions 
with affiliates and optional payments and modification of  debt instruments.
134  Defined in Chapter 5.
2004  =  $85.9 million
2005  =  $65.1 million
2006  =  $81.7 million
2007  =  $43.1 million
Asset-Backed Securitization facility
The Company and several of  its U.S. subsidiaries sell certain accounts receivable to a wholly-owned, con-
solidated, bankruptcy-remote special purpose corporation (Lear ASC Corporation) under an asset-backed 
securitization facility (the “ABS facility”). In turn, Lear ASC Corporation transfers undivided interests in the 
receivables to bank sponsored commercial paper conduits. As of  2003, the ABS facility provides for maxi-
mum purchases of  adjusted accounts receivable of  $200 million.
The level of  funding utilized under this facility is based on the credit ratings of  the Company’s major 
customers, the level of  aggregate accounts receivable in a specific month, and the Company’s funding require-
ments. Should these customers experience reductions in their credit ratings, the Company may be unable or 
elect not to utilize the ABS facility in the future. Should this occur, the Company would utilize its primary 
credit facilities to replace the funding currently provided by the ABS facility.
The Company retains a subordinated ownership interest in the pool of  receivables sold to Lear ASC 
Corporation. As of  2003, accounts receivable totaling $671.1 million had been transferred to Lear ASC 
Corporation, and no undivided interests in the receivables were transferred to the conduits. As such, this 
amount is included in accounts receivable in the consolidated balance sheet as of  2003. As of  2002, accounts 
receivable totaling $636.6 million had been transferred to Lear ASC Corporation, including $447.6 million 
of  retained interests, which is included in accounts receivable in the consolidated balance sheet and serves as 
credit enhancement for the facility; and $189.0 million of  undivided interests, which was transferred to the 
conduits and is excluded from accounts receivable in the consolidated balance sheet.
Pension and Other Post-Retirement Benefit Plans
The Company has noncontributory defined benefit pension plans covering certain domestic employees 
and certain employees in foreign countries. In general, the Company’s policy is to fund its pension obligation 
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3. “Are there any issues of  operating concern in the financials?” Lear manages an astonishing 
inventory turnover (cost of  goods sold/inventory) of  26 times, which is multiples of  the 
industry’s experience. The primary explanation for this experience is the JIT ordering that 
is used throughout automobile manufacturing. This also explains the tighter profit margins 
than the industry (Exhibit L-1) and the lower requirement for balance sheet cash and inven-
tory as shown in the industry and company ratios (Exhibit L-3).
4. “Are there any non-operating concerns in the financials?” Goodwill is a substantial portion 
of  Lear’s total assets – about 35% – compared to the industry at about 3%. In the event of  
a bankruptcy, that is not a saleable asset under most circumstances. It is critical to limit any 
further increases in goodwill, and given the current magnitude of  goodwill, it would be ideal 
to set that amount as a cap and not allow further increases.
 As discussed in the balance sheet footnotes, there is a substantial amount of  unfunded pen-
sion obligations ($140 million in 2002).135 A requirement is desirable (subject to a waiver 
by the bank) for lenders to cap shortfalls at “X” dollars.
5. “Are there any other balance sheet concerns?” Operating lease obligations are substantial. 
Traditionally, many banks use EBIT coverage ratios, insisting that the borrower cover interest 
135  Section 9, “Pension and Other Postretirement Benefit Plans,” Lear Corporation, 10K, 2003, pages 51-54, at yahoo.brand.
edgar-online.com/displayfilinginfo.aspx?FilingID=2214089-218387-400836&type=sect&TabIndex=2&companyid=867
3&ppu=%252fDefault.aspx%253fcompanyid%253d8673%2526amp%253bformtypeID%253d7.
The senior notes also contain covenants restricting the ability of  the Company and its subsidiaries to 
incur liens and to enter into sale and leaseback transactions, and restricting the ability of  the Company to 
consolidate with, to merge with or into, or to sell or otherwise dispose of  all or substantially all of  its as-
sets. As of  2003, the Company was in compliance with all covenants and other requirements set forth in its 
primary credit facilities and senior notes.
The primary credit facility is guaranteed by certain of  its subsidiaries and is secured by the pledge of  
all or a portion of  the capital stock of  certain of  its significant subsidiaries. Pursuant to the terms of  the 
primary credit facility, the guarantees and stock pledges may be released, at its option, when and if  certain 
conditions are satisfied, including credit ratings at or above BBB- from Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services 
and at or above Baa3 from Moody’s Investors Service.
SuGGeSTeD SoluTIoNS
There are several questions that should be considered in the Lear case in constructing a credit 
agreement.
1. “Is this industry cyclical?” Lear sells to automobile companies that are decidedly cyclical 
in demand. Care must be taken to protect the bank in the event that the cyclicality is exac-
erbated and leads to a filing for bankruptcy protection. As a result, tight limits must be in 
place in the covenants of  any loan. See the discussion in the Chemical Companies case on 
derived demand.
2. “Are there quality assets on the balance sheet?” Ideally, a bank lender finds comfort that the 
borrower has quality assets in the event of  forced liquidation, one of  the most liquid and 
highly valuable of  which is accounts receivable. In this case, the Company has sold or secu-
ritized a substantial amount of  the accounts receivable. Two possible avenues in approaching 
this problem in a loan agreement are:
• to require the proceeds (or a portion thereof) from the sale of  the receivables to be used 
to pay down any outstandings under the credit agreement
• to limit how much of  receivables can be sold at any one time
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FLORIDA TURNPIKE
A NoTe oN ProJeCT fINANCe
The concept of  project finance involves lending for construction or improvements to long-term public 
infrastructure (such as roads and bridges), industrial projects and various services based upon a non-recourse 
or limited recourse structure. Debt and equity used to finance the construction or improvements are repaid 
from the resulting cash flows from the project. Unlike corporate finance cases where substantial analytical 
attention is paid to financial statement considerations including the income statement and balance sheet, the 
analytical focus is often confined solely to cash flows.
In the attached case study, a government entity, the Florida Turnpike Commission (the Turnpike), has 
decided to explore the temporary privatization of  service plazas. This is not an unusual activity today as the 
Chicago Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road have been privatized for periods of  time, reflecting the value 
that the private sector can deliver considering the huge demands on public sector resources.136 For example, 
in both of  these situations, substantial money was paid in advance to the City of  Chicago and to the State 
of  Indiana, monies that would not have been available if  the transactions had not been consummated. In 
Indiana’s situation, these monies were used to improve secondary roads throughout the state.
In a typical private public partnership in the U.S., the private sector manages, owns and maintains the 
operation (e.g., the service plazas in the Florida Turnpike case) through a so-called concession agreement. The 
assets are returned to government control at the end of  the concession term. Concession agreements provide 
a means for allowing a public infrastructure project to be placed into private hands for a limited period of  
136  For a discussion of  the Indiana Toll Road situation, see Andrew Bary, “The Long and Binding Road,” Barron’s, May 11, 
2009, at online.barrons.com/article/SB124183159872002803.html#articleTabs_panel_article%3D1.  The article notes 
other privatized highways and proposed privatizations in North America.
expense by two or more times. If  interest expense were, say $1,000, earnings before interest 
and taxes needs to be at a minimum $2,000.
 However, this covenant ignores operating lease expenses which in the Lear case are well over 
$100 million. Therefore, an EBIRT ratio is more appropriate. In this situation, operating 
leases (“rent”) are factored into coverage ratios, and the Company could be mandated to 
achieve a coverage ratio of  perhaps three times for interest and operating leases, so that if  
interest and operating lease expense combined is $200 million, earnings before interest, rent 
and taxes must be at least $400 million.
6. “Are subsidiary companies an issue?” As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, it is critical 
to have subsidiaries limited to the debt that they can manage, have subsidiaries guarantee the 
debt of  the parent or, ideally, limit subsidiary debt and have them guarantee the debt of  the 
parent (“upstream guarantees”). In the Lear case, not all subsidiaries currently guarantee the 
debt of  the parent, and an ideal approach would be to have all subsidiaries act as joint and 
several guarantors.
The term “joint and several” is essential as some subsidiaries may fail, but if  the obligations are “joint 
and several”, the solvent subsidiaries are responsible for guaranteeing all the debt of  the parent regardless of  
the insolvency of  some subsidiaries. Any debt that subsidiaries now have on their books should be capped, 
either at existing levels or limited to both a leverage test. There could also be an interest coverage or interest 
and rent coverage test.




BuSINeSS PlAN for THe ProJeCT
The Florida Turnpike is a 460 mile system of  toll roads including the Mainline from Miami to Central 
Florida, the Homestead Extension, the Sawgrass Expressway, the Seminole Expressway, the Beachline 
Expressway, the Southern Connector Extension of  Central Florida, the GreeneWay, the Western Beltway, 
the Veterans Expressway, the Suncoast Parkway and the Polk Parkway. On average, 1.8 million motorists use 
Florida’s Turnpike each day, making the Florida Turnpike one of  the nation’s busiest roads.
There are eight service plazas located along the Turnpike, spaced about 50 miles apart. All eight plazas 
are open 24 hours a day and located on the center median for access from both directions. They offer gas, 
travel and tourism information, food, picnic areas, gift shops and family-friendly restrooms. The full-service 
plazas (seven of  the eight plazas) feature coffee and donuts, fried chicken, hot dogs, sandwiches, ice cream and 
hamburgers.  In 2009, Areas U.S.A. signed a 30-year contract with the Turnpike for the operation of  food 
and retail concessions. The reconstruction and renovation of  six of  the service plazas began on November 1, 
2010, to be completed in 2012. The Okahumpka and Ft. Pierce plazas will begin reconstruction when the 
other plaza projects are complete. Renovation costs are estimated at $160 million.
Under the new agreement with Areas U.S.A., the Turnpike can receive a percentage of  revenues but is 
guaranteed a minimum level of  rents for the next 30 years. Along with the facilities improvements of  the 
plazas, significant changes are planned to enhance customer service and provide more options to the customer. 
Concession revenues, one of  the primary contributors to revenues, are enhanced by clean service plazas that 
are aesthetically pleasing, and by delivering excellent customer-centric service. During fiscal year 2010, food 
and service concession sales totaled $50.3 million with $9.0 million accruing to the Turnpike. For recent data 
on and forecasts of  future concession revenues, see Exhibits FL-1 and 2.
time. In contrast to a typical management agreement under which the government pays the operator a fixed 
fee for operations, a concession agreement allows the operator to keep the profits it generates by building and 
managing the project. 
The concessionaire incurs significant risks in the Florida Turnpike case, in that it assumes substantial 
debt. In exchange, the Turnpike allows the concessionaire the right to operate the concession freely during 
the life of  the agreement. The operator enters into the transaction on the assumption that debt will be repaid 
and the operator will achieve a satisfactory return. The Turnpike, after the expiration of  the concession agree-
ment, receives a fully functioning service plaza system which it may then run itself. Another option is to bid 
the management and operation of  the plazas in the hopes of  achieving substantial monies which can be put 
to use in other areas of  the administration of  Florida highways.
For the Florida Turnpike, the State plans to assist in the construction of  new and expanded service plazas 
through a substantial subsidy which is detailed in the case. During the period of  the concession (approxi-
mately ten years after completion of  the service plazas), the operator will manage and run the service plazas, 
repay the debt incurred, and achieve a satisfactory profit for the operator’s equity investors.
PurPoSe of THe CASe
Your Assignment: The Florida Turnpike, an agency of  the State of  Florida, has approached your bank to 
learn of  your possible interest in financing the renovation of  seven service plazas on the Turnpike. Construction 
will begin in November of  2010. You are an experienced lending officer employed by a large project finance 
bank, the Macquarie Group.137
Various issues should be resolved prior to a decision on your bank’s involvement. Can the project borrow 
at an acceptable rate of  interest? Can surplus monies be invested at a sufficiently attractive rate? How should 
these funds be invested? What would you do to improve this transaction? How do a longer loan period and/
or a bullet repayment affect the interests of  your bank? Will the transaction activity of  the Turnpike be suf-
ficient to meet revenue projections?
137 For a discussion of  Macquarie Bank’s role in project finance, see Bethany McLean, “Would You Buy a Bridge from This 
Man?” Fortune Magazine, Oct. 2, 2007, at money.cnn.com/2007/09/17/news/international/  macquarie_infrastructure_
funds.fortune/index.htm.




Toll revenues in 2011 are expected to grow slightly to $598 million. Beyond 2011, the Turnpike expects 
to see continual increases in toll revenues. Management believes the processes to estimate toll and conces-
sion revenues and develop the work program adequately consider the potential effects of  uncertain economic 
conditions.
TerMS of THe ProJeCT fINANCe ArrANGeMeNT
The drawdown of  funds for construction will be approximately $4.7 million a month while all seven 
service plazas are rebuilt concurrently, some being completed sooner than others, with the total construction 
period estimated at 24 to 30 months. The total contribution to be made by the Turnpike will be $63.8 mil-
lion, while the total cost of  the entire project is estimated at $200 million.
The Turnpike agency will provide a total subsidy to the project finance entity. It is assumed that the com-
pany that is chosen will establish a bankruptcy remote entity (Special Purpose Vehicle or “SPV”) that will 
be the borrower (the “Issuer”) of  record and that the cash flows from the project will be sufficient to repay 
the borrowings that are used to finance the construction and renovation of  the service plazas. The name of  
the SPV is Turnpike Plazas. It is proposed that $100 million of  the $136.2 million to be financed will be 
through a 12 year bullet loan.138
A total subsidy of  $63.8 million will be received after the construction period, with 95% paid upon 
completion of  each service plaza. The remaining 5% will be paid a year following completion of  the indi-
vidual plazas. This subsidy will be invested into a “reserve fund” which will be invested with A- rated (or 
higher rated) bank (or banks). The expectation is that the notes will yield a minimum of  100 basis points 
138 This type of  loan requires payment of  the entire loan principal (and sometimes the principal and interest) at the end of  the 
loan term.
The Turnpike system is geographically diverse, serving a large part of  the state with revenue generated 
from a varied customer base. Turnpike system toll revenues were $596.2 million for 2010, an increase of  
nearly $6 million, or one percent, from the preceding year. This modest increase is primarily due to early signs 
of  general economic recovery. However, with current unemployment rates at historic highs, a full recovery is 
yet to be realized. Nevertheless, Florida’s positive output growth for three consecutive quarters suggests that 
a self-sustaining recovery may be underway.
Although most financial analysts would concur that sales taxes, tolls for expressways and other usage taxes are 
less volatile than state income taxes, such taxes and usage fees are not immune from the impact of recessions. As 
seen in Exhibits FL-3 and FL-4, there has been considerable weakness in various population and economic trends, 
particularly in the past three years. Accordingly, any project finance evaluation must address a worst case scenario.




more than the fixed rate cost of  borrowing for the SPV. Accordingly, the gross yield on the monies invested in 
the reserve fund will be used to service the SPV’s debt, effectively reducing the cost of  the debt and assisting 
in the repayment of  the debt in full at the maturity of  the SPV’s own debt.
As stated above, construction for each plaza begins on November 2010 and completion is scheduled 
for November 2012 with the final 5% payment received by December 2012. Funding from the SPV will 
commence at the time of  construction with debt funding drawn down in five installments over a 12 month 
period, $12.5 million on November 2010, $12.5 million on February 2011, $12.5 million on May 2011, 
$12.5 million on August 2011 and $50 million on November 2011.
fINANCIAl STATeMeNTS AND CollATerAl
Attached to this case are projected cash flows; see Exhibit FL-5A/B/C. Per the discussion with interested 
lenders, the revenue assumptions given by you, after discussions with interested lenders, has been given a rev-
enue “haircut” of  15%. What this means is that despite your argument with interested potential lenders that 
the revenues initially projected were “rock solid”, the entire lending community spoke with a singular voice, 
“reduce the revenues by 15%”, and you reluctantly agreed to their ultimatum.




Some of  the issues that should be considered are the following:
• Can the project borrow at 100 basis points over a comparable 12 Year U.S. Treasury security? 
Is this likely? Why or why not? How would you ascertain if  this is likely or not?
• Surplus monies, i.e. the subsidies from the State, will be invested with banks rated A- or 
better at a yield 100 basis points higher than the interest rate cost for the SPV’s borrowings. 
How realistic is this?
• If  you accept that it is realistic, is depositing money with a bank (or banks) a good idea? 
Does it add risk or reduce risk to the transaction? Why or why not? How would you ascer-
tain if  this is likely or not? Would you be able to see from a rating agency (such as Moody’s 
or Standard & Poor’s) the spreads between an AA rated entity and a single A rated entity?
• If  we examine recent yields for ten year corporate bonds, we see that as of  early 2010 there 
is perhaps 100 basis points difference between AAA and AA corporate bonds, that is, if  a 
AAA trades at a 3% yield, perhaps 50 basis points over the ten year Treasury security, a AA 
rated bond might go for 100 basis points over the AAA corporate bond or 250 basis points 
over the Treasury bond. But the A rated bond is trading at perhaps 20 basis points over the 
AA corporate bond, so is this strategy effective? Even if  effective, does it reduce risk or add 
risk to the transaction?
• The projections do demonstrate the ability of  the project to repay the loan, i.e., the project 
has borrowed $100 million and you have cumulative cash flows of  $50.4 million and $63 
million in bank deposits.
• What would you do to improve this transaction? If  you accept the bank deposit strategy, 
would you agree to A- ratings? Would you agree if  the interest rates were not 100 basis points 
over your borrowing costs? Would you modify the agreement to stipulate that if  the spread 
is not 100 basis points, then subsidy payments must be used to say reduce outstandings?
• Are a longer tenure and a bullet repayment in your interest or in the interest of  the borrower?
As to collateral, lenders will be given a perfected security interest over the Florida Turnpike 
Concession Agreement and have the right to step in and reassign the Agreement in the event of  a default 
by the Issuer. The Agreement will also allow for pre-payment through a “make whole” call provision. 
This type of  provision is frequently found in private placement financing, allowing the borrower to 
pre-pay its debt prior to the scheduled maturity. The pre-payment is tied to a net present value (NPV) 
formula.
For example, this transaction involves a 12 year bullet repayment with semi-annual interest payments, 
and is priced at 100 basis points over a comparable 12 year U.S. Treasury bond. The make-whole payment 
calls for the borrower to repay the bond at a price that discounts the semi-annual interest payments and the 
bullet repayment at the then prevailing U.S. Treasury comparable maturity, plus, in this case, 25 basis points, 
a spread well below the contractual 100 basis points.
Assume that two years into the deal, interest rates have dropped sharply with U.S. Treasuries yielding 
2%, down from 3% at date of  issuance. As the existing interest payments on the U.S. Treasury comparable 
bond are $1.5 million payable semi-annually (or $3 million a year), the present value of  $3 million a year 
for ten more years is approximately $24 million. Add to that the present value of  the principal due ($100 
million), approximately $85 million, the pre-payment would be $109 million. This type of  call provision, 
a make-whole call, does not motivate pre-payments. In effect, it strongly discourages pre-payments due to a 
significant pre-payment penalty.
leNDING ProPoSAl CoMPoNeNTS
In developing your proposal, the borrower suggests only one financial covenant: a debt service coverage 
ratio of  1.5 times effective in year 3 and for all years thereafter. The debt service coverage ratio takes EBITDA 
and divides by gross interest expense. Even with the worst case projections, the borrower easily meets that 
threshold.
As one of  the proposed lenders, consider the merits of  this transaction and delineate any risks that you 
perceive in your response. Would there be a better way to structure this transaction and, if  so, what would it 
be? Would you propose additional covenants and, if  so, what would they be?




4. Lenders should limit or prohibit dividends from the sponsor to its parent (the Turnpike) or 
shareholders until the loan is fully repaid.
5. Lenders may want to insert a capital call should projections not be realized; this is particu-
larly useful if  the sponsor’s parent is a financially strong entity.
In addition to having the concession agreement assigned to the lender or lenders, pledges may be asked 
of  any monies deposited with other banks and assignment of  any insurance proceeds.
SuGGeSTeD SoluTIoNS
An analysis of  default rates calculated by rating agencies indicates that one key factor dominates all oth-
ers: defaults increase over time. For example, a Single A rated obligation in year 1 has a default rate close to 
zero, i.e., 0.2%, but by year 5 the default rate on bonds initially rated A climbs to 0.4% and would escalate 
further over time. Accordingly, a long-term bullet loan, that is, loans where repayment is done at the final 
maturity, is a high risk loan. In the case of  the Florida Turnpike, the loan is due at the final maturity, and there 
is no amortization over the life of  the loan. Statistically, this is not wise.
Second, there is a risk inherent in constructing and building gasoline and food toll plazas, in that use 
of  these facilities and the revenues received may be mediocre during an economic recession. As is shown in 
Exhibit FL-3, traffic on the Turnpike has experienced a 5.8% annual growth rate during the past decade, but 
a negative growth since 2007 due to the economic recession. Is it wise to add additional risk in the form of  
“A” rated banks to the lending agreement? The authors think not.
Third, is it reasonable to expect a wide spread between banks rated in the A to A- category and a project 
finance deal, totally dependent on cash flows. In the opinion of  the authors, the spread would either not exist 
or would, at best, be very marginal, perhaps five bp at current interest rates. Therefore, why introduce additional 
risk? However, the key is to demand principal repayments as cash flows are generated rather than a bullet loan.
The loan should be granted, as cumulative cash flows total $50.4 million combined with the $63.0 
million in surplus monies provided by the state will allow it to be repaid. As to key covenants, the following 
should be included:
1. There should not be offsetting deposits with banks; instead, the loan must have periodic 
amortization.
2. Lenders must be allowed to replace the special purpose entity (SPV) in running the opera-
tion if  there is a payment default.
3. Lenders should see regularly scheduled progress reports on the status of  construction proj-
ects. In addition, the bank could require a covenant that construction should be in accor-
dance with approved project plans and not to be altered without the consent of  the lender.
GLOSSARY OF 
TERMS RELATING TO 
CORPORATE LENDING
A
Aging schedule:  Shows the quality of  a company’s receivables by listing the amount of  outstanding invoices 
by groupings of  days.
Altman’s Z-score: A credit analysis technique that uses various corporate income statement and balance 
sheet values to evaluate a borrower’s financial condition and likelihood of  bankruptcy. The Z-score is a linear 
combination of  business ratios, weighted by coefficients and then collecting a sample of  ongoing businesses, 
matched by industry and size.
Asset-based financing (or lending): A method of  lending for rapidly growing and cash-strapped companies 
to meet their short-term cash needs; current assets (accounts receivable or inventory) are pledged as collateral.
B
Bank examiner: A public official appointed by the Federal Reserve to inspect and audit the operations and 
accounts of  banks in the examiner’s Federal Reserve district.
Bank loan covenant: Restrictions established by lenders on corporate borrowers that apply to lines of  credit 
and other types of  credit agreements that requiring a certain level of  performance.
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Benchmark rate: An interest rate that is used as a reference rate to which a incremental rate is added or 
subtracted to establish a borrower’s rate for a loan. The most commonly-used rates are Federal (Fed) funds, 
LIBOR and the prime rate.
Business risk: The possibility that the national or global economy will enter into a recession, resulting in 
reduced loan demand and a weakening of  the position of  borrowers and depositors.
C
Calling, the process of:  An organized attempt by a bank to secure new corporate clients (or keep existing 
clients) by repeated efforts at getting “face time” with senior financial managers. The calling effort involves 
asking questions about existing services that are used, the level of  satisfaction with current providers, and 
future plans that might involve the bank’s expertise.
CAMELS rating: A ratings system that assigns numerical grades to a bank based on examiner judgment re-
garding the following criteria: capital adequacy, asset condition, management quality, earnings, liquidity and 
market risk sensitivity.
Capital adequacy: A measure of  the financial strength of  a bank or securities firm, usually expressed as a ratio 
of  its capital to its assets. The Basel Capital Accords require banks to have capital equal to a minimum of  8 
per cent of  their assets. Also, see “Basel 2”.
Capital rationing: The limitation of  a company’s new investments, either by setting a cap on the capital bud-
get or by using a threshold cost of  capital when weighing the merits of  potential investments. This process is 
often used when a company has a greater number of  acceptable projects than capital to invest.
Capital risk: The possibility that the losses of  a bank or its corporate customers will erode a bank’s capital, 
causing it to fail.
Cash flow statement (analysis): A display of  the cash inflows and outflows of  a business. Cash flow analysis 
is used by a lender to evaluate the ability of  a business to repay its obligations. Previously known as a sources 
and uses statement.
Collateral: An asset pledged as security for the repayment of  a loan.
Bank position limit: The maximum allowable credit exposure to any single borrower, industry, geographic 
location or other customer classification. Many banks limit exposure to a single customer to ten percent of  
total loans and leases, with industry limits of  fifteen to twenty percent.
Bank relationship management: A “partnership” between a bank and a company established for the purpose 
of  selecting and using credit and non-credit services. Bank relationship management involves the marketing 
of  a financial institution by a relationship manager or calling officer who attempts to meet a company’s needs 
with a complete package of  financial offerings.
Bank stress test: An analysis conducted under unfavorable economic scenarios designed to determine whether 
a bank has enough capital to withstand the impact of  adverse conditions. Stress tests focus on a few key fac-
tors – such as credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk – that could affect a bank’s financial health in crisis 
situations.
Basel Accords: Two agreements and a third proposed agreement on the capital requirements of  global banks; 
developed to provide some protection against illiquidity or failure
Basel 1: The first international agreement on minimum capital requirements for global banks, ap-
proved in Basel, Switzerland, in 1988. The original signatories were the U.S., Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and Luxembourg.
Basel 2: The second of  the Basel Accords, which are recommendations on banking laws and regula-
tions issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The purpose is to create international 
standards that banking regulators can use regarding the amount and types of  capital banks must 
maintain.
Basel 3: Draft Basel 3 regulations developed as the result of  the credit crisis that began in 2008; 
involve increased common equity with banks required to hold 4.5% by 2015, then a further 2.5%, 
totaling 7%; the introduction of  a debt leverage ratio requirement; and other measures to prevent a 
global financial system collapse.
Basis point (bp): A market abbreviation for 1/100th of  1%, usually used in conjunction with comparisons 
of  interest rates.
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and establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to supervise the practices of  
accountants and auditors.
Correspondent banking: A system of  relationships among banks that facilitates the exchange of  essential ac-
tivities such as check clearing, the loan of  Fed funds, and services not provided by smaller banks but required 
by corporate customers (e.g., foreign exchange).
Cost of  capital (weighted average cost of  capital or WACC): The weighted average of  a firm’s cost of  debt 
(after tax) and cost of  equity (common stock and retained earnings). The WACC is expressed as a percentage.
Credit agreement: A commitment letter or contract in which a financial institution agrees to lend money to 
a corporate borrower. The company promises to repay the loan, with interest, in regular installments (usually 
monthly). The credit agreement contains all the terms and conditions of  the loan, as well as the customer’s 
rights and responsibilities with respect to the loan.
Credit analysis: The process of  evaluating an applicant’s loan request or a corporation’s debt issue in order to 
determine the likelihood that the borrower will live up to his/her obligations.
  Credit analysis systems: Statistical or quantitative models that attempt to predict the likelihood that 
a firm will face financial distress or enter bankruptcy during the period of  the loan; for example, see 
the definition of  Altman’s Z-score.
Credit derivatives: Financial contracts designed to hedge a portion of  a bank’s assets against defaults on its 
loan or securities portfolio.
Credit risk: The possibility that the issuer of  a loan or a security will default on promised payments of  inter-
est and/or principal.
Credit union: A financial cooperative created for and by its members who are its depositors, borrowers, and 
shareholders. Operated on non-profit basis, credit unions offer many banking services, such as consumer and 
commercial loans (usually at lower than market interest rates), time deposits (usually at higher than market 
interest rates), credit cards, and guaranties.
Commercial and industrial loan (C&I): Bank lending to businesses is referred to as C&I loans and is used 
for working capital requirements and longer-term capital investments.
Commercial finance: A secured business loan in which the borrower pledges as collateral any assets (equip-
ment or receivables) used in the conduct of  a business.
Commercial paper:  A negotiable, discount note issued by investment grade issuers on an unsecured basis for 
up to a nine-month maturity.  The yield on commercial paper normally exceeds the yield on U.S. Treasury 
Bills by 30-50 basis points because of  the risk of  default.
Common size financial statement: A process of  balance sheet and income statement analysis in which each 
financial item is expressed as a percentage of  the total of  assets, liabilities and owners’ equity, or sales amount 
for easy comparison with its industry.
Community bank: A commercial bank that is owned and operated in the local community. These financial 
institutions do not have a national or regional presence, and are typically used for home mortgages and small 
business loans.
Compliance risk: Uncertainty as to whether a financial institution in engaging in behavior inconsistent with 
existing laws and regulations.
Comptroller of  the Currency (OCC): The agency within the U.S. Treasury that awards charters for national 
banks and supervises all national banks.
Construction lending: Any loan where the proceeds are used to finance construction or land development.
Core (bank) deposits: A stable base of  deposited funds provided by households and small businesses that 
remain in a bank regardless of  interest rate movements or other exogenous circumstances (other than a threat 
to the solvency of  the institution).
Corporate governance: A term associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2002 that prohibits a public 
company from knowingly making false or misleading statements, requires various internal control procedures 
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Federal (fed) funds: The rate that commercial banks charge each other for overnight loans. The fed funds 
market is managed through the Federal Reserve System. Fed funds are a base rate (or benchmark rate) for 
loans to companies in the U.S. See, also, LIBOR.
Federal Reserve System: The American central bank created by Congress in 1913 to act as a lender of  last 
resort to member commercial banks and to control the money supply and short-term interest rates.
Financial leverage: The degree to which borrowed money is utilized to increase volumes in production, sales 
and earnings; generally, the higher the amount of  debt, the greater the financial leverage.
Foreign exchange risk: Exposure to possible loss due to adverse movements in currency rates; may be hedged 
using forwards and futures contracts.
Forward (or futures) contract: An agreement between a company and a bank (forwards) or a commodities 
exchange (futures) to provide an amount of  foreign currency at a specific price and future date. This enables 
a company requiring foreign currency to hedge against an adverse move in the price of  that currency versus 
the company’s home currency.
Franchising: A business relationship in which a franchisor provides a license to the franchisee to do business 
and offers assistance in organizing, training, marketing and managing in return for a monetary consideration. 
A franchisee pays an initial fee and ongoing royalties to a franchisor; in return, the franchisee gains the use 
of  a trademark, ongoing support from the franchisor, and the right to use the franchisor’s system of  doing 
business and sell its products or services.
G
Goodwill: An account that is found in the assets portion of  a company’s balance sheet. Goodwill arises when 
one company (or a portion  of  a company) is purchased by another company. In an acquisition, the amount 
paid for the company over book value accounts for the firm’s intangible assets.
I
Inflation risk: The possibility that the cost of  materials, labor and/or money will rise or that the value of  
assets will erode due to a general rise in the level of  prices.
Criminal risk: The danger of  a felony or misdemeanor committed against a bank, such as fraud, embezzle-
ment, robbery, wire fraud, or other acts that result in a loss.
D
Demand deposit: A checking account in a bank that allows withdrawal by the depositor on demand 
(immediately).
Derived demand: Demand derived from another source. Of  particular importance in industrial markets 
which are largely dependent on consumer demand.
Dilutive (or dilution): A term usually applied to the impact of  a merger and/or acquisition (M&A) on a 
company’s earnings, when new shares are issued that reduce earnings per share (EPS). A similar effect occurs 
to ownership when new shares reduce the position of  existing stockholders. The opposite result is known as 
accretive (or accretion), when EPS or existing stockholders are improved by the issuance of  shares to finance 
an M&A transaction.
e
EBIRT: Earnings before taxes and interest, adding back operating lease expense or “rent”.
EBIT: Earnings before interest and taxes. A measure of  a company’s earnings from ongoing operations, equal 
to earnings before deduction of  interest payments and income taxes.
EBITDAR: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and rent. A measure of  a company’s 
operating cash flow based on data from the company’s income statement. Calculated from earnings before the 
deduction of  interest expenses, taxes, depreciation, amortization, and rent.
Economies of  scale and scope: Cost savings due to efficient economic size (scale) or diversification of  prod-
ucts or services offered (scope).
f
Factoring: The sale of  or borrowing against accounts receivable to raise working capital.
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Loan commitment: A bank’s promise to provide credit to a company at a future time provided certain condi-
tions are met.
Loan covenants: Requirements in lending agreements for specified levels of  performance by borrowers. 
Positive covenants state the levels that must be met or exceeded; negative covenants specify actions that the 
company may not take.
Loan documentation: Data required from a company by a bank in support of  a lending decision. Example of  
typical documentation include the loan application, articles of  incorporation or partnership, audited financial 
statements and tax returns, a cash budget, and banking references.
Loan origination fee: The process by which a company applies for a new loan and a lender processes that 
application, including all of  the steps from taking a loan application through the disbursal of  funds. An 
origination fee is paid for these services, varying from 50 bp to 200 bp of  the loan amount.
Loan participation: An agreement by a lender to share a large loan with other banks in order to provide the 
required amount of  funds and to reduce each lender’s risk.
Loan sales: A sale by a bank under contract of  all or a portion of  the cash stream from a specific loan, thereby 
removing the loan from the bank’s balance sheet.
Loan securitization: A process in structured finance that manages risk by pooling assets (loans) and then is-
suing securities backed by the assets and their cash flows.
Loan syndications: A practice in which several banks cooperatively lend an amount of  money to a borrower 
at the same time and for the same purpose. Bank syndicates usually only lend large amounts of  money that 
an individual bank could not manage to lend.
Loan workout: A series of  steps taken by a lender with a borrower to resolve the problem of  delinquent loan 
payments. These actions can include rescheduling loan payments into lower installments over a longer period 
of  time so that the entire outstanding principal is eventually repaid.
Intangible Asset: With goodwill, intangible assets are defined as identifiable non-financial assets that cannot 
be seen, touched or physically measured, which have been created through human effort and are identifiable as 
a discrete asset. The forms of  intangible assets are legal intangibles (such as trade secrets, copyrights, patents, 
and trademarks), and competitive intangibles (such as knowledge activities, collaboration activities, leverage 
activities and structural activities).
Interest, fixed rate: A rate that, once established, does not vary according to fluctuations in the prime lending 
rate. A variable interest rate may increase or decrease with changes in financial market conditions.  
Interest rate spread: The difference between rates paid to depositors and the rates charged to borrowers
Intermediation, financial: The process by which the financial industry manages liquidity in the economy, 
taking savings and investments from institutions and individuals and allocating it in the form of  credit to 
institutions and individuals.
Investment banking: The banking activity that includes the underwriting of  debt and equity securities in 
order to raise capital for a company. These services were effectively restricted to securities firms from the 
Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 until the passage of  the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of  1999.
l
Lending philosophy: An attitude to corporate lending established as the initial step in the development of  
a bank’s credit function. The three approaches in general use today – values, profits and market share – are 
driven by time horizon perspectives.
LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate): The rate on Eurodollar deposits that is used as a basis (or bench-
mark) for loan rate quotes to companies. Used predominantly outside of  the U.S. See, also, Federal funds.
Line of  credit (credit line): A prearranged amount of  credit a bank will extend to a company over a specified 
period of  time, usually one year.
Liquidity: The cash used in a normal business environment, including operating cash flow, as well as short-
term investments and credit sources.
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Portfolio risk diversification: A term developed from modern investment theory, this concept is often ap-
plied to a large company or financial institution. It involves the management of  business risk by having various 
unrelated or marginally related business sectors to smooth the possibility of  a significant loss from any one 
sector.
Prime rate: A lending rate established by commercial banks based on Federal funds; often used to price loans 
for middle market and small business corporate customers.
Pro forma statement: A financial analysis prepared on the basis of  assumptions of  future events which affect 
the expected condition of  the company as a result of  those events or actions. For example, assumptions as to 
future sales levels generally enable a company to project anticipated income.
Project finance:  The financing of  long-term infrastructure (such as roads and bridges), industrial projects 
and various public services based upon a non-recourse or limited recourse structure. Project debt and equity 
used to finance the project are repaid from the cash flows generated by the project.
Q
Quantitative finance: The application of  sophisticated mathematical equations to model the risk of  a par-
ticular class of  securities in order to create new and exotic financial instruments.
r
Ratio analysis: A technique that places financial statement data in a numerator and in a denominator to al-
low the calculation of  a quotient. The result can be used to provide critical information about a company to 
bankers as well as to financial managers and other interested parties. There are four sets of  ratios: liquidity, 
activity utilization, leverage and profitability.
Regional bank: A midsized depository institution that is larger than a community bank, but smaller than a 
large money center bank.
Regulators, U.S. banking: The principal regulators are Office of  the Comptroller of  the Currency (OCC), 
the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
M
Market risk: The possibility of  loss due to the forced sale of  a bank’s own assets or of  a borrower’s collateral 
due to a default.
Material adverse change:  A provision often found in financing agreements (and merger and acquisition 
contracts) that enables the lender to refuse to complete the financing if  the borrower suffers such a change. 
The rationale is to protect the lender from major adverse events that make the borrower a less attractive client.
Mezzanine financing: A subordinated (junior) loan that represents a claim on a company’s assets that is se-
nior only to that of  a company’s common stock. This form of  borrowing is often used by small companies 
and may involve additional risk for which a high yield is demanded by the lender.
Money center bank: A term that describes the largest financial services firms. Characteristics include a very 
large balance sheet (perhaps $100 billion or more), and involvement in all types of  commercial lending and 
related services in domestic and international markets.
Money-market mutual funds (MMMFs): Pools of  various types of  short-term investments that offer shares 
to corporate (and individual) investors through of  mutual funds.
o
Off-balance sheet obligation: A commitment by a company to honor debts that are not recorded on the 
balance sheet but may be construed as a moral or legal responsibility , including leases, contingent liabilities, 
unused lines of  credit, and special purpose entities (SPEs).
Operational (transaction) risk: The possibility of  failures or problems with a bank’s computer systems, 
other processing capabilities, management or employee errors, or natural disasters.
P
Pledged collateral: An asset pledged as security for the repayment of  a loan that can be seized and sold 
should the borrower default.
Handbook of Corporate Lending: A GuIDe for BANkerS AND fINANCIAl MANAGerS
258
GloSSArY of TerMS relATING To CorPorATe leNDING
259
S
Securitization: A structured finance process that distributes risk by aggregating debt instruments in a pool, 
then issues securities backed by the pool.
Scenario analysis: The forecast of  financial results derived from the application of  probabilities to different 
outcomes of  future events. It is customary to develop at least three “cases”: a most likely case, a worst case, 
and a best case scenario.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): A regulatory organization established in 1934 to supervise the 
activities of  public companies. Among its requirements are periodic reports to the Commission and the filing 
of  a registration statement prior to the issuance of  a new security.
Securitization: Securities issued against a pool of  similar, income-producing loans such as mortgages. These 
securities are often purchased by institutional investors seeking a steady stream of  earnings.
Sources and uses statement: See cash flow statement (analysis).
Sovereign risk: The possibility of  loss due to adverse actions by a foreign government affecting investments 
or loans made in a country. Such actions could include expropriation, freezing of  assets, currency controls, 
laws aimed at favoring local businesses, tax changes or harassment of  foreign national employees.
Swap: An exchange of  similar assets for others with more desirable characteristics. In corporate lending, 
interest-rate swaps are transfers of  variable-rate for fixed-rate loans (or vice-versa) to reduce borrowing costs, 
guarantee a specific interest cost and/or match funds flows.
Sweat equity: The effort to build a company by hard work for small or no compensation but slight invest-
ment of  capital. This term is often associated with angel investors, who act to support new businesses with 
financial capital at slight or even no expectation of  monetary reward.
Regulatory arbitrage: A technique of  evading potentially harsh regulation by changing regulators when there 
are perceived differences in two or more markets among these bodies.
Relationship management:  See Bank relationship management.
Repurchase agreement (repo): A form of  short-term borrowing for dealers in government securities used 
to finance their inventories. The dealer sells these securities to investors, nearly always on an overnight basis, 
with a guarantee to buy them back the following day. The investor earns one day of  interest on each repo 
transaction.
Reputational risk: The uncertainty of  loss associated with adverse publicity or negative opinion regarding a 
bank’s behavior toward its customers or the community.
Restrictive covenants: The section of  a loan agreement that specifies the actions that the borrower must 
(positive covenants) or must not (negative covenants) take in order for the loan to continue.
Revolving credit agreements (revolvers): Loans written by banks to corporations for periods longer than 
one year and lasting for up to five years.
RFP process (request-for-proposal): A formal document soliciting responses to specific questions asked in 
considering a purchase of  services by a company. A statement is provided regarding the specific requirements 
to be addressed by the proposal, including the timing of  the selection process and the qualifications of  the 
bidder.
Risk: In general, the possibility of  an adverse event(s) that causes an unforeseen loss. Possible loss situa-
tions that apply to corporate lending include those relating to business, capital, compliance, credit, criminal, 
foreign exchange, inflation, market, operations (transaction), portfolio, reputation and sovereign (country) 
risks.  (See specific risks for definitions.) Various risk management techniques are available to mitigate adverse 
consequences; see, for example, value-at-risk.
Road show, financial: Promotional presentations by a corporate issuer of  securities and its lead underwriters 
to potential institutional investors and other underwriters about the desirable qualities of  the investments.
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Venture capital: A financing source for new, usually high-risk businesses usually provided by private equity 
firms that expect to receive a significant portion of  equity in return for financial capital.
W
Working capital: In finance, the operational position of  a company measured as current assets less current 
liabilities.
Y
Yield curve: A graphic display of  interest rates of  various maturities at a given moment in time. The shape 
of  the yield curve is considered as the market’s expectation of  future inflation, with a normal or rising curve 
a forecast of  future inflation. A flat yield curve would indicate an absence of  expectations for inflation.
Yield-to-maturity: The true yield from a debt security; measured by forcing the current price of  the secu-
rity to equal the present value of  all future interest payments and the repayment of  the amount lent (the 
principal).
T
Term loan: A loan that matures in a period of  up to five years, and is used for capital investments or a per-
manent increase in working capital. There are variations in these loans structured for the convenience of  the 
borrower.
Time deposit: Interest-bearing depository accounts in a bank, often known as savings accounts or certificates 
of  deposit (CDs). Early withdrawal usually carries a penalty in the form of  a reduction in interest paid.
Tranches: Various components of  a loan or investment based on maturity and risk category; from the word 
for “slice” in French.
Treasury management services: Previously known as cash management, non-credit services offered by banks 
and vendors to improve the cash collections, concentration and disbursement activities of  a company. More 
efficient processes lead to higher levels of  investable funds and reduced borrowing requirements.
Treasury securities (U.S. Treasury securities): Debt obligations of  the U.S. with varying maturities: bills, up 
to one year; notes, one to ten years; bonds, ten years and greater. Treasuries are backed by the full faith and 
credit of  the government.
Tying arrangement: A requirement by a vendor (such as a bank) that a buyer (such as a company) purchases 
certain ancillary products in order to be allowed to acquire the desired product; generally made illegal by the 
Clayton Act of  1914.
u
Underwriting: The purchase and resale of  securities issued by companies that requires financing; the under-
writer guarantees the funds to the issuer in return for an underwriting fee.
V
Value-at-Risk (VaR): A risk management procedure that uses statistics to measure the maximum risk expo-
sure of  a portfolio of  assets, subject to a specified level of  probability.
